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**Laidback Al** · June 23, 2012, 09:06 AM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Now here?s the reassuring part ? the mutations that make the virus pass easily from one animal to another also make it a little less dangerous. Instead of taking root deep in the lungs, causing a hard-to-treat pneumonia, the mutated version of H5N1 likes to live in the upper respiratory tract.

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aunPenh; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-bidi-language:AR-SA;} </style> <![endif]--> I don?t think we should be reassured. What is the definition of less dangerous? The fact that the mutated version of H5N1 establishing itself in the upper respiratory tract may cause fewer cases of hard-to-treat pneumonia does not make the mutated virus less dangerous.

It is highly likely that an H5N1 virus in the upper respiratory tract will be much more transmissible, causing even more cases, perhaps in short periods of time which could overwhelm the health care system. The real question is - what is the overall virulence of the strain, not where it lodges itself in the human body.

**gsgs** · June 23, 2012, 10:43 AM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

what do we know ? they just tested one strain

let it reassort a bit ...

**gsgs** · July 1, 2012, 01:04 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

TWiV130 about the Fouchier paper - FluTrackers News and Information

http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/showthread.php?p=458976#post458976

Vincent Racaniello's Blog

Room 404

http://alandove.com/content/2012/06/unleashing-the-ferrets-of-fear/

Sorry, that's not here.

Influenza H5N1 virus versus ferrets, round two | Virology Blog

http://www.virology.ws/2012/06/21/influenza-h5n1-virus-versus-ferrets-round-two/

The second of two papers on avian influenza H5N1 virus that caused such a furor in the past year was published today in the journal Science. I have carefull ...

none of these people does sequencing
can you decide the threat without comparing the sequences,
the mutations ?
and other experts are more concerned

and now we have the additional danger of terrorists and lab-escapes

**gsgs** · July 2, 2012, 05:27 AM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

?You can?t put a number on it,? said Fauci

if Fauci "can't", others can and hopefully will.
That just means, we will not so much consider
Fauci's opinion on this issue, sigh.

-------------------------------------------

Derek Smith said :
> But asking whether a five-mutation strain could evolve in human hosts,
> was like asking if it could ever snow in the Sahara ? unlikely, but not inconceivable.

comparing it with weather events means that experts "can"
and will put numbers to it.

January 20, 2012 ? BECHAR, Algeria - Snow fell Tuesday in the Sahara Desert in western Algeria.

-----------------------------------------------
> Asked if a rogue researcher could now try to duplicate Dr. Fouchier?s
> work, Dr. Fauci said it was possible. But he argued that open discussion
> was still better than restriction to a few government-cleared flu
> researchers, because experts in unrelated fields, like X-ray
> crystallography or viral epidemiology, might take interest
> and eventually make important contributions, he said.

sure, but what is more likely ? I don't count on the X-ray people
to save us. 80 years of flu research didn't achieve a lot so far.
Best achieved is presumably antibiotics against bacterial pneumonia.
And how shall knowing these special mutations help flu-research ?
The only thing that comes to mind is surveillance and watching
and concentrating on the dangerous strains.
But that doesn't need publishing.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
> The only groups who might logically consider using such
> a weapon are those for whom humans are the problem,
> such as environmental extremists and animal-rights activists,
> or apocalyptic sects, such as the Japanese terrorist cult
> Aum Shinrikyo, which released sarin gas in the Tokyo underground
> in 1995. Then there are those who do not care about casualties,
> such as a state or a regime that believes it faces imminent
> existential threat, or suicide fighters.

or any group who is desperate enough. E.g. in a war, when the
world knows that the country/dictator has H5N1 panflu weapons, they
will not allow it to become desperate enough to use it.
So it makes sense to have such weapons, and that bares the risk
of lab escapes.
And normal terrorists can also well make use of it.
They can threaten to use it so to press the world to
fulfill conditions. They don't want to use, but will make
it almost automatical if the conditions aren't met.
So they can be realatively sure that the conditions are met.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Tim Trevan:
> Precise calculation is not possible, but the evidence strongly suggests that the
> increase in risk is quite small.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
> ?There is always a risk,? Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, the director of the National Institute
> for Allergy and Infectious Diseases, said in a telephone news conference held by
> Science. ?But I believe the benefits are greater than the risks.?

I think it will turn out in the next years, that he overestimated the benefits ...
----------------------------------------------------------------
> ?done something really, really stupid? and had ?mutated the hell out of H5N1?
someone suggested this was maybe incorrectly translated. Any Dutch-speakers here ?
------------------------------------------------------------------
> up to three in a single human is ?a possibility,? said Derek J. Smith,
> ?Five mutations is pretty difficult, but we don?t yet know how difficult it is

reminds me to Fujian H3 in 2002. Suddenly 11 mutations in HA out of nowhere.
T31C,C121A,G156T,T273G,C511A,A512C,G648A,G1011A,C1 044T,T1149C,C1642T
only 3 nonsynonymous, though.
We've seen multiple mutations in prolonged infection in immunodeficient people
-------------------------------------------
has someone read the paper ? 6 ferret sequences at genbank with many common
mutations, I haven't yet found which viruses went to which ferrets, can't be that
all these 14 multi-mutations developed independently ?!?!
Also, they started with a different,special variant of A/IDN/5/2005(H5N1) , why ?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
?It?s possible that the chances are one in a thousand, and we?ve just gotten lucky,?
Dr. Smith said. ?Or it?s possible that the chance is one in a million and it might not
happen for a long time.?
--------------------------------------------------------------------
> No one knows the probability that H5N1 would reassort with a human flu.
everyone has a subjective probability
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
> ?We really don?t talk about it, because so little is known about the probability of it,? said Dr. Smith.
we should.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fauci ,
> hopes scientists will be able to amass a longer list of potential mutations,
> and even find a common denominator in how they alter H5N1. It might then be
> possible to monitor emerging strains for signs that they are about to cross over into humans.
> That may be the real home run for surveillance,
OK, but we could vaccinate people in countries with more dangerous strains and concentrate on those.
If e.g. it turns out that Indonesia is dangerous, but -Qinghai,Fujian,Vietnam are not,
then we could concentrate on IDN. ~Half of efforts saved
Or we could even increase our efforts to eradicate that one strain.
Or even introduce another H5N1 to that country hoping that it will
replace the more dangerous one
We needn't make the mutations public now, though.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fouchier adds.
> Very little has gone wrong so far, so why would that be different now??
because things have changed. Now we have reverse genetic
---------------------------------------------------------------------
> In 2002, for reasons that are still unclear, the viruses started hopping back into wild birds
ahh, wasn't it in wild birds all the time ? AFAIK it didn't go from poultry to wild birds ((?))
except occasional, e.g. one of the Qinghai strain components afair
----------------------------------------------------------------
2.3.2.1, is of great concern to Webster.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Palese suspects that the severe cases have simply inhaled high doses of the virus.
But Peiris says that this cannot be the sole explanation.
-------------------------------------------------------
Wendy Barclay,
> not quantify the odds or reassortment. If you force the event, it'll happen, but I haven't seen
> anyone do the experiment in a more natural way,
nature does. We have much data to estimate the likelyhood of double infection
and reassortment.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Farrar:
I think the great worry is that a purely avian virus somehow crosses over to us,
H5N1 tops the list of concerns
-----------------------------------------------------------

**gsgs** · July 25, 2012, 12:45 AM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

can they please figure out now, which mutations reduce
its virulence while keeping it transmissable ?

**Pathfinder** · July 27, 2012, 09:43 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

As flu scientists meet, question looms: When will bird flu studies resume?

Helen Branswell, The Canadian Press
Published Friday, Jul. 27, 2012 12:49PM EDT
Last Updated Friday, Jul. 27, 2012 12:50PM EDT

Six months after leading influenza scientists announced they would voluntarily halt research into what it takes to make bird flu viruses transmit among mammals, it's still not clear when and how the cease-work order will be lifted.

Figuring out what an acceptable path towards that end might be will likely occupy considerable time and brain power as many of the researchers capable of doing this work meet in New York next week.

"I very much hope ... that no decision is made at that meeting," microbiologist David Relman says of the annual gathering of the Centers of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance.
...
"I think the most important point is that this can't be a self-proclaimed decision or assessment by a very narrow group of people behind closed doors. This has to be an open process," insists Relman, who teaches at Stanford University in California.
...
Even some flu experts worry about the work.

"Where's this going to take us?" asks Dr. Ilaria Capua, an outspoken Italian researcher who runs an avian influenza reference laboratory for the Food and Agriculture Organization in Padua.

"When are we going to have another moratorium because somebody else comes up with a virus that we don't want to have in many labs around the world?"
...
Capua says it's unfortunate that in the time since the moratorium was announced, there wasn't a greater effort to resolve questions like whether there is a line that ought to be drawn and if so, where it is.
...

Full text:

As flu scientists meet, question looms: When will bird flu studies resume?

http://www.ctvnews.ca/health/as-flu-scientists-meet-question-looms-when-will-bird-flu-studies-resume-1.895533

Six months after leading influenza scientists announced they would voluntarily halt research into what it takes to make bird flu viruses transmit among mammals, it's still not clear when and how the cease-work order will be lifted.

**gsgs** · September 29, 2012, 06:34 AM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Reverse genetics of influenza viruses - PubMed

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22528161

The ability to modify influenza viruses at will has revolutionized influenza research. Reverse genetics has been used to generate mutant or reassortant influenza viruses to assess their replication, virulence, pathogenicity, host range, and transmissibility. Moreover, this technology is now being us …

Reverse genetics of influenza viruses. Neumann G, Ozawa M, Kawaoka Y.
The ability to modify influenza viruses at will has revolutionized influenza research.
Reverse genetics has been used to generate mutant or reassortant influenza viruses
to assess their replication, virulence, pathogenicity, host range, and transmissibility.

**Pathfinder** · January 1, 2013, 09:06 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Research Moratoriums And Recipes For Superbugs: Bird Flu In 2012

by Nell Greenfieldboyce
December 31, 2012 3:30 AM

For scientists who study a dangerous form of bird flu, 2012 is ending as it began — with uncertainty about what the future holds for their research, but a hope that some contentious issues will soon be resolved.
...
Officials have drawn up a set of draft criteria for making decisions, and they want to know what people think. They're accepting emailed comments until Jan. 10.

At the same time, government officials are finishing up a review of what kind of lab safety measures should be used when doing this type of work.
Fouchier, for one, says it's still unclear to him how things will go.

"It's critical who is going to do the vetting on this research, who decides what can be done and what cannot be done," Fouchier says. "If you ask infectious disease specialists about what should be done, you're going to get different answers than if you ask security specialists."
...

Full text:

Research Moratoriums And Recipes For Superbugs: Bird Flu In 2012

http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/12/31/167986224/research-moratoriums-and-recipes-for-superbugs-bird-flu-in-2012

When scientists figured out how to make the deadly H5N1 virus more contagious, a debate ignited about whether to publish the research and do more experiments. Over the past year, scientists published the contentious work, but they still can't agree on the field's future.

**Pathfinder** · January 2, 2013, 11:44 AM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Panels III and IV: Perspectives on the Proposed Framework and on the Case Studies

Submit comments on the draft HHS Framework by January 10, 2013 to:
HHS-Framework-H5N1@mail.nih.gov

http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/biosecurity/meetings/Dec2012/Panel_34-H5N1_Workshop_Summary_Slides.pdf

**Pathfinder** · January 23, 2013, 01:10 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

H5N1 virus: Transmission studies resume for avian flu

Ron A. M. Fouchier,<SUP>1</SUP>

<LI class=vcard>Adolfo Garc?a-Sastre,<SUP>2</SUP><LI class="vcard c1 no-comma">Yoshihiro Kawaoka<SUP>3</SUP><LI class="vcard last-author no-comma">& 37 co-authors

<DL class="citation dates"><DT>Journal name:<DD class=journal-title>Nature<DT>Year published:<DD>(2013)<DT>DOI:<DD class=doi>doi:10.1038/nature11858<DT class="published-online first"><DT class="published-online first">Published online 23 January 2013 </DT></DL>...
Because H5N1 virus-transmission studies are essential for pandemic preparedness and understanding the adaptation of influenza viruses to mammals, researchers who have approval from their governments and institutions to conduct this research safely, under appropriate biosafety and biosecurity conditions, have a public-health responsibility to resume this important work. Scientists should not restart their work in countries where, as yet, no decision has been reached on the conditions for H5N1 virus transmission research. At this time, this includes the United States and US-funded research conducted in other countries. Scientists should never conduct this type of research without the appropriate facilities, oversight and all necessary approvals.

We consider biosafety level 3 conditions with the considerable enhancements (BSL-3+) as outlined in the referenced publications<SUP>11, 12, 13</SUP> to be appropriate for this type of work, but recognize that some countries may require BSL-4 conditions in accordance with applicable standards (such as Canada). We fully acknowledge that this research ? as with any work on infectious agents ? is not without risks. However, because the risk exists in nature that an H5N1 virus capable of transmission in mammals may emerge, the benefits of this work outweigh the risks.

Full text:

303 See Other

http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature11858.html

**gsgs** · January 23, 2013, 01:23 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

> However, because the risk exists in nature that an H5N1 virus
> capable of transmission in mammals may emerge, the benefits
> of this work outweigh the risks.

this "outweighting" however can only be decided by actually
doing some "weighting" of the risks, and not just listing the two.

**Pathfinder** · January 23, 2013, 02:08 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

January 23rd, 2013
01:00 PM ET

Bird flu research resumes - but not in U.S.

... United States has been unclear about how long it will be before it issues official guidelines for conditions under which H5N1 transmission research can continue, the letter says. As such, laboratories in the United States and facilities abroad that receive U.S. funding should not proceed with their transmission studies.
...
Kawaoka cannot continue his research in Wisconsin, funded by the National Institutes of Health, pending further guidance from the United States. Fouchier also receives some NIH funding, but the rest is supported by the European Union and other organizations, so his group can continue studying avian flu using those non-U.S. resources.
...
Fouchier's group is not restarting experiments immediately, but probably within the next few weeks, he said. His group will attempt to nail down exactly how many mutations - and which - are sufficient to make the H5N1 avian flu virus airborne, and whether these particular mutations can also make other bird flu viruses airborne.

Avian flu strains from Indonesia and Vietnam has been studied in the context of mutations so far. But, says Fouchier, "there are other genetic lineages of H5N1 in Egypt, in China, for instance, that we would like to test whether also, in these countries, viruses may emerge with an airborne transmission phenotype."
...

Full text:

410 Gone

http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/2013/01/23/bird-flu-research-resumes-but-not-in-u-s/

**Pathfinder** · January 23, 2013, 02:56 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Leading scientists condemn decision to continue controversial research into deadly H5N1 bird-flu virus
...
Steve Connor
Wednesday 23 January 2013
...
Forty of the world?s most prominent flu researchers have decided to lift their voluntary moratorium on studies into the airborne transmission of the H5N1 strain of bird-flu, which they imposed upon themselves last January following public outrage over the work.
...
Sir Richard Roberts, who won the Nobel Prize in medicine in 1993...
?The decision to lift the moratorium, which seems to have been made a small group of self-interested scientists, makes a mockery of the concept of informed consent,? Sir Richard said.
...
Simon Wain-Hobson, professor of virology at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, said he was taken by surprise by the suddenness of the announcement to end the moratorium.

?There has been no consultation with any virologist outside the flu community on this and, as a virologist, I?m not convinced of the benefits of this research,? Professor Wain-Hobson said.

?The risks are clear for all to see and the benefits are qualitative, and that?s rather weak.Civil scientists are not here to increase the risk from microbes. We are not here to make the microbial world more dangerous,? he said.
...

Full text:

Leading scientists condemn decision to continue controversial research

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/leading-scientists-condemn-decision-to-continue-controversial-research-into-deadly-h5n1-birdflu-virus-8463863.html

Research has already led to the creation of a mutated form of avian flu that can spread easily between mammals – including humans

**Giuseppe** · January 23, 2013, 03:13 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

The issue will remain open since - luckily - good science has to be made for open discussion and debate.

The possible public health consequences of a deliberate or erroneous release into the environment of these chimera viruses should be addressed properly and evalutated by all shareholders.

**gsgs** · January 23, 2013, 10:41 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

we need a global organization to handle these things.

Every country has different rules and arguments ...
but the risks affect the whole world

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Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

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