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  • WHO risk assessment (monthly)

    ## WHO ignores the risk from lab-escapes or human(e.g. "terrorist") deliberately
    ## created and released viruses
    ## so presumably they consider that risk smaller than the ones that they mention





    WHO May.10.2013 on H7N9 : The risk has not changed since Apr.13
    WHO,Apr.26.2013 on H5N1 : Therefore, the public health risk remains unchanged.
    WHO,Apr.13.2013,H7N9
    What is the risk of the occurrence of further cases in the affected areas of China and other areas?
    The epidemiology of this virus among animals, including the main reservoirs of infection among
    animals and the extent of geographic spread, is not yet established. However, it is likely that most
    human H7N9 infections so far are associated with infection among as-of-yet undetermined animals
    and that further human cases of infection should be expected.
    What is the risk of human-to-human transmission?
    There is no evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission. However the two possible family
    clusters suggest that limited human-to-human transmission may occur where there is close contact
    between cases and other individuals, as occurs in families and, potentially, healthcare settings.
    Moreover, the genetic changes seen among these viruses suggesting adaptation to mammals is of
    concern, and further adaptation may occur.
    What is the risk of international spread?
    At this time, there is no information to indicate international spread of this virus. However, it is
    possible that an infected person, who may or may not have symptoms, could travel to another
    country. However, if the virus cannot sustain human-to-human transmission, as appears to be the
    current situation, then extensive community spread is unlikely
    WHO,Mar.12.2013,H5N1,unchanged
    WHO,Feb.15,2013,H5N1,unchanged
    WHO,Jan.16.2013,H5N1,unchanged
    WHO,Dec.17.2012,H5N1,unchanged
    WHO,05.Nov.2012,H5N1,unchanged
    WHO,01.Oct.2012 ,H5N1, unchanged.
    10 September 2012
    Public health risk assessment for avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses: The public health risk for the virus
    remain unchanged.
    10 August 2012
    Overall public health risk assessment for avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses: Two sporadic human cases
    reported this month in a country with known endemic influenza A(H5N1) virus circulation in poultry is
    within the expected range. From the data available, there is no evidence of onward sustained human
    to human transmission at this time hence the public health risk for the virus remains unchanged.
    25 June 2012
    Overall public health risk assessment: Based on previous years observations, a decrease in reported
    events in poultry is expected for this time of year. One sporadic case reported this month in the
    country with known influenza A(H5N1) virus circulation in poultry is within the expected range. From
    the data available there is no risk of onward sustained human to human transmission.
    04 June 2012
    Overall public health risk assessment: A decrease in reported events in poultry is expected for this
    time of year. Two sporadic cases reported this month in countries with known influenza A(H5N1)
    circulation in poultry are within the expected range. These sporadic cases do not appear to have
    features that would raise concern regarding onward sustained human to human transmission.
    07 May 2012
    Overall public health risk assessment: Poultry outbreaks and sporadic human cases and small clusters
    would be expected at this time of year. These sporadic cases do not appear to have features that
    would raise concern regarding onward sustained human to human transmission.
    02 April 2012
    Overall public health risk assessment: Poultry outbreaks and sporadic human cases and small clusters
    would be expected at this time of year. These sporadic cases do not appear to have features that
    would raise concern regarding onward sustained human to human transmission.
    05 March 2012
    Overall public health risk assessment: an increase in poultry outbreaks and sporadic human cases and
    small clusters would be expected at this time of year. Further investigations around the mild cases
    detected in Bangladesh are awaited to define public health risk
    06 February 2012
    Overall public health risk assessment: an increase in poultry outbreaks and sporadic human cases and
    small clusters would be expected at this time of year. No further spread has apparently occurred;
    therefore the risk to public health has not changed from what would be expected this time of year.
    09 January 2012
    Epidemiologic investigations have identified only limited human‐to‐human transmission of this virus since its
    emergence in 2003, and no community‐level transmission has been noted. Therefore, the sporadic cases and
    small clusters being reported are not considered unusual and are not thought to indicate any increase in
    public health risk. As well, recent reported evolution of the H5N1 virus is not thought to indicate any increase
    in public health risk3.
    05 December 2011
    Therefore, the sporadic cases
    and small clusters being reported are not considered unusual and are not thought to indicate any
    increase in public health risk. As well, recent reported evolution of the H5N1 virus is not thought to
    indicate any increase in public health risk3.
    07 November 2011
    03 October 2011
    05 September 2011
    30 August 2011
    Evolution of H5N1 avian influenza virus does not increase risk to public health
    WHO closely monitors the evolution of influenza viruses and is aware of recent reports of an H5N1 virus
    (described as H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1) circulating in poultry in parts of Asia. Based on available information,
    # this evolution of the H5N1 virus poses no increased risk to public health. It is not considered unusual
    because influenza viruses are constantly evolving, especially in areas where they circulate regularly in
    poultry. The WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System, the group of experts that studies
    animal and human influenza viruses that may impact human health, recognized this new clade in February
    2011.WHO also routinely assesses the public health risk from all animal influenza viruses. Based on available
    information, the identification of this newly-reported H5N1 virus clade does not change the current public
    health implications of the H5N1 avian influenza viruses for humans. Human cases of H5N1 infection remain
    rare and sporadic events, occurring mostly in areas where H5N1 viruses circulate regularly in poultry.
    Human cases could occur wherever the viruses are present in poultry and when humans might be exposed
    to infected birds or contaminated environments.
    03 August 2011
    04 July 2011
    17 June 2011 Low pathogenicity H7 viruses are also currently circulating in poultry in
    Europe and China. These viruses likely do not pose a significant risk to public health
    currently, but warrant consistent monitoring and control in animal populations.
    I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
    my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

  • #2
    Ecdc:



    more than 3000 contacts of the cases were traced, which did not lead to the detection of
    additional laboratory-confirmed cases
    In China, many samples from birds were tested but less than 1% were positive
    National authorities should make preparations for the occurrence of confirmed
    cases in the EU/EEA Member States;
    (as of 6 May
    2013) and focuses on developments after the publication of ECDC?s Rapid Risk
    Assessment of 3 April 2013 [1], updated 12 April 2013 [2].
    Close to 3000 contacts have been followed-up and only four are reported to have
    developed symptoms,
    As of April 26, national and provincial avian influenza
    reference laboratories in China have collected 390 628 samples for virus testing from 13 014 surveillance sites
    around the country, including 2 587 live-poultry markets, 337 poultry slaughterhouses, 8 808 poultry farms, 341
    wild birds habitats, 277 pig slaughterhouses, 31 pig farms, and 633 other sampling spots. It is reported that
    218 897 samples were tested, including 150 837 serology samples and 68 060 pathology samples. Of the 68 060
    samples, only 46 tested positive for the virus, resulting in a positive rate of 0.07% [22].

    Of those animals tested positive, almost all (44) were from 14 live-poultry markets

    The risk of the disease spreading to Europe via humans in the near future is considered low

    It is also likely that ? as in the Jiangsu-to-Taiwan case ? there
    will eventually be laboratory-confirmed cases in the EU

    There is insufficient evidence to quantify the risk of A(H7N9) developing into a virus that transmits from human to
    human. Close monitoring of the outbreak epidemiology, clinical features and the viruses? genetic variation over
    time will be critical for assessing this risk; instruments like the Influenza Risk Assessment tool can be used for this
    task [61, 62]. However, that risk is certainly not zero.

    The risk of the A(H7N9) virus arriving in Europe with migratory birds cannot be quantified at this time

    The
    hypothesis that poultry in the affected area have been infected by wild birds has not been confirmed
    I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
    my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: WHO risk assessment (monthly)

      WHO,2014/01/24, http://www.who.int/influenza/human_a...4January14.pdf
      H5N1:the risk of community-level spread of this virus remains low
      H7N9:no identifyable risk statement
      H9N2:This virus does not seem to transmit easily between humans and tends to result in mild
      clinical disease, therefore the current likelihood of community-level spread and public health
      impact of this virus is considered low.

      ECDC,2014/01/27: http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publica...nuary-2014.pdf

      my snippets from it:
      Further information about influenza A(H7N9) detections in China can be
      found at the Global Animal Disease Information System EMPRES-i [30].
      30. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (EGADIS). Low pathogenic avian influenza –
      H7N9 12/01/2014 – China 2014. Available from: http://empres-i.fao.org/eipws3g/#h=0.
      intravenous pathogenicity index
      Currently, the most likely scenario in China, and therefore worldwide, is that this event remains
      a localised, widespread zoonotic outbreak in which the virus is transmitted sporadically to humans
      in close contact with the animal reservoir. However, with the regular influenza season now ongoing
      in southern China and elsewhere in the northern hemisphere there is a potential risk for co-infections
      and the development of new reassortants with the possibility of increased capacity to transmit among
      human populations.
      Chinese New Year, which falls on 31 January this year, will dramatically increase the potential
      for human exposure to both A(H7N9) and seasonal influenza viruses, increasing the risk of
      reassortment in humans
      Considering the spread of influenza A(H5N1) over national and geographic borders in and outside Asia,
      it is nothing short of surprising that neighbouring Asian countries have not reported more cases of
      influenza A(H7N9). It is possible that additional countries will be affected in the coming months.
      The current influenza A(H7N9) viruses are considered to have pandemic potential [63].
      63. Nicoll A, Danielsson N. A novel reassortant avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in China – what are
      the implications for Europe. Euro Surveill. 2013;18(15).
      the risk of the disease spreading to Europe via humans in the near future is still considered low.
      To date, there is no epidemiological evidence that avian influenza can be transmitted to humans
      through the consumption of cooked food, notably poultry meat and eggs.
      There is insufficient evidence to quantify the risk of influenza A(H7N9) developing into a virus that
      transmits from human to human, thereby increasing the risk of an influenza pandemic.
      Close monitoring of the outbreak epidemiology, clinical features and the genetic characteristics
      of the virus will be critical for assessing this risk; instruments like the Influenza Risk Assessment
      Tool (IRAT) can play a role [64,65].
      The risk of increased transmission of H7N9 viruses between humans is not negligible
      The risk of influenza A(H7N9) virus being transported to Europe in viraemic poultry through
      legal trade is negligible
      The risk of the avian influenza A(H7N9) viruses arriving in Europe with migratory birds cannot
      be quantified. ECDC and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) have performed multiple
      independent risk assessments in the past regarding avian influenza that also cover pathways
      for avian influenza A(H7N9) [64,70,71]. The hypothesis that poultry in the affected area has
      been infected by wild birds has not been confirmed but neither can it be excluded.
      Surveillance in wild birds for this novel virus has not been initiated in the EU/EEA.
      I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
      my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

      Comment

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