Responses to Avian Influenza and State of Pandemic Readiness - Fourth Global Progress Report - October 2008 [UN - excerpts]
Responses to Avian Influenza and State of Pandemic Readiness - Fourth Global Progress Report - October 2008
[Full PDF text: http://un-influenza.org/files/ProgressReport2008.pdf ]
Executive summary
It is now nearly five years since H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) spread across Southeast Asia and then to the rest of Asia, Europe and Africa. The rapid spread, significant socioeconomic losses, numerous human deaths, and the potential threat of a human pandemic influenza triggered concerted global action to control the disease and prepare for the next influenza pandemic.
Since then around US$2.7 billion has been pledged and US$1.5 billion disbursed globally by the donor community to fight against HPAI and to aid pandemic preparedness. In addition, proportionately enormous funding and human resources have been expended by countries affected and at‐risk of HPAI and in preparing for a pandemic.
The threat posed over the last 5 years has mobilized an unprecedented coming together of the animal health, human health, disaster preparedness and communication sectors to work in a cross discipline, cross sector and cross boundary way. At the last International Ministerial Conference on Avian and Pandemic Influenza held in New Delhi (4‐6 December 2007) it was acknowledged that significant progress made towards eliminating HPAI in many infected countries, but serious concerns remained.
In response to requests from participants at the New Delhi Conference, the United Nations System Influenza Coordinator (UNSIC) and the World Bank have produced this Fourth Global Progress Report on Responses to Avian Influenza and Pandemic Readiness.
The report
i) describes international financial assistance provided to date;
ii) assesses national capacities to respond to HPAI and prepared for the next influenza pandemic;
iii) analyses implications of this progress for animal and human health and
iv) recommends some key next steps.
It focuses on progress with responses to avian influenza and with pandemic preparedness between June 2007 and June 2008, but also looks back over the last three years. Information was provided by national authorities from 148 countries that responded to an UNSIC survey questionnaire supplemented by with case studies, interviews and reports from UN system bodies and other partners. The information on donor pledges, commitments and disbursements has been collected by the World Bank via a donor polling exercise.
A global analysis of the situation now in mid to late 2008 indicates fewer outbreaks in poultry, fewer newly infected countries, fewer human cases and fewer deaths compared to the same period in 2006 and 2007. Over 50 of the 61 countries that have experience an H5N1 outbreak, have successfully eliminated the disease.
However, the virus remains entrenched in several countries and the threat of further outbreaks of HPAI in poultry (and sporadic cases in humans) persists. The threat of an influenza pandemic remains unchanged. While these findings suggest that HPAI strategies are successful when properly implemented, they also highlight that sustained vigilance and continued investment is needed in both surveillance and capacity to respond to HPAI.
Significant progress has been made during the last year, and there is now near global awareness of the issue and the need to enable nations and communities to prevent, prepare and be able to respond to HPAI and pandemic influenza. Surveillance capacities have improved significantly over the past 3 years and there is now greater awareness and more incentives for reporting. Significant efforts are still needed in biosecurity and fundamental behavior change by poultry owners/ producers remains a long term objective. There is still the need for high political commitment to improve and invest in animal and public health systems. Many countries have made substantial progress for their national pandemic preparedness; in some regions sophisticated advancements continue to be made in deepening and developing preparations. However, many of the plans have not yet been fully endorsed or made operational ? in particular at the local level and preparations in sectors beyond health need to be strengthened. Whilst the threat remains, it can be concluded that the world is significantly better prepared to respond to HPAI and to mitigate the impacts of the next influenza pandemic.
Need remains for continued advocacy, support and monitoring of preparations to ensure the capacity to respond to the threat of HPAI (and in many cases other zoonosis) is strengthened and made sustainable. In addition, it is essential to review, adapt and update pandemic preparations which will not only be of benefit in the event of pandemic but for the general resilience of a country against other emergencies.
With the threat of HPAI came an increased awareness of health threats at the animal‐human‐interface, and of the importance of a multi‐sectoral response. This better understanding needs to be sustained and advanced: During 2009, the world?s nations should agree on ways to better prevent, prepare and respond to the health, social, economic and political impacts of pandemics and emerging infectious diseases at the at the animalhuman‐ecosystem‐interface.
1. Background and Introduction
Global Avian and Human Influenza (AHI) Situation
1.1 An analysis of the situation world‐wide between January and June 2008 indicates fewer outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and fewer infected countries compared to the same period in 2006 and 2007. From January ?September 2008, no countries were newly infected (4 countries were newly infected in the first six months of 2007) and only 20 countries have
experienced outbreaks so far (25 countries reported outbreaks in 2007).(1)
1.2 In Asia, the virus is actively circulating in a number of hotspots. The disease appears enzootic in Indonesia and the virus continues to resurface in Pakistan, parts of China, Bangladesh and from time to time in India (West Bengal), Thailand, Lao PDR, Vietnam and the Republic of Korea. Besides Egypt, where infection is endemic, the epidemiological situation in the Middle‐East and
North Africa has improved despite an isolated outbreak in recent months in Israel. Saudi Arabia reported outbreaks in late 2007 but no cases have been detected since then. In Sub Saharan
Africa, while the overall epidemiological situation seems to have improved, in July 2008 Nigeria announced their first outbreak in nearly 10 months. Whilst it is discouraging that this outbreak
has occurred, it is also an encouraging sign that the Nigerian surveillance and control strategies are working, resulting in early detection and response. In Europe there continue to be sporadic
cases of wild and domestic birds infected with H5N1 and other less pathogenic avian influenza but these are well contained especially in the western part of Europe.
1.3 Several countries that detected HPAI infections or re‐infections in 2007 and 2008 have now succeeded in eliminating infection thanks to implementation of effective surveillance, prompt detection and rapid responses.(2) However the virus is still entrenched in several countries and the threat of further outbreaks of HPAI in poultry (and sporadic cases in humans) persists. These findings suggest that (a) HPAI control succeeds when strategies are properly implemented and (b) sustained vigilance and continued investment in both surveillance and capacity to respond to HPAI is required world‐wide.
The threat of an influenza pandemic remains unchanged.
1.4 Human infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses continue to present a serious and highly complex public health challenge where they occur. At the time of writing, since late 2003, there have been 385 human cases recorded, with more than 245 deaths in 15 countries in Africa, Asia and Europe. In 2008 there have been 36 cases and 28 deaths (predominantly in Indonesia although Egypt, China and Vietnam continue to experience cases and deaths). Bangladesh is the only new country in 2008 to experience a human case.
1.5 Currently, H5N1 still causes infections relatively rarely in people, however when they occur, such infections have been frequently fatal (the case fatality rate this year is 76% in total compared to 63% in total since late 2003).(3) H5N1 viruses continue to evolve and could develop into a much greater public health threat resulting in the next influenza pandemic.
Purpose and Outline of Progress Report
1.6 This Fourth Progress Report on Avian Influenza and State of Pandemic Readiness has been jointly produced by the United Nations System Influenza Coordinator (UNSIC) and the World Bank, with 3 valuable contributions from the Pandemic Influenza Contingency Team (PIC) based in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the UN Children?s Fund (UNICEF). The collaboration of 148 countries and territories that returned the UNSIC survey was the basis for much of the report content. It focuses on the progress in the response to avian influenza and pandemic preparedness between June 2007 and June 2008, but comparatively covers data from the past three years.
1.7 Previous UNSIC‐World Bank reports have covered the periods January to June 2007 produced in preparation for the New Delhi Intergovernmental Ministerial Conference on Avian and Pandemic
Influenza (December 2007), July to December 2006 for the Bamako Conference (December 2006), and January to June 2006 for the Vienna meeting (June 2006). This report will be released ahead
of time for the next intergovernmental ministerial conference, to be hosted in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, in October 2008.
1.8 The report includes presentation of data, analysis and comment in five main subject areas:
(a) global financial and technical assistance,
(b) animal health,
(c) human health,
(d) pandemic preparedness and
(e) communications.
The purpose of this report is to provide an analysis of:
i) International financial assistance provided to date;
ii) National capacities to respond to HPAI and prepare for the next influenza pandemic;
iii) Implications of this progress for animal and human health ;and
iv) Some key next steps.
Study Methods: Design, Collection, Analysis and Limitations
1.9 Data and information for the current report was obtained from six principle sources:
? National authorities, surveyed by UNSIC: including responses from Ministries of Agriculture, Ministries of Health, National Disaster Committees and other responsible governmental agencies;
? Information collected from donor countries (by the World Bank) covering pledges, commitments, and disbursements in support of avian and human influenza control and pandemic preparedness;
? Case studies and illustrative examples of ongoing programs or projects;
? A report prepared by FAO, which assesses the capacity to prevent, detect and respond to HPAI in 54 countries where FAO is either implementing projects or there is a fluid epidemiological
situation;
? Information from UN system and partner agencies; Reports from informants within the international community on coordination of external support and successes and challenges encountered during programme implementation; and
? Other published studies and assessments.
1.10 For the collection of UNSIC primary data, a survey of 46 questions was posed to 178 countries or territories (where the report refers to countries this also infers territories). The survey was made available in the six official UN languages. Overall, 148 responses to the survey were received, giving a response rate of over 83%. Of the 148, 127 were from the same countries as 2007 which provides an 86% global comparison. Questions were intended to be applicable to countries in a variety of situations. The full list of responding countries can be found in Annex I Table 1. The questionnaire contained a combination of questions, some repeated from previous years? surveys to enable comparisons and new or adapted questions that were asked for the first time. The new or adapted questions are in response to changing circumstances: progress identified in previous reports was recognized, and now new dimensions of countries? capacities and preparedness need to be assessed.
1.11 In line with the December 2007 report, where possible responses to the data collection exercise were sought from contacts points within the national authorities. UN country level focal points were available to assist national authorities in this exercise; countries in which UN officials completed the questionnaire are specifically marked in Annex I Table 1. The draft report has also
been circulated to those national authorizes who have taken part for their review.
1.12 As per previous reports, responses have been aggregated along World Bank Regional classifications (Annex I Table 1). In addition this year?s analysis has also been conducted via new disaggregations:
? To enable the identification of specific progress, same country responses to repeated questions from previous years have been analyzed;
? In an effort to distinguish the unique situation of countries with experience since 2003 of HPAI infection and those without (infected ? non‐infected), disaggregation occurs on this basis (as
per reports to OIE of 25 July 2008); and
? To enable further distinction of where the challenges remain, disaggregation also occurs on a country income scale (as per World Bank classifications, Annex I Table 4).
1.13 The reader is asked to bear in mind that the data and interpretation of results based on the UNSIC survey reflects the assessment by national officials and remains indicative. Whilst it has not
proved possible for UNSIC and the World Bank to validate all those responses, it is hoped that by including inputs from the UN Technical Agencies and independent sources the report will provide
a broader assessment. However, these results presented here remain indicative.
1.14 UNSIC and the World Bank are jointly responsible for the preparation, content and production of the report, and for any revisions that may be issued.
-
--
1) Global Early Warning System for Major Animal Diseases, including Zoonoses (GLEWS)
2) FAO/ AGAH Programming Unit: FAO Contribution to the UNSIC report January ? June 2008
(...)
-
--
Box 1.1
As the majority of human cases occurred in Indonesia, which has always experienced a higher mortality rate than other countries, this number
may not indicate a trend.
Latest Research on the Continued Threat of Influenza Pandemic and the Transmissibility of H5N1 (Focus on 2008)
Five years after the re‐emergence of H5N1, sporadic cases and small clusters of human infections with H5N1 avian influenza persist and the virus remains a substantial threat to global public health security. Other avian influenza A sub‐types (H7, H9) also present a potential danger but to date H5N1 viruses constitute the most imminent and important pandemic influenza threat. Thus far this year (between 1 January and 10 September 2008), 36 human cases of H5N1 have been confirmed in five countries1 of which, Bangladesh reported its first human case. When compared with the same period during the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, this year has witnessed the fewest number cases. (2)
There has been little reported change in epidemiological features. As with previous years, the case fatality rate of the virus has been high; H5N1 human infections have, by a large majority, been sporadic and are believed to have been acquired through avian‐to‐human transmission, usually following human exposure to sick or dead poultry.(1),(6)
There has been no report suggesting human‐to‐human transmission amongst the few cluster cases that emerged so far in 2008.
Nevertheless, studies have suggested that, in the recent past, limited, non‐sustainable human‐to‐human transmission has probably occurred amongst clusters of epidemiologically linked cases in a small number of countries, including China, Indonesia and Pakistan.
Since the re‐emergence of the threat in 2003, there has been no evidence of sustained human‐to‐human transmission of H5N1 and the WHO alert level has remained at Phase 3 (no or very limited human‐to‐human transmission).
However, despite the fact that there have been fewer cases in fewer countries thus far in 2008 when compared with the same periods in the past couple of years, it is important to underscore that the virus is now entrenched in parts of Asia and Africa and that the threat of an H5N1 pandemic influenza undoubtedly persists.
1) Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Indonesia and Vietnam
2) Year 2005: 69 cases (as of 16 September 2005); Year 2006: 97 cases (as of 08 September 2006); Year 2007: 64 cases (as of 31 August 2007)
Sources :
? Uyeki TM. Global epidemiology of human infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) viruses. Respirology 2008; 12: S2‐S9.
? WHO (2008). Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO
? Writing Committee of the Second World Health Organization Consulation on Clinical Aspects of Human Infection with Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus (Abdel‐Ghafar AN, Chotpitayasunondh T, Gao Z et al). Update on Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus Infection in Humans. N Engl J Med 2008; 368 (3): 261‐273.
? Wang H, Feng, Z, Shu Y et al. Probable limited person‐to‐person transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) virus in China. Lancet 2008; 371 (9622): 1427‐34.
? Yang, Y, Halloran ME, Sugimoto J, Longini IM. Detecting Human‐to‐Human transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1). Emerg Infect Dis 2007; 13(9):1348‐53.
? WHO (2008). Avian influenza ? situation in Pakistan ‐ update 2 (03 April 2008). Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/don/2008_04_03/en/index.html .
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<table style="width: auto;"><tbody><tr><td></td></tr><tr><td style="font-family: arial,sans-serif; font-size: 11px; text-align: right;">From MAPS</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table style="width: auto;"><tbody><tr><td></td></tr><tr><td style="font-family: arial,sans-serif; font-size: 11px; text-align: right;">From MAPS</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table style="width: auto;"><tbody><tr><td></td></tr><tr><td style="font-family: arial,sans-serif; font-size: 11px; text-align: right;">From MAPS</td></tr></tbody></table>
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Responses to Avian Influenza and State of Pandemic Readiness - Fourth Global Progress Report - October 2008
[Full PDF text: http://un-influenza.org/files/ProgressReport2008.pdf ]
Executive summary
It is now nearly five years since H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) spread across Southeast Asia and then to the rest of Asia, Europe and Africa. The rapid spread, significant socioeconomic losses, numerous human deaths, and the potential threat of a human pandemic influenza triggered concerted global action to control the disease and prepare for the next influenza pandemic.
Since then around US$2.7 billion has been pledged and US$1.5 billion disbursed globally by the donor community to fight against HPAI and to aid pandemic preparedness. In addition, proportionately enormous funding and human resources have been expended by countries affected and at‐risk of HPAI and in preparing for a pandemic.
The threat posed over the last 5 years has mobilized an unprecedented coming together of the animal health, human health, disaster preparedness and communication sectors to work in a cross discipline, cross sector and cross boundary way. At the last International Ministerial Conference on Avian and Pandemic Influenza held in New Delhi (4‐6 December 2007) it was acknowledged that significant progress made towards eliminating HPAI in many infected countries, but serious concerns remained.
In response to requests from participants at the New Delhi Conference, the United Nations System Influenza Coordinator (UNSIC) and the World Bank have produced this Fourth Global Progress Report on Responses to Avian Influenza and Pandemic Readiness.
The report
i) describes international financial assistance provided to date;
ii) assesses national capacities to respond to HPAI and prepared for the next influenza pandemic;
iii) analyses implications of this progress for animal and human health and
iv) recommends some key next steps.
It focuses on progress with responses to avian influenza and with pandemic preparedness between June 2007 and June 2008, but also looks back over the last three years. Information was provided by national authorities from 148 countries that responded to an UNSIC survey questionnaire supplemented by with case studies, interviews and reports from UN system bodies and other partners. The information on donor pledges, commitments and disbursements has been collected by the World Bank via a donor polling exercise.
A global analysis of the situation now in mid to late 2008 indicates fewer outbreaks in poultry, fewer newly infected countries, fewer human cases and fewer deaths compared to the same period in 2006 and 2007. Over 50 of the 61 countries that have experience an H5N1 outbreak, have successfully eliminated the disease.
However, the virus remains entrenched in several countries and the threat of further outbreaks of HPAI in poultry (and sporadic cases in humans) persists. The threat of an influenza pandemic remains unchanged. While these findings suggest that HPAI strategies are successful when properly implemented, they also highlight that sustained vigilance and continued investment is needed in both surveillance and capacity to respond to HPAI.
Significant progress has been made during the last year, and there is now near global awareness of the issue and the need to enable nations and communities to prevent, prepare and be able to respond to HPAI and pandemic influenza. Surveillance capacities have improved significantly over the past 3 years and there is now greater awareness and more incentives for reporting. Significant efforts are still needed in biosecurity and fundamental behavior change by poultry owners/ producers remains a long term objective. There is still the need for high political commitment to improve and invest in animal and public health systems. Many countries have made substantial progress for their national pandemic preparedness; in some regions sophisticated advancements continue to be made in deepening and developing preparations. However, many of the plans have not yet been fully endorsed or made operational ? in particular at the local level and preparations in sectors beyond health need to be strengthened. Whilst the threat remains, it can be concluded that the world is significantly better prepared to respond to HPAI and to mitigate the impacts of the next influenza pandemic.
Need remains for continued advocacy, support and monitoring of preparations to ensure the capacity to respond to the threat of HPAI (and in many cases other zoonosis) is strengthened and made sustainable. In addition, it is essential to review, adapt and update pandemic preparations which will not only be of benefit in the event of pandemic but for the general resilience of a country against other emergencies.
With the threat of HPAI came an increased awareness of health threats at the animal‐human‐interface, and of the importance of a multi‐sectoral response. This better understanding needs to be sustained and advanced: During 2009, the world?s nations should agree on ways to better prevent, prepare and respond to the health, social, economic and political impacts of pandemics and emerging infectious diseases at the at the animalhuman‐ecosystem‐interface.
1. Background and Introduction
Global Avian and Human Influenza (AHI) Situation
1.1 An analysis of the situation world‐wide between January and June 2008 indicates fewer outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and fewer infected countries compared to the same period in 2006 and 2007. From January ?September 2008, no countries were newly infected (4 countries were newly infected in the first six months of 2007) and only 20 countries have
experienced outbreaks so far (25 countries reported outbreaks in 2007).(1)
1.2 In Asia, the virus is actively circulating in a number of hotspots. The disease appears enzootic in Indonesia and the virus continues to resurface in Pakistan, parts of China, Bangladesh and from time to time in India (West Bengal), Thailand, Lao PDR, Vietnam and the Republic of Korea. Besides Egypt, where infection is endemic, the epidemiological situation in the Middle‐East and
North Africa has improved despite an isolated outbreak in recent months in Israel. Saudi Arabia reported outbreaks in late 2007 but no cases have been detected since then. In Sub Saharan
Africa, while the overall epidemiological situation seems to have improved, in July 2008 Nigeria announced their first outbreak in nearly 10 months. Whilst it is discouraging that this outbreak
has occurred, it is also an encouraging sign that the Nigerian surveillance and control strategies are working, resulting in early detection and response. In Europe there continue to be sporadic
cases of wild and domestic birds infected with H5N1 and other less pathogenic avian influenza but these are well contained especially in the western part of Europe.
1.3 Several countries that detected HPAI infections or re‐infections in 2007 and 2008 have now succeeded in eliminating infection thanks to implementation of effective surveillance, prompt detection and rapid responses.(2) However the virus is still entrenched in several countries and the threat of further outbreaks of HPAI in poultry (and sporadic cases in humans) persists. These findings suggest that (a) HPAI control succeeds when strategies are properly implemented and (b) sustained vigilance and continued investment in both surveillance and capacity to respond to HPAI is required world‐wide.
The threat of an influenza pandemic remains unchanged.
1.4 Human infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses continue to present a serious and highly complex public health challenge where they occur. At the time of writing, since late 2003, there have been 385 human cases recorded, with more than 245 deaths in 15 countries in Africa, Asia and Europe. In 2008 there have been 36 cases and 28 deaths (predominantly in Indonesia although Egypt, China and Vietnam continue to experience cases and deaths). Bangladesh is the only new country in 2008 to experience a human case.
1.5 Currently, H5N1 still causes infections relatively rarely in people, however when they occur, such infections have been frequently fatal (the case fatality rate this year is 76% in total compared to 63% in total since late 2003).(3) H5N1 viruses continue to evolve and could develop into a much greater public health threat resulting in the next influenza pandemic.
Purpose and Outline of Progress Report
1.6 This Fourth Progress Report on Avian Influenza and State of Pandemic Readiness has been jointly produced by the United Nations System Influenza Coordinator (UNSIC) and the World Bank, with 3 valuable contributions from the Pandemic Influenza Contingency Team (PIC) based in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the UN Children?s Fund (UNICEF). The collaboration of 148 countries and territories that returned the UNSIC survey was the basis for much of the report content. It focuses on the progress in the response to avian influenza and pandemic preparedness between June 2007 and June 2008, but comparatively covers data from the past three years.
1.7 Previous UNSIC‐World Bank reports have covered the periods January to June 2007 produced in preparation for the New Delhi Intergovernmental Ministerial Conference on Avian and Pandemic
Influenza (December 2007), July to December 2006 for the Bamako Conference (December 2006), and January to June 2006 for the Vienna meeting (June 2006). This report will be released ahead
of time for the next intergovernmental ministerial conference, to be hosted in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, in October 2008.
1.8 The report includes presentation of data, analysis and comment in five main subject areas:
(a) global financial and technical assistance,
(b) animal health,
(c) human health,
(d) pandemic preparedness and
(e) communications.
The purpose of this report is to provide an analysis of:
i) International financial assistance provided to date;
ii) National capacities to respond to HPAI and prepare for the next influenza pandemic;
iii) Implications of this progress for animal and human health ;and
iv) Some key next steps.
Study Methods: Design, Collection, Analysis and Limitations
1.9 Data and information for the current report was obtained from six principle sources:
? National authorities, surveyed by UNSIC: including responses from Ministries of Agriculture, Ministries of Health, National Disaster Committees and other responsible governmental agencies;
? Information collected from donor countries (by the World Bank) covering pledges, commitments, and disbursements in support of avian and human influenza control and pandemic preparedness;
? Case studies and illustrative examples of ongoing programs or projects;
? A report prepared by FAO, which assesses the capacity to prevent, detect and respond to HPAI in 54 countries where FAO is either implementing projects or there is a fluid epidemiological
situation;
? Information from UN system and partner agencies; Reports from informants within the international community on coordination of external support and successes and challenges encountered during programme implementation; and
? Other published studies and assessments.
1.10 For the collection of UNSIC primary data, a survey of 46 questions was posed to 178 countries or territories (where the report refers to countries this also infers territories). The survey was made available in the six official UN languages. Overall, 148 responses to the survey were received, giving a response rate of over 83%. Of the 148, 127 were from the same countries as 2007 which provides an 86% global comparison. Questions were intended to be applicable to countries in a variety of situations. The full list of responding countries can be found in Annex I Table 1. The questionnaire contained a combination of questions, some repeated from previous years? surveys to enable comparisons and new or adapted questions that were asked for the first time. The new or adapted questions are in response to changing circumstances: progress identified in previous reports was recognized, and now new dimensions of countries? capacities and preparedness need to be assessed.
1.11 In line with the December 2007 report, where possible responses to the data collection exercise were sought from contacts points within the national authorities. UN country level focal points were available to assist national authorities in this exercise; countries in which UN officials completed the questionnaire are specifically marked in Annex I Table 1. The draft report has also
been circulated to those national authorizes who have taken part for their review.
1.12 As per previous reports, responses have been aggregated along World Bank Regional classifications (Annex I Table 1). In addition this year?s analysis has also been conducted via new disaggregations:
? To enable the identification of specific progress, same country responses to repeated questions from previous years have been analyzed;
? In an effort to distinguish the unique situation of countries with experience since 2003 of HPAI infection and those without (infected ? non‐infected), disaggregation occurs on this basis (as
per reports to OIE of 25 July 2008); and
? To enable further distinction of where the challenges remain, disaggregation also occurs on a country income scale (as per World Bank classifications, Annex I Table 4).
1.13 The reader is asked to bear in mind that the data and interpretation of results based on the UNSIC survey reflects the assessment by national officials and remains indicative. Whilst it has not
proved possible for UNSIC and the World Bank to validate all those responses, it is hoped that by including inputs from the UN Technical Agencies and independent sources the report will provide
a broader assessment. However, these results presented here remain indicative.
1.14 UNSIC and the World Bank are jointly responsible for the preparation, content and production of the report, and for any revisions that may be issued.
-
--
1) Global Early Warning System for Major Animal Diseases, including Zoonoses (GLEWS)
2) FAO/ AGAH Programming Unit: FAO Contribution to the UNSIC report January ? June 2008
(...)
-
--
Box 1.1
As the majority of human cases occurred in Indonesia, which has always experienced a higher mortality rate than other countries, this number
may not indicate a trend.
Latest Research on the Continued Threat of Influenza Pandemic and the Transmissibility of H5N1 (Focus on 2008)
Five years after the re‐emergence of H5N1, sporadic cases and small clusters of human infections with H5N1 avian influenza persist and the virus remains a substantial threat to global public health security. Other avian influenza A sub‐types (H7, H9) also present a potential danger but to date H5N1 viruses constitute the most imminent and important pandemic influenza threat. Thus far this year (between 1 January and 10 September 2008), 36 human cases of H5N1 have been confirmed in five countries1 of which, Bangladesh reported its first human case. When compared with the same period during the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, this year has witnessed the fewest number cases. (2)
There has been little reported change in epidemiological features. As with previous years, the case fatality rate of the virus has been high; H5N1 human infections have, by a large majority, been sporadic and are believed to have been acquired through avian‐to‐human transmission, usually following human exposure to sick or dead poultry.(1),(6)
There has been no report suggesting human‐to‐human transmission amongst the few cluster cases that emerged so far in 2008.
Nevertheless, studies have suggested that, in the recent past, limited, non‐sustainable human‐to‐human transmission has probably occurred amongst clusters of epidemiologically linked cases in a small number of countries, including China, Indonesia and Pakistan.
Since the re‐emergence of the threat in 2003, there has been no evidence of sustained human‐to‐human transmission of H5N1 and the WHO alert level has remained at Phase 3 (no or very limited human‐to‐human transmission).
However, despite the fact that there have been fewer cases in fewer countries thus far in 2008 when compared with the same periods in the past couple of years, it is important to underscore that the virus is now entrenched in parts of Asia and Africa and that the threat of an H5N1 pandemic influenza undoubtedly persists.
1) Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Indonesia and Vietnam
2) Year 2005: 69 cases (as of 16 September 2005); Year 2006: 97 cases (as of 08 September 2006); Year 2007: 64 cases (as of 31 August 2007)
Sources :
? Uyeki TM. Global epidemiology of human infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) viruses. Respirology 2008; 12: S2‐S9.
? WHO (2008). Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO
? Writing Committee of the Second World Health Organization Consulation on Clinical Aspects of Human Infection with Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus (Abdel‐Ghafar AN, Chotpitayasunondh T, Gao Z et al). Update on Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus Infection in Humans. N Engl J Med 2008; 368 (3): 261‐273.
? Wang H, Feng, Z, Shu Y et al. Probable limited person‐to‐person transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) virus in China. Lancet 2008; 371 (9622): 1427‐34.
? Yang, Y, Halloran ME, Sugimoto J, Longini IM. Detecting Human‐to‐Human transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1). Emerg Infect Dis 2007; 13(9):1348‐53.
? WHO (2008). Avian influenza ? situation in Pakistan ‐ update 2 (03 April 2008). Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/don/2008_04_03/en/index.html .
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<table style="width: auto;"><tbody><tr><td></td></tr><tr><td style="font-family: arial,sans-serif; font-size: 11px; text-align: right;">From MAPS</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table style="width: auto;"><tbody><tr><td></td></tr><tr><td style="font-family: arial,sans-serif; font-size: 11px; text-align: right;">From MAPS</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table style="width: auto;"><tbody><tr><td></td></tr><tr><td style="font-family: arial,sans-serif; font-size: 11px; text-align: right;">From MAPS</td></tr></tbody></table>
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Comment