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Preventing and Deterring Biological Attacks: Priorities that Should Emerge From the WMD Commission Report -- Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
Preventing and Deterring Biological Attacks: Priorities that Should Emerge From the WMD Commission Report
December 19, 2008
Summary
The Center for Biosecurity strongly agrees with the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission report ?World at Risk? that the threat of bioterrorism is urgent, growing, and requires decisive action.
Recommendations such as enhancing the nation?s capabilities for a rapid response to prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass casualties, and engaging the international community to counter biosecurity risks are valuable measures that could make an appreciable difference to national security.
The Commission also highlights the importance of laboratory oversight and securing dangerous pathogens.
Laboratory security is indeed critical and has increased greatly since the anthrax letters were mailed in 2001.
However, there are inherent limitations to our ability to secure dangerous pathogens given their ready availability outside of laboratories in the U.S. and around the world.
There is also a real danger that draconian or costly security measures will prevent scientists from working on treatments or vaccines that the country needs to treat emerging infectious diseases or to respond to a bioterrorism attack.
This memo highlights what the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC judges to be valuable preventive measures for addressing the biological terrorism threat stemming from laboratories?including personnel accountability, public-private partnerships with synthetic genomics companies, the availability of medical countermeasures as a deterrent to bioweapons development and use, and the Select Agent Program and Biosafety Improvement Act of 2008 (introduced in the 110th Congress, S.3127 and H.R. 6671).
Taken together, we believe they are key elements of a web of prevention that should deter biological weapons development and use, guide the operations of U.S. laboratories, and serve as a model for other countries.
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<cite cite="http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/commentary/2008-12-19-preventdeterbioweapons.html">Preventing and Deterring Biological Attacks: Priorities that Should Emerge From the WMD Commission Report -- Center for Biosecurity of UPMC</cite>
December 19, 2008
Summary
The Center for Biosecurity strongly agrees with the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission report ?World at Risk? that the threat of bioterrorism is urgent, growing, and requires decisive action.
Recommendations such as enhancing the nation?s capabilities for a rapid response to prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass casualties, and engaging the international community to counter biosecurity risks are valuable measures that could make an appreciable difference to national security.
The Commission also highlights the importance of laboratory oversight and securing dangerous pathogens.
Laboratory security is indeed critical and has increased greatly since the anthrax letters were mailed in 2001.
However, there are inherent limitations to our ability to secure dangerous pathogens given their ready availability outside of laboratories in the U.S. and around the world.
There is also a real danger that draconian or costly security measures will prevent scientists from working on treatments or vaccines that the country needs to treat emerging infectious diseases or to respond to a bioterrorism attack.
This memo highlights what the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC judges to be valuable preventive measures for addressing the biological terrorism threat stemming from laboratories?including personnel accountability, public-private partnerships with synthetic genomics companies, the availability of medical countermeasures as a deterrent to bioweapons development and use, and the Select Agent Program and Biosafety Improvement Act of 2008 (introduced in the 110th Congress, S.3127 and H.R. 6671).
Taken together, we believe they are key elements of a web of prevention that should deter biological weapons development and use, guide the operations of U.S. laboratories, and serve as a model for other countries.
(...)
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