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  • Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

    Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants Derived from Contemporary Avian H5N1 and Human H3N2 Influenza A Viruses

    Li-Mei Chen#, C. Todd Davis#, Hong Zhou, Nancy J. Cox, Ruben O. Donis*
    Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America

    Abstract
    The segmented structure of the influenza virus genome plays a pivotal role in its adaptation to new hosts and the emergence of pandemics. Despite concerns about the pandemic threat posed by highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses, little is known about the biological properties of H5N1 viruses that may emerge following reassortment with contemporary human influenza viruses. In this study, we used reverse genetics to generate the 63 possible virus reassortants derived from H5N1 and H3N2 viruses, containing the H5N1 surface protein genes, and analyzed their viability, replication efficiency, and mouse virulence. Specific constellations of avian?human viral genes proved deleterious for viral replication in cell culture, possibly due to disruption of molecular interaction networks. In particular, striking phenotypes were noted with heterologous polymerase subunits, as well as NP and M, or NS. However, nearly one-half of the reassortants replicated with high efficiency in vitro, revealing a high degree of compatibility between avian and human virus genes. Thirteen reassortants displayed virulent phenotypes in mice and may pose the greatest threat for mammalian hosts. Interestingly, one of the most pathogenic reassortants contained avian PB1, resembling the 1957 and 1968 pandemic viruses. Our results reveal the broad spectrum of phenotypes associated with H5N1/H3N2 reassortment and a possible role for the avian PB1 in the emergence of pandemic influenza. These observations have important implications for risk assessment of H5N1 reassortant viruses detected in surveillance programs.

    Author Summary
    The influenza pandemics of 1957 and 1968 were caused by hybrid viruses consisting of a mixture of human and avian influenza genes. The introduction of avian genes resulted in a sudden change of the virus surface antigens, allowing its worldwide spread due to lack of immunity in the population. The highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus has continued its spread in domestic and wild birds in Asia, Europe, and Africa. Although H5N1 infection in humans is rare and person-to-person transmission is very inefficient, the steady accumulation of human cases has raised concern over the possible reassortment between H5N1 and human seasonal influenza resulting in a virus with new surface antigens and pandemic potential. In this study, we used recombinant DNA technology to generate a systematic collection of hybrid viruses (with genes from human and avian viruses) bearing H5N1 surface antigens and analyzed their properties in cell culture and in mice. The H5N1 hybrid viruses revealed a broad range of viability and multiplication capacity in cell cultures. In addition, several H5N1 hybrid viruses were highly virulent in mice. Results from this systematic analysis provide important insight to support risk assessment of reassortant H5N1 avian influenza viruses.

    Citation: Chen L-M, Davis CT, Zhou H, Cox NJ, Donis RO (2008) Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants Derived from Contemporary Avian H5N1 and Human H3N2 Influenza A Viruses. PLoS Pathog 4(5): e1000072. doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1000072
    Editor: Adolfo Garcia-Sastre, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, United States of America
    Received: February 21, 2008; Accepted: April 15, 2008; Published: May 23, 2008
    This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Public Domain declaration which stipulates that, once placed in the public domain, this work may be freely reproduced, distributed, transmitted, modified, built upon, or otherwise used by anyone for any lawful purpose.

    Full study here:
    The salvage of human life ought to be placed above barter and exchange ~ Louis Harris, 1918

  • #2
    Re: Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

    1-line summary: "we report a strikingly high level of compatibility between avian and human virus genes"
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    I haven't yet read the whole paper, but

    isn't this contrary to the CDC-reassortment paper from 2006,

    where we were told that reassortants are not viable,
    often quoted in flu-forums since then ?

    I couldn't find any mention of that paper (yet)

    -------edit-- I found it now, it's reference 11
    I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
    my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

      Originally posted by gsgs View Post
      I haven't yet read the whole paper, but

      isn't this contrary to the CDC-reassortment paper from 2006,

      where we were told that reassortants are not viable,
      often quoted in flu-forums since then ?

      I couldn't find any mention of that paper (yet)
      Please. These are the same authors.
      I think you have misunderstod prior posts on "viability". More reassortants in earlier study (which was smaller) did not replicate as well as the parental strains, and didn't transmit at well as the parental strains.
      Once again you are mixing up concepts.

      Comment


      • #4
        Re: Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

        here the table in computer-readable form and sorted by avian-segments:
        (they made a picture-file from it :-( )

        A/Wyoming/3/2003(H3N2) and A/Thailand/16/2004(H5N1)


        segments
        12345678
        rescue efficiency
        +-
        plague-size
        ----------------
        aaaaaaaa,76,2,45
        aaaaaaah,72,3,45
        aaaaaaha,70,2,40
        aaaaaahh,72,1,40
        aaaaahaa,68,8,27
        aaaahaaa,10,5,0
        aaaahaah,43,9,15
        aaaahaha,10,5,0
        aaaahahh,69,2,42
        aahaaaaa,64,3,22
        aahaaaah,59,7,25
        aahaaaha,38,2,17
        aahaaahh,48,7,10
        aahahaaa,10,5,0
        aahahaah,10,5,0
        aahahaha,10,5,0
        aahahahh,37,2,12
        ahaaaaaa,69,2,40
        ahaaaaah,73,1,45
        ahaaaaha,69,2,40
        ahaaaahh,76,2,42
        ahaahaaa,20,3,10
        ahaahaah,61,9,17
        ahaahaha,23,6,17
        ahaahahh,69,5,45
        ahhaaaaa,61,10,22
        ahhaaaah,44,14,15
        ahhaaaha,43,13,20
        ahhaaahh,43,5,7
        ahhahaaa,10,5,0
        ahhahahh,31,10,3
        haaaaaaa,66,1,12
        haaaaaah,71,1,15
        haaaaaha,70,3,40
        haaaaahh,75,2,35
        haaahaaa,10,5,0
        haaahaah,45,6,12
        haaahaha,28,7,17
        haaahahh,68,6,37
        hahaaaaa,70,1,30
        hahaaaah,73,3,27
        hahaaaha,70,3,40
        hahaaahh,72,3,37
        hahahaaa,10,5,0
        hahahaah,39,3,7
        hahahaha,53,3,15
        hahahahh,67,3,22
        hhaaaaaa,46,8,20
        hhaaaaah,67,2,17
        hhaaaaha,57,1,35
        hhaaaahh,63,8,32
        hhaahaaa,10,5,0
        hhaahaah,44,1,15
        hhaahaha,10,5,0
        hhaahahh,45,6,35
        hhhaaaaa,53,7,12
        hhhaaaah,71,1,17
        hhhaaaha,66,7,35
        hhhaaahh,72,3,35
        hhhahaaa,10,5,0
        hhhahaah,48,10,10
        hhhahaha,26,4,12
        hhhahahh,74,1,25
        hhhhhhhh,72,2,45
        --------------------

        correlation(rescue efficiency,plague-size)=0.84



        hhhahahh,74,1,25 : so, just the human H3N2 with HA and NA from the Thai-H5N1 replicated well !
        (in mice)
        now try ferrets ! Quickly !
        Last edited by gsgs; May 26, 2008, 12:42 AM.
        I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
        my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

        Comment


        • #5
          Re: Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

          what did that study cost ?

          wasn't it worth to get this earlier, in 2006 ?

          since when did the authors know partial results ?

          did they inform WHO, governments ?
          I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
          my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

          Comment


          • #6
            Re: Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

            Originally posted by gsgs View Post
            1-line summary: "we report a strikingly high level of compatibility between avian and human virus genes"
            ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


            I haven't yet read the whole paper, but

            isn't this contrary to the CDC-reassortment paper from 2006,

            where we were told that reassortants are not viable,
            often quoted in flu-forums since then ?

            I couldn't find any mention of that paper (yet)

            -------edit-- I found it now, it's reference 11
            This paper used a human H3N2 and a clade 1 isolate from 2004, which is one of the inherant limitations of such studies. There are not many human clade 1 cases anymore, and H1N1 is the human serotype that has picked up the H5N1 Tamiflu resistance, which is flying around in clade 2.2.

            H5N1 is using MANY more combinations than the CDC.

            Comment


            • #7
              Re: Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

              from the 2006-paper :




              Table 2. In vitro and in vivo characteristics of avian-human
              reassortant influenza viruses


              Avian or human virus gene[1] PB2,PB1,PA,HA,NP,NA,M,NS
              EID50/ml, log10
              pfu/ml
              Weight loss (&#37 [2] No. of inoculated ferrets/total number
              Sneezing (day of onset) No. of inoculated ferrets/total number
              Virus detected in nasal wash (days p.i.) [3] No.of inoc.ferrets/total
              Peak nasal wash titer (day) [4]
              Weight loss (%) [6] No.of contact ferrets
              Sneezing virus detected in nasal wash No.of contact ferrets
              Sero-conversion(HI titer) [7]

              Code:
              hhhhhhhh,9.3,5e6,2/3( 1.4),3/3(2),3/3(1-7) ,5.1(1)
              aaaaaaaa,7.5,5e5,3/3(21.1),0/3   ,3/3(1-7+),6.2(5)
              hhhahahh,7.8,1e3,1/3( 2.2),0/3   ,3/3(1-7+),3.7(3), 1/3(0.8),0/3,0/3,0/3
              aaahahaa,7.8,4e6,3/3( 4.1),3/3(2),3/3(1-5) ,5.2(3)  1/3(0.4),0/3,0/3,1/3(40)
              hhhahaaa,7.5,1e7,2/3( 1.7),0/3   ,3/3(1-5) ,4.7(3)  3/3(2.3),0/3,0/3,0/3
              hhhahaaa,8.3,4e7,3/3( 0.3),2/3(7),3/3(1-5) ,5.1(3)  0/3     ,0/3,0/3,0/3
              [1] Avian genes (A) are from HK486 (H5N1), and human genes (H) are
              from Vic75 (H3N2) virus.
              [2] The percentage mean maximum weight loss is shown.
              [3] +, the endpoint of virus detection in nasal washes was not
              determined for all ferrets.
              [4] Peak nasal wash titers are expressed as the mean log10 EID50/ml.
              [5] rg486:VicRNP was passaged five times in ferrets and then grown in eggs
              [6] The percentage mean maximum weight loss is shown
              [7] HI assays were done by using Vic75 or HK486 and RBCs from
              turkey or horse, respectively


              Vic75+486 vs Wyo+THA :
              Code:
              hhhhhhhh,9.3,5e6,  7.2,2,45
              aaaaaaaa,7.5,5e5,  7.6,2,45
              hhhahahh,7.8,1e3,  7.4,1,25
              aaahahaa,7.8,4e6,
              hhhahaaa,7.5,1e7,  0
              hhhahaaa,8.3,4e7,  0
              I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
              my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

              Comment


              • #8
                Re: Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

                Originally posted by gsgs View Post
                here the table in computer-readable form and sorted by avian-segments:
                (they made a picture-file from it :-( )

                A/Wyoming/3/2003(H3N2) and A/Thailand/16/2004(H5N1)


                segments
                12345678
                ----------------
                aaaaaaaa,76,2,45
                aaaaaaah,72,3,45
                aaaaaaha,70,2,40
                aaaaaahh,72,1,40
                aaaaahaa,68,8,27
                aaaahaaa,10,5,0
                aaaahaah,43,9,15
                aaaahaha,10,5,0
                aaaahahh,69,2,42
                aahaaaaa,64,3,22
                aahaaaah,59,7,25
                aahaaaha,38,2,17
                aahaaahh,48,7,10
                aahahaaa,10,5,0
                aahahaah,10,5,0
                aahahaha,10,5,0
                aahahahh,37,2,12
                ahaaaaaa,69,2,40
                ahaaaaah,73,1,45
                ahaaaaha,69,2,40
                ahaaaahh,76,2,42
                ahaahaaa,20,3,10
                ahaahaah,61,9,17
                ahaahaha,23,6,17
                ahaahahh,69,5,45
                ahhaaaaa,61,10,22
                ahhaaaah,44,14,15
                ahhaaaha,43,13,20
                ahhaaahh,43,5,7
                ahhahaaa,10,5,0
                ahhahahh,31,10,3
                haaaaaaa,66,1,12
                haaaaaah,71,1,15
                haaaaaha,70,3,40
                haaaaahh,75,2,35
                haaahaaa,10,5,0
                haaahaah,45,6,12
                haaahaha,28,7,17
                haaahahh,68,6,37
                hahaaaaa,70,1,30
                hahaaaah,73,3,27
                hahaaaha,70,3,40
                hahaaahh,72,3,37
                hahahaaa,10,5,0
                hahahaah,39,3,7
                hahahaha,53,3,15
                hahahahh,67,3,22
                hhaaaaaa,46,8,20
                hhaaaaah,67,2,17
                hhaaaaha,57,1,35
                hhaaaahh,63,8,32
                hhaahaaa,10,5,0
                hhaahaah,44,1,15
                hhaahaha,10,5,0
                hhaahahh,45,6,35
                hhhaaaaa,53,7,12
                hhhaaaah,71,1,17
                hhhaaaha,66,7,35
                hhhaaahh,72,3,35
                hhhahaaa,10,5,0
                hhhahaah,48,10,10
                hhhahaha,26,4,12
                hhhahahh,74,1,25
                hhhhhhhh,72,2,45



                hhhahahh,74,1,25 : so, just the human H3N2 with HA and NA from the Thai-H5N1 replicated well !
                (in mice)
                now try ferrets ! Quickly !
                Please. You are again posting nonsense. The are MANY pure H5N1's the replicate well in mice, ferrets, AND humans. The issue with H5N1 is TRANSMISSION, not replication.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Re: Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

                  Originally posted by gsgs View Post
                  what did that study cost ?

                  wasn't it worth to get this earlier, in 2006 ?

                  since when did the authors know partial results ?

                  did they inform WHO, governments ?
                  Please. The data is PUBLISHED, and it says VERY little. H5N1 is a transmission issue, not a replication issue.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Re: Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

                    no replication, no transmission.

                    Floobiehood had believed, hybrids were probably not viable since
                    that July-2006 paper. You may remember the discussions
                    and press-releases.

                    See also the comments of the authors, who were astonished
                    themselves.
                    I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
                    my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Re: Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

                      Originally posted by gsgs View Post
                      no replication, no transmission.

                      Floobiehood had believed, hybrids were probably not viable since
                      that July-2006 paper. You may remember the discussions
                      and press-releases.

                      See also the comments of the authors, who were astonished
                      themselves.
                      Please. The earlier study focused on transmission, and none transmitted as well as pure avian. Others did replicate well. The current study simply shows that the VAST majority don't even replicate well. Only 3 combinations caused major weight loss in mice. Qinghai KILLS mice in 3 days.
                      You are still posting nonsense,
                      Last edited by AlaskaDenise; May 25, 2008, 04:46 PM. Reason: typo

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Re: Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

                        OK, I read the whole paper now.
                        Their "important implication for risk assessment"
                        is presumably just the usual exaggerations of the very paper's importance
                        usually seen in the introductions of such papers.
                        As you say, no transmission was examined/considered.
                        The surprisingly high number of viable reassortants
                        is not so worrying, since I assume that in coinfections
                        many combinations are being tried and filtering the
                        best one from 256 is not so difficult anyway with so many cells
                        and viruses.

                        They found apparantly higher virulence as in 2006 with the
                        hhhahahh combination but they had mice, while in 2006 it were ferrets.

                        Transmissiability via droplets is difficult to predict,
                        and to measure. Maybe it's even rather discontinuous in the
                        genome. So with mutations or reassortments in a hill-climbing
                        process you only find local maxima, rarely the global one.
                        And then it depends on weather, host-habits etc.

                        No significant increase of the panflu-threatlevel
                        I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
                        my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Re: Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

                          Originally posted by gsgs View Post
                          OK, I read the whole paper now.
                          Their "important implication for risk assessment"
                          is presumably just the usual exaggerations of the very paper's importance
                          usually seen in the introductions of such papers.
                          As you say, no transmission was examined/considered.
                          The surprisingly high number of viable reassortants
                          is not so worrying, since I assume that in coinfections
                          many combinations are being tried and filtering the
                          best one from 256 is not so difficult anyway with so many cells
                          and viruses.

                          They found apparantly higher virulence as in 2006 with the
                          hhhahahh combination but they had mice, while in 2006 it were ferrets.

                          Transmissiability via droplets is difficult to predict,
                          and to measure. Maybe it's even rather discontinuous in the
                          genome. So with mutations or reassortments in a hill-climbing
                          process you only find local maxima, rarely the global one.
                          And then it depends on weather, host-habits etc.

                          No significant increase of the panflu-threatlevel
                          I am on the road and haven't had a chance to go through the paper, but I suspect these are leftovers, most of which grow, but do little more (three legged dog category). Like the earlier studies, isolates with 100% avian H5N1 beat out avian / human reassortants in vritually all categories, including transmission (which is why WHO consultants are not as interested in H5N1. It doesn't fit their model, so the more they look, the more they are wrong).

                          However, H5N1 couldn't care less about their model, because its nonsense and based on "hopes and dreams", but hazardous to the world's health.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Re: Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

                            Figure 3

                            Code:
                            segments 12345678 from a:TH04 , h:WY03
                            LD_50 , lethal dose
                            MID_50 , mouse infective dose
                            weight loss
                            MST , mean survival time
                            lung
                            spleen
                            brain
                            nasal turbinate
                            
                            ---------------------------------
                            aaaaaaaa,18,15,198,06,71,19,33,55
                            aaaaahaa,22,14,255,07,67,23,15,43
                            hahahahh,25,10,172,07,65,00,11,55
                            hahaaaha,27,15,218,07,69,11,13,52
                            haaaaaha,28,15,194,09,77,27,16,39
                            hhhaaaha,34,15,255,06,60,10,15,44
                            haaaaahh,35,12,255,07,71,19,11,42
                            hhaaaaha,35,13,224,08,70,14,08,34
                            haaaaaaa,35,08,195,09,64,22,22,49
                            ahaaaaha,38,15,223,08,68,07,00,18
                            hhhahahh,38,18,189,09,70,14,00,53
                            hahahaha,38,25,174,13,62,08,00,30
                            hhaaaaaa,38,22,162,07,69,20,22,43
                            aaaaaaah,38,20,156,08,68,12,00,35
                            hahaaaaa,38,22,151,08,68,22,15,54
                            hahaaahh,44,12,237,22,68,19,00,32
                            hhhaaaah,44,14,229,22,67,18,09,48
                            hhaaaaah,44,20,189,22,38,00,00,31
                            haaahahh,44,15,188,22,68,00,11,50
                            hhaahahh,44,10,169,22,60,07,09,55
                            ahaaaaah,44,17,144,22,63,25,10,30
                            ahaahahh,44,16,140,22,46,00,07,45
                            hhhaaahh,44,17,135,22,32,00,00,16
                            ahaaaahh,44,08,120,22,39,00,00,07
                            aaaahahh,44,25,120,22,68,08,00,54
                            aahaaaaa,44,44,086,22,16,00,00,00
                            hhaaaahh,44,13,073,22,59,09,00,41
                            ahaaaaaa,44,35,073,22,49,15,17,32
                            hahaaaah,44,35,068,22,12,07,00,39
                            haaaaaah,44,25,063,22,64,09,07,35
                            aaaaaahh,44,27,057,22,63,00,08,38
                            aahaaaha,44,10,035,22,42,00,00,30
                            haaahaah,44,10,029,22,32,08,00,34
                            hhhaaaaa,44,15,026,22,41,16,10,35
                            ahaahaah,44,08,002,22,51,12,10,49
                            aaaaaaha,44,14,000,22,59,00,00,35
                            aaaahaah,44,12,000,22,46,11,00,46
                            aahaaahh,44,25,000,22,47,00,00,00
                            aahaaaah,44,40,000,22,08,00,00,07
                            ahhaaaaa,44,44,000,22,10,00,00,00
                            hhhhhhhh,66,60,000,22,00,00,00,00
                            ---------------------------------
                            correlation coefficients * 100 :

                            Code:
                                        1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8 
                            --------------------------------------------
                            1.LD_50     --  47 -60  78 -59 -58 -61 -48    
                            2.MID_50    47  -- -42  27 -66 -34 -25 -59    
                            3.-weight  -60 -42  -- -67  65  41  42  44    
                            4.MST       78  27 -67  -- -56 -55 -54 -38    
                            5.lung     -59 -66  65 -56  --  49  48  69    
                            6.spleen   -58 -34  41 -55  49  --  50  49    
                            7.brain    -61 -25  42 -54  48  50  --  53    
                            8.nose     -48 -59  44 -38  69  49  53  --    
                            --------------------------------------------
                                        1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8
                            best correlation between lethal dose_50 and mean survival time
                            I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
                            my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Re: Genetic Compatibility and Virulence of Reassortants of H5N1 and H3N2

                              Source: http://canadianpress.google.com/arti...HKailnUqgYJz4g

                              Study shows hybrids of bird flu and human flu viruses fit well, could occur

                              17 minutes ago

                              TORONTO ? An experiment mating H5N1 avian flu viruses and a strain of human flu in a laboratory produced a surprising number of hybrid viruses that were biologically fit, a new study reveals.

                              And while none of the offspring viruses was as virulent as the original H5N1, about one in five were lethal to mice at low doses, showing they retained at least a portion of the power of their dangerous parent.

                              The work suggests that under the right circumstances - and no one is clear what all of those are - the two types of flu viruses could swap genes in a way that might allow the H5N1 virus to acquire the capacity to trigger a pandemic. That process is called reassortment.

                              "This study is just showing exactly that: There is a risk this virus can successfully reassort with a human virus," said Richard Webby, director of the World Health Organization's collaborating centre for influenza research at St. Jude Hospital in Memphis, Tenn.

                              "The problem is we don't know at this stage whether there's a benefit to these H5N1 viruses in doing that."

                              Nor can anyone say why, if the viruses swapped genes so readily in the laboratory, that hasn't seemed to have happened in the parts of the world where H5N1 has been circulating for years.

                              "This is the million dollar question," says senior author Dr. Ruben Donis, of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control's influenza division.

                              Reassortment is one of two ways in which a pandemic virus can evolve. The other is for a bird virus to acquire a number of mutations that allow it to more easily infect people and transmit among them.

                              The latter, called adaptive mutation, is thought to be the way the 1918 Spanish flu virus emerged. The viruses responsible for the milder pandemics of 1957 and 1968 arose through the mixing of human and avian flu virus genes.

                              This work, done at the CDC, was conducted to study the reassortment potential of H5N1 and H3N2 viruses. H3N2 is one of two human influenza A viruses that cause disease during flu season.

                              The study was published in PLoS Pathogens, one of the Public Library of Science journals.

                              Reassortment studies can be done one of two ways. One involves simultaneously infecting cells with the two viruses and seeing what nature produces. The other involves making viruses by piecing together combinations of synthesized human and avian genes.

                              "It's like Lego," Donis, head of the molecular virology and vaccines branch, says of this approach, which was the one used for this study.

                              But this is a game of Lego where it's not clear from looking at the pieces which will go together into a structure that will hold. "We really don't understand the rules of engagement for playing the Legos. We don't know what makes these things connect well or not connect well," he admits.

                              The researchers created 63 viruses representing the various potential combinations of human and avian internal genes, using an H5N1 virus that circulated in Thailand in 2004 and an H3N2 virus recovered in Wyoming in 2003.

                              All but one of the hybrids carried the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes - the H and N in a flu virus's name of H5N1. The remaining one used the neuraminidase from the human virus, creating an H5N2 virus that grew virtually as well as the H5N1 virus and was almost as lethal in mice.

                              Once the viruses were made they were placed in a medium to see if and how well they grew. Viruses were then harvested to use to infect mice, to test for virulence.

                              While 13 of the hybrid viruses either didn't grow or barely grew, the other 50 grew to some degree. And 28 replicated nearly as well as the original H5N1. Donis admits he was surprised by how well the avian and human gene combinations performed.

                              "I was expecting more incompatibility," he says.

                              By studying the combinations that succeeded and failed, the scientists were able to start to see patterns of which gene combinations are critical for an H5N1 virus to thrive.

                              When the most viable viruses were tested in mice, none was as nasty as H5N1. "That's the good news," Donis says, alluding to the fact that if reassortment turns H5N1 into a pandemic strain, the resulting virus could be less virulent than the current version.

                              Since late 2003 there have been 383 confirmed human cases of H5N1 infection and 241, or 63 per cent, of those people have died.

                              The virus that most closely matched H5N1 for virulence was one with three avian genes, the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase, plus the PB1 gene combined with five genes from the human virus.

                              Both the viruses from the 1957 and 1968 pandemics carried an avian PB1 gene. The authors suggest that picking up an avian PB1 gene may be a critical step in a potential pandemic virus arising through reassortment.

                              But just because the viruses mated successfully in a laboratory doesn't mean those viruses could go on to trigger a pandemic. In order to have that potential, a virus would have to be able to transmit from person to person - a skill that has so far eluded H5N1.

                              "The bottom line is it comes back down to transmission really being the key," Webby says. "But to say that we understand what are the factors involved in transmission is certainly an overstatement."

                              Earlier work at the CDC on some H5N1-H3N2 reassortant viruses showed they failed to transmit from infected to uninfected ferrets, an animal often used in flu research.

                              Donis says his team hopes to test its reassortant viruses in ferrets as well, but is still going through the approvals process.

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