Announcement

**sharon sanders** · September 22, 2008, 07:55 AM

Re: September 2008 Market Phenomena

"Although gold dust is precious, when it gets in your eyes, it obstructs your vision."

Hsi-Tang

**sharon sanders** · September 22, 2008, 03:55 PM

Re: September 2008 Market Phenomena

We need a new revolution:

The Alternative Energy Revolution.

It would create jobs and stimulate the economy.

We need an aggressive program of tax incentives, rebates, low interest loans, scholarships, grants, and other forms of passive and active encouragements from the public and private sectors.

**sharon sanders** · September 22, 2008, 05:05 PM

Treasury Fact Sheet

September 20, 2008
hp-1150

FACT SHEET:
Proposed Treasury Authority to Purchase Troubled Assets

Washington � The Treasury Department has submitted legislation to the Congress requesting authority to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions in order to promote market stability, and help protect American families and the US economy. This program is intended to fundamentally and comprehensively address the root cause of our financial system's stresses by removing distressed assets from the financial system. When the financial system works as it should, money and capital flow to and from households and businesses to pay for home loans, school loans and investments that create jobs. As illiquid mortgage assets block the system, the clogging of our financial markets has the potential to significantly damage our financial system and our economy, undermining job creation and income growth. The following description reflects Treasury's proposal as of Saturday afternoon.
Scale and Timing of Asset Purchases. Treasury will have authority to issue up to $700 billion of Treasury securities to finance the purchase of troubled assets. The purchases are intended to be residential and commercial mortgage-related assets, which may include mortgage-backed securities and whole loans. The Secretary will have the discretion, in consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, to purchase other assets, as deemed necessary to effectively stabilize financial markets. Removing troubled assets will begin to restore the strength of our financial system so it can again finance economic growth. The timing and scale of any purchases will be at the discretion of Treasury and its agents, subject to this total cap. The price of assets purchases will be established through market mechanisms where possible, such as reverse auctions. The dollar cap will be measured by the purchase price of the assets. The authority to purchase expires two years from date of enactment.
Asset and Institutional Eligibility for the Program. To qualify for the program, assets must have been originated or issued on or before September 17, 2008. Participating financial institutions must have significant operations in the U.S., unless the Secretary makes a determination, in consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, that broader eligibility is necessary to effectively stabilize financial markets.

Management and Disposition of the Assets. The assets will be managed by private asset managers at the direction of Treasury to meet program objectives. Treasury will have full discretion over the management of the assets as well as the exercise of any rights received in connection with the purchase of the assets. Treasury may sell the assets at its discretion or may hold assets to maturity. Cash received from liquidating the assets, including any additional returns, will be returned to Treasury's general fund for the benefit of American taxpayers.
Funding. Funding for the program will be provided directly by Treasury from its general fund. Borrowing in support of this program will be subject to the debt limit, which will be increased by $700 billion accordingly. As with other Treasury borrowing, information on any borrowing related to this program will be publicly reported at the end of the following day in the Daily Treasury Statement. (http://www.fms.treas.gov/dts/)

Reporting. Within three months of the first asset purchases under the program, and semi-annually thereafter, Treasury will provide the appropriate Congressional committees with regular updates on the program.

**sharon sanders** · September 22, 2008, 05:19 PM

Wall Street Journal

<small>SEPTEMBER 22, 2008, 5:06 P.M. ET</small>

Democrats Craft Bailout Plans
To Include Homeowner Help

By COREY BOLES and MICHAEL R. CRITTENDEN

more in Politics & Campaign »

WASHINGTON --

<snip>

Rep. Barney Frank (D., Mass.), chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, said the Treasury has also agreed to the Democrats' idea that the federal government should receive warrants for equity stakes in financial firms in exchange for the government purchase of toxic assets from them.

</object>Congress may raise the cost of a $700 billion market-rescue deal by adding a new economic stimulus plan to benefit taxpayers, according to Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., chairman of the House Financial Services Committee. (Sept. 22)

"We also made it clear that if you take that equity, it has to be with warrants so if a company becomes profitable, we get a little bit more than the general share for taking these risks," he said.

Later Monday however, a source close to the Treasury said there was no deal with the Democrats on the warrant issue.

A Treasury spokeswoman declined to comment.

Mr. Frank sounded confident that the plan could begin positively affecting financial markets from the day it's implemented. Mr. Frank also said it would cost less than the $700 billion authority Treasury is requesting for the bailout scheme.

"It's never going to remotely cost anything like $700 billion," Mr. Frank said.

<snip>

According to a draft of the Frank bill obtained by Dow Jones Newswires, there is a broad definition of assets that could be purchased by the Treasury, encompassing commercial mortgages or other loans as deemed by the Treasury Secretary.

It includes residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations or other instruments that are based on or related to mortgages, as long as it was originated or issued on or before Sept. 17, 2008, the bill said.

Mr. Frank said he didn't think hedge funds holding assets linked to mortgages would be able to take part in the plan. Also, the plan is likely to be limited to aiding U.S. financial institutions, but what constitutes a U.S. institution is still being discussed.

<snip>

Like hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds holding toxic assets would not be permitted to take part in the scheme.

He said that Mr. Paulson hasn't agreed to the notion that there should be no "golden parachutes" for chief executives at the financial firms that take part in the rescue plan.

<snip>

The Fallout Continues
</snip></snip></snip></snip>

See complete coverage of the crisis on Wall Street.

More

<snip>

Democrats have made repeated attempts to allow bankruptcy judges to modify the terms of mortgages to help cash-strapped borrowers, a position opposed by Republicans and the banking industry.

<snip>

"The bill gave the Secretary (Paulson) much too much authority," Mr. Frank said. "We restored the notion of judicial review and accountability; we have created in our legislation...a very tough oversight board independently funded to check" the program's operation.

<snip>

<cite class="tagline"></cite>Write to Corey Boles at corey.boles@dowjones.com and Michael R. Crittenden at michael.crittenden@dowjones.com

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122209290438362805.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
</snip></snip></snip>

**sharon sanders** · September 22, 2008, 05:43 PM

Re: September 2008 Market Phenomena

September 22, 2008

Perils of Paulson

Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke may be escaping from the precipice of one horrific calamity, only to be breathing a sigh of relief just as an even worse catastrophe looms. The plan to buy distressed mortgage related assets and derivative products, referred to by some as TARP (the Troubled Asset Relief Program) and by others as MOAB (the Mother of All Bailouts), may provide some short term relief to the global financial markets, which perhaps will suffice to head off greater disaster. However, putting aside the concerns raised regarding the wisdom and efficacy of the proposal, the larger question remains as to how to mitigate the threat posed by the still-completely-unregulated $62 trillion credit default swap market.

As discussed in this space before, a credit default swap (CDS) is a swap agreement whereby the holder of debt may purchase protection from a third party against the debt issuer's default. The seller thereby takes on the credit risk of the issuer, and the buyer replaces the credit risk with counterparty risk. As CDSs have evolved from hedging devices into speculative instruments (buyers making short bets without actually owning the underlying debt), the market has grown exponentially.

(pretty soon we will be talking about real money -Fla1)

continued...

Redirecting

http://overhedged.blogspot.com/2008/09/perils-of-paulson.html

**sharon sanders** · September 22, 2008, 05:53 PM

New York Steps in to Regulate Credit Swaps

Monday, September 22, 2008 - 4:49 PM EDT
State ramps up oversight of financial markets

The Business Review (Albany)

Gov. David Paterson?s administration said Monday that the state now has the power to regulate part of the stock market?s $62 trillion in credit default swaps, the first time the state has ever had such power.
The state Insurance Department announced the regulatory changes, which take effect in January. It marks the state?s latest response to the spiraling stock market brought on by the failure or fragility of the nation?s largest investment banks and bond insurance companies.
Under Paterson?s direction, the Insurance Department effectively reversed an 8-year-old ruling that credit default swaps are not a form of insurance. Now, the state has established that some credit swaps are considered insurance, making them subject to state regulation.
?The absence of regulatory oversight is the principle cause of the Wall Street meltdown we are currently witnessing,? Paterson said in a statement. He called credit default swaps ?a major contributor to the emerging financial crisis on Wall Street.?
The move mirrors federal action made last week to curb short-selling of stocks. A credit swap is similar, in that an investor can profit when the value of a security drops.
Under the new guidelines, the state Insurance Department can regulate a credit swap when the buyer owns the underlying security on which he or she is buying protection. Therefore, swaps can only be issued by entities who are licensed to conduct insurance business.
Paterson said the goal of regulation is not to stop ?sensible economic transactions,? but instead to ensure that sellers have sufficient capital in place to protect buyers.
?We are providing an appropriate way for those with an insurable interest to protect themselves and we are going to ensure that whoever sells them that protection is solvent,? said Eric Dinallo, superintendent of the state Insurance Department. ?We are not regulating naked credit default swaps.

Just a moment...

http://www.bizjournals.com/albany/stories/2008/09/22/daily11.html

**sharon sanders** · September 23, 2008, 04:42 AM

Re: September 2008 Market Phenomena

A Hedge Fund Like No Other

A Key Task for Congress: Matching Managers' and Taxpayers' Interests
By Simon Johnson and James Kwak
Tuesday, September 23, 2008; A21

Given the panic in Washington over the financial markets, it is virtually certain that Congress will soon pass some form of the bailout plan the Treasury put forward last week. This is not an ideal proposal, particularly since it does not address the underlying problem with mortgages and negative housing equity. No troubled mortgage holders would benefit directly, and key commercial banks might still end up undercapitalized.

However, no legislator wants to risk allowing the economy to collapse on his or her watch, and, according to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, that is what's at stake.

Within these political realities, there is a key issue on which lawmakers should focus, quickly, in designing this legislation: governance.

The draft proposal authorizes the Treasury to "purchase . . . on such terms and conditions as determined by the secretary, mortgage-related assets from any financial institution having its headquarters in the United States." In effect, this would invest $700 billion (for starters) of taxpayer money in a hedge fund controlled by a single person, the Treasury secretary. Given the urgency of the effort and the complex nature of the securities involved, this de facto fund would be government-run but overseen largely by Wall Street veterans; any actual management would probably be outsourced to existing fund management companies.

Ordinarily, the interests of hedge fund managers and investors are at least somewhat aligned by the fee structure of hedge funds, in which managers are paid 2 percent of assets under management plus a share of the returns over a certain threshold (commonly 20 percent). In addition, competition in the industry dictates that fund managers with below-market returns are less likely to be able to raise new funds. But neither of these incentives exists in this case.
Management fees cannot be tied to fund returns in the usual manner because the fund is highly likely -- some would say designed -- to lose money. To restore our nation's banks to health, the fund must pay above-market prices for mortgage-backed securities; if it paid market prices (about 22 cents on the dollar, based on the largest known recent transaction), that would simply trigger the massive write-downs that everyone fears. Because there is no competition for this fund, and no one involved is planning to raise another, the second incentive doesn't apply. Worse, the Treasury-appointed fund managers negotiating with banks to buy their mortgage-backed securities not only come from those banks but will almost certainly be looking for jobs at those banks once the need for the fund has passed, creating enormous potential conflicts of interest.

While the usual mechanisms for aligning incentives are unavailable, the stakes are unprecedented. Every dollar that the fund loses is a dollar handed from taxpayers to the banks and their shareholders. While previous bailouts, including that of AIG, have been designed to give the government at least some of the potential upside, the only upside here is that these securities may turn out to be worth more in the long term than the market thinks they are worth today. Despite this possibility, paying more for something than anyone else is willing to pay is, simply put, a sucker's bet. It is most likely that "governance" over the fund will be provided by periodic hearings of the relevant Senate and House committees during which the Treasury secretary and the fund managers will be asked why they overpaid for banks' securities and will answer that there was no choice if the financial system was to be saved.

While there is still time, Congress should consider alternative means of aligning incentives. For example, lawmakers could set a target for what return the fund is expected to get, and managers' compensation could be tied to their actual return relative to that target. Would-be fund managers should bid in an open process what target return they are willing to base their compensation on -- the management company that is willing to accept the highest (or least negative) target for a set of assets would get the contract for those assets.

In any case, the fund should provide full disclosure of the securities it buys, its valuation of them and the price paid, which would help ensure that the fund is managed in the country's best interests. Its leaders should be open about overpaying relative to market price, and on that basis, the fund should receive preferred stock in any participating bank. This would, among other things, give taxpayers some much deserved and long overdue potential upside.
Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is a professor at MIT and a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. James Kwak is a student at Yale Law School.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...092202584.html

**gsgs** · September 23, 2008, 05:03 AM

Re: September 2008 Market Phenomena

the money can't be lost, no destruction of assets.

So, where did the money go ? Who benefits from this ?

The debtors whose debts are now down-rated and thus cheaper ?

Doesn't America as a whole benefit from cheaper house-prices ?

**sharon sanders** · September 23, 2008, 07:14 AM

Re: September 2008 Market Phenomena

I am not sure what you are asking, but generally a problem exists when people owe more on their homes then the home is worth. This generally means the home can not be sold unless the owner is willing to sell it and also write a check at the closing. If the home owner can no longer make the mortgage payments due to a job loss, emergency, or rising interest rate on that mortgage, then the homeowner usually tries to sell that home. If the price of the home is less than the payoff of the mortgage and the closing costs then the chance that the home owner will walk away from the situation increases. If this happens, the mortgage company takes the home after a lengthy legal process. This is a non-performing loan and the bank must try to convert this asset to cash.

**gsgs** · September 23, 2008, 07:27 AM

Re: September 2008 Market Phenomena

in that example the bank loses and the ex-owner wins by
annulating his debt.

sum = zero

if the ex-owner can sell the house at lower price then he loses
the difference, but the buyer wins it.

sum = zero

did America lose from this "crisis" as a whole ?

**tropical** · September 23, 2008, 08:33 AM

Re: September 2008 Market Phenomena

Maybe the problem where sum isn't zero happened when:

If the PREVIOUS ON MARKET price of the home CAN BE QUOTED POTENTIALY OVER than the payoff of the mortgage and the closing costs BEFORE THE CRACK,

than after an wide market crack, the home prizes droped much more down, and what previously was an potential money suficit over the received mortgage in case of house selling, after the crack became an big deficit.
Thus, when the house was sell, the owner must found more additional funds to added to the house sell money, to extinguish totaly the mortgage.

**Amish Country** · September 23, 2008, 10:00 AM

Re: September 2008 Market Phenomena

Originally posted by tropical View Post

Maybe the problem where sum isn't zero happened when:

If the PREVIOUS ON MARKET price of the home CAN BE QUOTED POTENTIALY OVER than the payoff of the mortgage and the closing costs BEFORE THE CRACK,

than after an wide market crack, the home prizes droped much more down, and what previously was an potential money suficit over the received mortgage in case of house selling, after the crack became an big deficit.
Thus, when the house was sell, the owner must found more additional funds to added to the house sell money, to extinguish totaly the mortgage.

What it sounds like what you are describing is a Short Sale. Some mortgage companies will "forgive" the short amount (the difference between the sales price and the amount needed to satisfy the mortgage) sometimes they will not and will hold the mortgage holder responsible for the difference.

For more information on short sales:

Page Not Found

http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/wiki/Short_Sale_Defined.asp

**sharon sanders** · September 23, 2008, 10:06 AM

Re: September 2008 Market Phenomena

Senator Dodd's Proposal:

Summary: Dodd Legislative Changes to Treasury Proposal

***For Background Use Only***

The breadth of the Treasury proposal is extraordinary: the Department is asking for $700 billion to purchase any asset without any transparency as to the process; without any oversight by any court or administrative agency; and without any commitment to helping homeowners with troubled mortgages. Senator Dodd has offered a number of proposals that will address these concerns, as follows:

A. Transparency and Accountability

1. Establish an Oversight Board: We intend to establish an oversight board to make sure that the Treasury Secretary is not acting completely alone.

2. Require Program Transparency: We would require the Treasury to lay out its program, policies and procedures to ensure that the new authority is not used on a completely ad hoc basis. The Congress, the markets, and the American people deserve to understand how the Treasury is using these funds.

3. Significantly Improve Reporting Requirements: We add a strengthened reporting provision to require monthly rather than semi-annual reports to Congress regarding the exercise of authority under the Act. The provision requires financial statements describing all agreements and transactions entered into. Again, transparency is good for the markets and the economy.

4. GAO Audit: In order to ensure proper use of funds, and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse, we add a new provision to require the Office to annually issue financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and to require the Government Accountability Office to annually audit the Office and to assess internal financial controls.

5. Warrants: In the case of AIG and the GSEs, the government took warrants in the companies in exchange for our assistance. We include a provision to ensure the federal government gets warrants from companies that sell their bad assets to us.

6. Minimize Conflicts of Interest: Treasury intends to hire large asset management firms to organize the purchases of the “toxic” assets as well as their sale. However, many of these firms, such as PIMCO and Blackrock, have large positions in the same assets. Those positions could be affected by the way they manage the federal government’s portfolio. The Treasury proposal largely ignores this issue. We would add a provision to require the Secretary to issue rules on conflicts of interest that may arise in connection with the administration of the authorities provided in the Act. The conflicts include, but are not limited to hiring contractors or advisors, management of assets, bidding or purchasing of assets, and employees leaving the Office to work for an institution that has benefitted from the program.

7. Integrity of Deposit Insurance: This week the Treasury Department announced that it was offering temporary, unlimited deposit insurance for funds in participating money markets. This has caused considerable concern among banks (especially smaller banks) that it will precipitate a run on the banks by large depositors, who can now access unlimited deposit insurance in money markets. We add a provision to create parity between banks and money markets in terms of insured deposits during the period in which Treasury offers the insurance.

8. Executive Compensation: We add a provision to require the Secretary to have executive compensation standards for entities that seek to sell assets through the program. Such standards shall include limits on incentives and severance and a requirement for a claw-back provision.

B. Assistance for Homeowners

1. Court-Supervised Loan Modifications: After a year of efforts to get servicers and lenders to modify loans, the industry’s voluntary HOPE Now program has fallen far short of what is needed. This is because of the extreme complexity surrounding the securitization of mortgages. The only way to really help homeowners keep their homes is to allow borrowers to get the mortgages on their first homes reduced to the market value of those homes through bankruptcy. Second homes already have this benefit. We expect that very few homeowners will actually have to go into bankruptcy; however, this provision will finally give homeowners and servicers some leverage so that real modifications can move forward.

2. FDIC-Management of Mortgage Assets: The FDIC has shown a commitment to modifying mortgages both to ensure long-term affordability and to protect the taxpayer. FDIC staff estimate that performing loans are worth about 87% of par, while non-performing loans are worth only about 36% of par. Modifying loans to ensure affordability increases the value of the loans. For that reason, we would require the Treasury to shift the whole mortgages and residential MBS it purchases to the FDIC to manage, and add the requirement that the FDIC modify those loans where possible. We also require other federal agencies that hold or control mortgages or residential MBS to modify whenever possible. In addition to FDIC, this includes FHFA, which controls Fannie and Freddie’s portfolios, and the Federal Reserve Bank of NY, which owns a portfolio of mortgages acquired from Bear Stearns.

3. Affordable Housing Funds: The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) created two important housing funds – the Affordable Housing Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund. These entities were to be financed by the GSEs. Given the uncertainty of that source, we include a provision that requires that 20% of the profit of any assets purchased and sold by the Treasury through this program go to these two funds.

4. Expansion of HOPE for Homeowners: The HOPE for Homeowners program passed as part of HERA should help about 400,000 families keep their homes. However, it includes some restrictions that narrow the eligibility for the program. We propose to loosen the criteria modestly, so that more distressed homeowners can participate.

http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/SummaryDoddproposal92208.pdf

**sharon sanders** · September 23, 2008, 10:18 AM

Proposed Bill -

Section 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as

Sec. 2. Purchases of Mortgage-Related Assets.

(a) Authority to Purchase. -- The Secretary is authorized to purchase, and to make and fund commitments to purchase, on such terms and conditions as determined by the Secretary, mortgage-related assets from any financial institution having its headquarters in the United States.
(b) Necessary Actions. -- The Secretary is authorized to take such actions as the Secretary deems necessary to carry out the authorities in this Act, including, without limitation:

(1) appointing such employees as may be required to carry out the authorities in this Act and defining their duties;
(2) entering into contracts, including contracts for services authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, without regard to any other provision of law regarding public contracts;
(3) designating financial institutions as financial agents of the Government, and they shall perform all such reasonable duties related to this Act as financial agents of the Government as may be required of them;
(4) establishing vehicles that are authorized, subject to supervision by the Secretary, to purchase mortgage-related assets and issue obligations; and
(5) issuing such regulations and other guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to define terms or carry out the authorities of this Act.

Sec. 3. Considerations.

In exercising the authorities granted in this Act, the Secretary shall take into consideration means for--
(1) providing stability or preventing disruption to the financial markets or banking system; and
(2) protecting the taxpayer.

Sec. 4. Reports to Congress.

Within three months of the first exercise of the authority granted in section 2(a), and semiannually thereafter, the Secretary shall report to the Committees on the Budget, Financial Services, and Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committees on the Budget, Finance, and Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate with respect to the authorities exercised under this Act and the considerations required by section 3.

Sec. 5. Rights; Management; Sale of Mortgage-Related Assets.

(a) Exercise of Rights. -- The Secretary may, at any time, exercise any rights received in connection with mortgage-related assets purchased under this Act.
(b) Management of Mortgage-Related Assets. -- The Secretary shall have authority to manage mortgage-related assets purchased under this Act, including revenues and portfolio risks therefrom.
(c) Sale of Mortgage-Related Assets. -- The Secretary may, at any time, upon terms and conditions and at prices determined by the Secretary, sell, or enter into securities loans, repurchase transactions or other financial transactions in regard to, any mortgage-related asset purchased under this Act.
(d) Application of Sunset to Mortgage-Related Assets. -- The authority of the Secretary to hold any mortgage-related asset purchased under this Act before the termination date in section 9, or to purchase or fund the purchase of a mortgage-related asset under a commitment entered into before the termination date in section 9, is not subject to the provisions of section9.

Sec. 6. Maximum Amount of Authorized Purchases.

The Secretary's authority to purchase mortgage-related assets under this Act shall be limited to $700,000,000,000 outstanding at any one time.

Sec. 7. Funding.

For the purpose of the authorities granted in this Act, and for the costs of administering those authorities, the Secretary may use the proceeds of the sale of any securities issued under chapter 31 of title 31, United States Code, and the purposes for which securities may be issued under chapter 31 of title 31, United States Code, are extended to include actions authorized by this Act, including the payment of administrative expenses. Any funds expended for actions authorized by this Act, including the payment of administrative expenses, shall be deemed appropriated at the time of such expenditure.

Sec. 8. Review.

Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act are non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court of law or any administrative agency.

Sec. 9. Termination of Authority.

The authorities under this Act, with the exception of authorities granted in sections 2(b)(5), 5 and 7, shall terminate two years from the date of enactment of this Act.

Sec. 10. Increase in Statutory Limit on the Public Debt.

Subsection (b) of section 3101 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking out the dollar limitation contained in such subsection and inserting in lieu thereof $11,315,000,000,000.

Sec. 11. Credit Reform.

The costs of purchases of mortgage-related assets made under section 2(a) of this Act shall be determined as provided under the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, as applicable.

Sec. 12. Definitions.

For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) Mortgage-Related Assets. -- The term "mortgage-related assets" means residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based on or related to such mortgages, that in each case was originated or issued on or before September 17, 2008.
(2) Secretary. -- The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Treasury.
(3) United States. -- The term "United States" means the States, territories, and possessions of the United States and the District of Columbia.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/20/AR2008092002376_pf.html

Announcement

September 2008 Market Phenomena

September 2008 Market Phenomena

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