Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

[Shiloh]

Source: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakin...t-on-hog-virus

RP raises alert on hog virus
Pork exports stopped
By Amy R. Remo
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 22:19:00 12/10/2008

MANILA, Philippines—The Philippine government warned consumers on Wednesday about the ebola reston virus, which was found to have infected four hog farms in Luzon.

In a joint briefing, the Departments of Agriculture and of Health assured the public, however, that this low pathogenic strain was found to be "harmless" and "predominantly an animal health issue."

"Even if you are exposed to this virus, you will not get sick. This is not like the ebola virus which had hit Africa years ago," officials stressed.

As a precautionary measure, Agriculture Secretary Arthur C. Yap said the DA placed on quarantine the four farms in Pandi, Bulacan; Manaoag, Pangasinan, and the towns of Cabanatuan and Talavera in Nueva Ecija.

Yap, together with Health Secretary Francisco T. Duque, also advised consumers to buy meat only from accredited retail outlets; to properly handle and wash meat; and cook it thoroughly.

Yap has assured that monitoring of Bulacan hog farms will continue until all areas or farms there are free of the virus.

"I am confident that Visayas and Mindanao are not affected because since 1995, we have already stopped moving animals from Luzon to these two areas," he said,

The agriculture chief said on Wednesday the Philippine government was suspending pork exports until ensuring virus-free hog products.

"We have just started to look into the export market, so the industry will not lose anything. But we want to establish that we are responsible exporters," he said.

Agriculture and health officials, along with representatives from the World Health Organization and Food and Agriculture Organization, explained that the ebola reston virus has been endemic to the Philippines and was detected in monkeys which the country had exported to the United States. This was in 1989, 1992, and 1996, they added.

They, however, assured that of the 20 human handlers of the monkeys tested positive for ebola reston, only one manifested flu-like symptoms but had since fully recovered.

"What is clear is that ebola reston does not cause death to humans. There is no clear evidence that this can be transferred to a person and cause a casualty," Yap stressed.

Yap and Duque said they would write to the Paris-based Animal Health Organization to ask for support and technical assistance in clearing these farms and in eradicating the virus from the country.

Food handlers and the public are advised to follow five food safety rules namely: to keep clean; separate raw and cooked food; cook meat thoroughly; keep food at safe temperature; and use safe water and select fresh food.

[Gert van der Hoek]

The Reston ebolavirus, also referred to as Asian filovirus, Reston virus, or Ebola Reston—is suspected as either another subtype of the Ebola or a new filovirus of Asian origin.

It was discovered in crab-eating macaques from Hazleton Laboratories (now Covance)[A] in 1989.

This attracted significant media attention and led to the publication of The Hot Zone.

Despite its status as a Level-4 organism, the Reston ebolavirus is non-pathogenic to humans and is only mildly fatal to monkeys;[1][2]

the perception of its lethality was skewed due to the monkey's coinfection with Simian hemorrhagic fever virus (SHFV).[3]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ebola_Reston

[Giuseppe Michieli]

Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome, Philippines (12/10/2008) [OIE-WAHID]

Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome, Philippines

[Full PDF document at LINK]

Information received on 10/12/2008 from Mr Davinio P. Catbagan, Chief Veterinary Officer, Department of Agriculture, Office of the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, QUEZON CITY, Philippines

§ Summary

Report type Immediate notification
Start date 10/07/2008
Date of first confirmation of the event 30/10/2008
Report date 10/12/2008
Date submitted to OIE 10/12/2008
Reason for notification Unexpected increase in morbidity or mortality of a listed disease
Causal agent Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus
This event pertains to the whole country

§ Epidemiology
Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection Unknown or inconclusive
Introduction of new live animals

§ Epidemiological comments
In the district of Sto Nino (Pandi municipality, Bulacan province), the mortality was mostly observed in piglets. In the district of Pinagpanaan (Talavera municipality, Nueva Ecija province), all animals were downers with clinical signs suggestive of Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS)/Classical swine fever/Porcine circovirus type 2.
The Philippines has experienced a sudden increase in mortalities in pigs in the latter part of the second quarter of 2007 until the first quarter of 2008. The clinical signs exhibited by the diseased animals indicated atypical infection, which can be attributed to more than one pathogen.
Samples from the outbreaks were sent to the USDA Plum Island laboratory.
Results show that samples were positive for porcine circovirus type 2 and atypical PRRS virus, which is 98% homologous to the atypical PRRS virus isolated in China and Vietnam. With high morbidity and mortality observed similar to China and Vietnam, it was concluded that these outbreaks were most likely caused by atypical PRRS virus.
The USDA Plum Island laboratory also reported to have isolated Reston Ebola virus from swine samples.
Although considered of negligible public health importance, as indicated in the literatures and by the previous incident in the Philippines in a monkey farm in early 1990s with no human cases in spite of close contact with the monkeys, as a precautionary measure the BAI-DA (Bureau of Animal Industry – Department of Agriculture) and the DOH (Department of Health) immediately organised a team to investigate the affected areas.
Samples were collected from people and animals in the affected areas. Serum samples from animal caretakers and other people exposed to the animals were collected and tested at the DOH-RITM (Department of Health - Research Institute for Tropical Medicine), and all indicated negative results to Ebola-Reston antibodies.
Results from animals are still pending the arrival of kits for swine testing from CDC Atlanta (Centers for disease control and prevention), which have committed to send in the Philippines. All animals in the affected areas have been put under strict quarantine. The BAI-DA and DOH team will continue to conduct epidemiological investigation.

§ Increased Distribution
Disease Impact: Increased - Province - Species - Change
* Morbidity - BULACAN - Swine - 5%=>20%
* Morbidity - NUEVA ECIJA - Swine - 5%=>100%
* Mortality - BULACAN - Swine 5%=>20%

§ Control measures
Measures applied Movement control inside the country
Screening
Vaccination in response to the outbreak (s): Administrative division - Species - Total Vaccinated - Details
* BULACAN - Swine - 5000 - Ongoing

Disinfection of infected premises/establishment(s)
No treatment of affected animals

Measures to be applied No other measures

§ Diagnostic test results
Laboratory name and type Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory, Plum Island, New York (National laboratory)
Tests and results: Species - Test - Test date - Result
* Swine - virus isolation - 30/10/2008 - Positive

§ Future Reporting
The event is continuing. Weekly follow-up reports will be submitted.
-
------

[Giuseppe Michieli]

PHILIPPINES: EBOLA RESTON VIRUS FOUND IN PIGS, UPDATE (12/10/2008) [RSOE EDIS]

Situation Update No. 1
On 10.12.2008 at 20:56 GMT+2

Ebola virus was found for the first time in pigs in the Philippines, showing the potentially lethal disease is capable of infecting domestic livestock. The Ebola-Reston strain turned up in swine samples tested at a U.S. Department of Agriculture laboratory in New York, said Davinio P. Catbagan, the Philippines’ chief veterinary officer, in a report filed yesterday with the World Organization for Animal Health.


The strain is different from the Ebola known to kill humans in Africa, and the report cited no human cases.

Still, Ebola is one of the most feared infectious diseases, and the occurrence in livestock has aroused interest among epidemiologists.

The World Health Organization, the health agency of the United Nations, said it is looking into whether there’s any chance humans could have become infected.

“While it’s believed that Ebola-Reston is primarily a disease of animals, we are working with the Philippines government to see if there are any potential risks to humans,” said Gregory Hartl, a spokesman for the WHO in Geneva.

“At the moment, we believe the risks are quite low.”

The pigs, some of which came from a district on the outskirts of Manila, were also infected with at least two more common diseases, Catbagan said.

An outbreak of diseases beginning late last year wiped out entire herds in some cases.

“We have more questions than we have answers at this stage,” said Barrie Carnat, a veterinarian with the World Organization for Animal Health, in a telephone interview from Paris.

“It’s really unknown at this point if Ebola is an incidental finding or if it had any role in the mortality of the pigs.”

Carnat said it’s the first time Ebola has been reported in pigs.

The USDA’s Plum Island laboratory, off Long Island, isolated Ebola-Reston from the swine samples.

The virus subtype was discovered in the U.S. in 1989 in association with an outbreak of viral hemorrhagic fever among monkeys imported from the Philippines to Reston, Virginia. Although infection with this virus can be fatal in monkeys, it’s not known to cause severe disease in people.

In contrast, infection with an Ebola strain from Africa usually causes death in 50 to 90 percent of people, according to the WHO.

The Philippine report said the pig outbreak was “considered of negligible public health importance.”

There’s no specific treatment or vaccine for the African illness, which causes high fevers, diarrhea and vomiting and often leads to severe internal bleeding.

The Philippines Bureau of Animal Industry and the Department of Health organized a team to collect blood samples from people and animals in the affected areas, according to the report. None of the people caring for the animals had antibodies against Ebola-Reston, indicating that they hadn’t been infected.

Animal tests haven’t been completed.

All animals in the affected areas have been quarantined while officials conduct an epidemiological investigation into the outbreak.

The pigs, from Santo Nino in Bulacan province and Pinagpanaan in Nueva Ecija province, were also infected with porcine circovirus type 2 and a type of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome similar to that which killed pigs in China and Vietnam during the past two years, according to the report.
-

RSOE EDIS

[Giuseppe Michieli]

A possible reference abstract, below:

Comp Immunol Microbiol Infect Dis. 2007 Sep;30(5-6):391-8. Epub 2007 Jul 3.

Current knowledge on lower virulence of Reston Ebola virus
(in French: Connaissances actuelles sur la moindre virulence du virus Ebola Reston).

Morikawa S, Saijo M, Kurane I. - Department of Virology 1, National Institute of Infectious Diseases, 4-7-1 Gakuen, Musashimurayama, Tokyo 208-0011, Japan. morikawa@nih.go.jp

Ebola viruses (EBOV) and Marburg virus belong to the family Filoviridae, order Mononegavirales.

The genus Ebolavirus consists of four species: Zaire ebolavirus (ZEBOV), Sudan ebolavirus (SEBOV), Ivory Coast ebolavirus (ICEBOV) and Reston ebolavirus (REBOV).

Three species of ebolaviruses, ZEBOV, SEBOV, ICEBOV, and Marburg virus are known to be extremely pathogenic in primates and humans and cause severe hemorrhagic fever leading up to case fatality rate of some 90%, while REBOV is thought to be pathogenic in Asian monkeys but not in African monkeys and humans.

Recent studies indicated several factors involved in different virulence between African EBOV and REBOV.

This article reviews the history, epidemiology, and virulence of REBOV.

PMID: 17610952 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]
-
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1...ubmed_RVDocSum
------

[Shiloh]

Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?p...efer=australia

Ebola in Pigs Shows Deadly Virus Can Infect Domestic Livestock
By Jason Gale

Dec. 11 (Bloomberg) -- Ebola virus was found for the first time in pigs in the Philippines, showing the potentially lethal disease is capable of infecting domestic livestock.

The Ebola-Reston strain turned up in swine samples tested at a U.S. Department of Agriculture laboratory in New York, said Davinio P. Catbagan, the Philippines’ chief veterinary officer, in a report filed yesterday with the World Organization for Animal Health. The strain is different from the Ebola known to kill humans in Africa, and the report cited no human cases.

Still, Ebola is one of the most feared infectious diseases, and the occurrence in livestock has aroused interest among epidemiologists. The World Health Organization, the health agency of the United Nations, said it is looking into whether there’s any chance humans could have become infected.

“While it’s believed that Ebola-Reston is primarily a disease of animals, we are working with the Philippines government to see if there are any potential risks to humans,” said Gregory Hartl , a spokesman for the WHO in Geneva. “At the moment, we believe the risks are quite low.”

The pigs, some of which came from a district on the outskirts of Manila, were also infected with at least two more common diseases, Catbagan said. An outbreak of diseases beginning late last year wiped out entire herds in some cases.

“We have more questions than we have answers at this stage,” said Barrie Carnat, a veterinarian with the World Organization for Animal Health, in a telephone interview from Paris. “It’s really unknown at this point if Ebola is an incidental finding or if it had any role in the mortality of the pigs.”

First Time in Pigs

Carnat said it’s the first time Ebola has been reported in pigs. The USDA’s Plum Island laboratory, off Long Island, isolated Ebola-Reston from the swine samples. The virus subtype was discovered in the U.S. in 1989 in association with an outbreak of viral hemorrhagic fever among monkeys imported from the Philippines to Reston, Virginia.

Although infection with this virus can be fatal in monkeys, it’s not known to cause severe disease in people. In contrast, infection with an Ebola strain from Africa usually causes death in 50 to 90 percent of people, according to the WHO.

The Philippine report said the pig outbreak was “considered of negligible public health importance.”

Internal Bleeding

There’s no specific treatment or vaccine for the African illness, which causes high fevers, diarrhea and vomiting and often leads to severe internal bleeding.

The Philippines Bureau of Animal Industry and the Department of Health organized a team to collect blood samples from people and animals in the affected areas, according to the report. None of the people caring for the animals had antibodies against Ebola-Reston, indicating that they hadn’t been infected.

Animal tests haven’t been completed. All animals in the affected areas have been quarantined while officials conduct an epidemiological investigation into the outbreak.

The pigs, from Santo Nino in Bulacan province and Pinagpanaan in Nueva Ecija province, were also infected with porcine circovirus type 2 and a type of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome similar to that which killed pigs in China and Vietnam during the past two years, according to the report.

[Giuseppe Michieli]

Ebola virus strain found in Philippine swine [Channelnewsasia.com]

Ebola virus strain found in Philippine swine

Posted: 11 December 2008 1404 hrs
MANILA:

A strain of the Ebola virus has been found in pigs at a farm north of the Philippine capital Manila, the country's top agriculture official said Thursday.


The Ebola-Reston strain, however, was believed to have affected only domestic livestock and had so far not jumped between species, said Agriculture Secretary Arthur Yap.

This was the first Ebola case in swine, and the government was closely working with the World Health Organisation and the World Organisation of Animal Health in carrying out further tests, Yap said.

"This is the first time Ebola has been detected in pigs, but this is not a human health issue, but an animal health problem," Yap told local radio.

"There is no evidence that this could jump to humans," he said, adding that Ebola-Reston was different from three other African strains that cause deadly haemorrhagic fever, which has led to hundreds of human deaths in Africa.

Yap said the farm, on the main island of Luzon, was being closely monitored.

Farm hands and butchers had been tested, but results have so far come back negative, he said.

Other pigs on the farm were not infected, while old stocks of meat had been burned as a precaution, he said.

Yap reminded the public to buy pork only from markets inspected by agricultural officials and to cook the meat thoroughly.

This was not the first time that the Ebola-Reston strain was found in the Philippines, Yap said.

Fifteen years ago, several Filipinos were infected by the virus that apparently jumped from local monkeys.

Only one of them developed a cold, that later went away, Yap said.

- AFP/yb

Channelnewsasia.com

[Shiloh]

Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?p...Tiw&refer=asia

Pig Ebola May Lead Scientists to ‘Elusive Reservoir’ of Virus


By Jason Gale

Dec. 11 (Bloomberg) -- The first known Ebola infections in pigs may help researchers answer a question that’s confounded them since the deadly virus was first discovered more than 30 years ago: where it comes from.

International scientists will converge on farms in the Philippines to help local authorities discover how pigs contracted Ebola-Reston, a monkey-killing strain not known to harm people. The findings may help identify which species carries the virus in the wild without getting sick, enabling the pathogen to persist undetected in the environment, said Juan Lubroth, head of infectious diseases in the animal health unit of the Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome.

Knowing the natural host of Ebola will help people better protect themselves against one of the most-feared infectious diseases. African strains usually kill 50 percent to 90 percent of those infected through lethal bleeding and organ failure, according to the World Health Organization.

“Since the 1970s, scientists, veterinarians, microbiologists and physicians have been looking at thousands of species to see if they can find this elusive reservoir, and we have been pretty much empty-handed,” Lubroth said in a telephone interview today. “This opens up avenues to delve into the ecology and do more searching.”

Ebola was first recognized in 1976 after an outbreak near the Ebola River in the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly known as Zaire.

Thirteen years later, Ebola-Reston was discovered in the U.S. in association with an outbreak of viral hemorrhagic fever among monkeys imported from the Philippines to Reston, Virginia. The virus was found among Philippine monkeys in the U.S. again in 1990 and 1996, and in Italy in 1992. In October, for the first time, the strain was found in Philippine pigs.

Pig-Ebola Nexus

“What is the connection between the natural habitat of Ebola-Reston and swine production? That needs to be teased out in the Philippines,” Lubroth said.

Ebola-Reston turned up in six of 28 swine samples tested at a U.S. Department of Agriculture laboratory in New York, said Davinio P. Catbagan, the Philippines’ chief veterinary officer. The infected pigs were traced to two commercial and two backyard farms in three provinces north of Manila, he said. Further testing found no new cases, including among 42 people involved in caring for the animals.

“We’re still trying to find out how it came to the pigs,” Catbagan said in a telephone interview today.

Both Ebola, and a related virus known as Marburg hemorrhagic fever, are thought to infect humans via primates.

Snakes, Guinea Pigs

Disease trackers have tested everything from snakes to guinea pigs in the search for an animal reservoir and have been repeatedly led back to caves, mines and bats.

A 2005 study published in the journal Nature found evidence of symptomless infection by Ebola in three species of fruit bat in West Africa, indicating that these animals may be acting as a reservoir for the virus.

“It would merit looking at it in the natural habitat in the Western Pacific further,” Lubroth said. “We are only scratching the surface.”

The Philippines government said yesterday it would like technical assistance from the WHO, FAO and the World Organization for Animal Health in studying the disease and assessing what potential health risks it may pose.

“At the moment, it’s not a dangerous pathogen, but we cannot be sure it will remain like this,” said Soe Nyunt-U, the WHO’s representative to the Philippines. “We have to make sure we understand the ecology of the virus really well.”

To contact the reporter on this story: Jason Gale in Singapore at j.gale@bloomberg.net
Last Updated: December 11, 2008 08:09 EST

[HenryN]

Hogs found positive for Ebola virus in Philippines

www.chinaview.cn 2008-12-11 15:22:33

Print

MANILA, Dec. 11 (Xinhua) -- Hogs in four Philippine piggery farms have been found positive for Ebola Reston virus, officials said on Thursday. As of Wednesday evening, Ebola Reston cases were confirmed in four farms in Luzon, the northern Philippines, after six out of 28hogs tested positive for the virus. Arthur Yap, Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, allayed fears that the disease will be transferred to humans from infected hogs, Philippine TV network GMA News reported. There has been no documented case on the virus being transmitted from hogs to humans, said the agriculture chief. "This is an animal health problem and not a human issue," Yap said. Yap added that most of the hog samples that were tested on Wednesday yielded negative results. Meanwhile, he advised the public that pork meat should be properly cleaned and thoroughly cooked before they are eaten. "The WHO (World Health Organization) said that the meat should be thoroughly cooked because the heat could kill the virus. The meat should likewise be properly handled and washed," Yap said. On Thursday, the Bureau of Animal Industry set up "hog checkpoints" to prevent the transport of pigs from four piggery farms in Luzon for slaughter or breeding. Soledad Agbayani, president of the Philippine Association of Hog Farmers, likewise said the Ebola Reston virus was not harmful to humans. "The virus is not harmful to humans but to be sure, make sure the meat you eat is not 'double dead'," Agbayani told a local radio. Meanwhile, the Department of Agriculture has issued a ban on pork exports to other countries. The government was planning to export choice pork cuts to Singapore early next year. Ebola-Reston, a sub-type of the Ebola, was first discovered in 1989 from crab-eating macaques originating in the Philippines. Reportedly, it is non-pathogenic to humans and is only mildly fatal to monkeys.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/20...t_10489427.htm

[HenryN]

Commentary

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/12...ilippines.html

[HenryN]

DA prepares support program for hog industry amid Ebola Reston case

12/12/2008 | 05:06 PM

Email this | Email the Editor | Print | Digg this | Add to del.icio.us

MANILA, Philippines — The Department of Agriculture (DA) on Friday said it is working on a support program to assist hog producers in farms where the Ebola Reston virus had been detected.

Agriculture Secretary Arthur Yap said incentives will also be provided to other growers to encourage them to participate in the concerted government program to stamp out the disease.

The planned program will include the acquisition of additional laboratory kits needed to check the presence of the virus among swine and a support package to help livestock growers whose infected hogs will be culled or destroyed by quick-response government teams led by the DA’s Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI) to prevent the spread of the Reston disease among animals.

This developed as executives of international health institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) or World Animal Health Organization commended Secretaries Yap of the DA and Francisco Duque of the Department of Health (DOH) for their respective offices’ quick and appropriate action in containing the latest resurfacing of the Reston virus, which was earlier detected in two swine farms in certain parts of Luzon.

Officials of the DA and DOH along with these international health institutions have pointed out Wednesday night that the Reston virus “does not pose a significant public health risk."

Duque and Yap said this particular strain of the Ebola virus has been shown in the past to be “non-pathogenic," which means it is not harmful to humans.

Authorities say the Reston virus is entirely different from the three other Ebola subtypes, which are all potentially fatal to humans. Unlike the Zaire, Ivory Coast and Sudan strains, the Reston strain has not been found to be fatal like the three other strains or to have caused illnesses to humans in contact with the infected animals. It was first discovered in the Philippines in 1989 among crab-eating macaques or monkeys then being exported by the Laguna-based Ferlite Farms to the Hazleton Laboratories in Reston,Virginia .

The WHO and OIE consider the presence of the Reston virus in the Philippines as an “animal health issue and does not consider this a significant public health concern at this time."

At the end of a nine-hour consultative meeting with livestock industry leaders at the DA last Wednesday, WHO country representative to the Philippines Dr. Soe Nyunt spoke on behalf of OIE and FAO in thanking Yap and Duque for their efforts in immediately addressing the Reston issue.

The other experts present during the marathon meeting at the DA were Anthony Hazzard, WHO regional adviser for Food Safety; Carolyn Anne Coulombe, WHO technical officer (Risk Communications) Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response; and Research Institute for Tropical Medicine (RITM) director Remigio Olveda.

AGAP party-list Rep. Nicanor Briones, who represented the subsector of small livestock stakeholders during the consultative meeting, also thanked Yap, Duque and WHO officials for educating the public about the Reston virus.

“I would like to thank Secretary Duque and Secretary Yap and the representatives of WHO for making this thing clear to the public para hindi matakot ang ating mga consumer (so as not to spook our consumers)," Briones said.

Earlier, Yap said that after finding out the presence of the Reston virus in the quarantined farms, 28 pig tissue samples taken from different locations in four different periods — May, June 4 and 26 and September — were sent to Center Disease Control (CDC) Plum Island in the US for testing. Only six samples were positive of the virus.

Additional samples sent to the Research Institute for Tropical Medicine (RITM) in Alabang, Muntinlupa, after these earlier tests were all found to be free of the Reston virus.

WHO experts led by Dr. Nyunt and Dr. Julie Hall, team leader of its Emerging Infectious Diseases Division, have confirmed during the Dec. 10 consultative meeting at the DA that, based on historical evidence, the Reston virus has been found to be “non-pathogenic" and does not cause illnesses to humans in the past.

Yap said the WHO has also declared that pork that is properly handled, washed and cooked is safe for human consumption because heat from adequate cooking kills viruses, including Reston .

In fact, Hazzard told a press briefing after the consultative meeting that consumers should be worried of normal bacteria and not of the Reston virus when eating undercooked pork.

“I think that if you undercooked pork, you have much more to worry about with the normal bacteria and normal parasites. Significantly more to worry about than Reston," he said.
As a matter of precaution, Yap has called on the public to report sick animals to their City and Provincial Veterinarians and to refrain from buying meats from stalls without National Meat Inspection Service (NMIS) certifications.

Yap said that in general, meat from sick or already dead animals “regardless of whatever viruses these animals had been infected with" should never be eaten by people.

Yap and Duque, BAI Director Davinio Catbagan and Eric Tayag of the DOH National Epidemiology Center along with the international health experts met with officials of industry stakeholders like the National Federation of Hog Farmers, the Philippine College of Swine Practitioners or PCSP, Philippine Swine Producers Association, the Soro-soro Ibaba Development Cooperative, and the partylist organization Agriculture Sector Alliance of the Philippines (AGAP), to brief them on the official findings on the virus.

Yap pointed out that although “no current reports of unusual illnesses nor deaths in pigs have been reported, the DA and the DOH have engaged stakeholders in the hog industry, local and international health and animal experts, to assist the government in the pro-active eradication of this virus" and in the interest of transparency in government.

Besides tissue samples taken from pigs in the affected areas, Yap said tests were also done on the handlers in the farms where the virus originated; and even the butchers in the slaughterhouses where the animals were usually sent, as a precautionary measure. All the tests conducted on human samples yielded negative results for the presence of the Reston virus, he said.

Yap has ordered the BAI, together with the local government units (LGUs), to continually test pigs in their localities. Hogs in farms that have tested positive for the virus will be quarantined and will undergo a comprehensive inventory.

All pigs found to be infected will be destroyed and disposed of properly, Yap said.

As a precautionary measure, Yap had also suspended all Philippine pork exports until further notice. - GMANews.TV
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/139123/D...la-Reston-case

[HenryN]

Pangasinan piggery farm quarantined due to ebola virus

December 11, 2008 6:45 pm by pna

MANAOAG, Pangasinan, Dec. 11 —- A 30-hectare piggery farm in Barangay Parian here was placed under quarantine starting on Thursday as a precautionary measure to prevent the spread of the dreaded ebola virus.

The move was undertaken after the Tropical Disease Institute of the Philippines (TDIP) examined all the hogs in the Lambino farm in this town and found out most of its swine were afflicted by ebola virus, believed to be the same virus that infected humans some years back in Africa.
The virus was discovered when specimens of hogs being raised in the Lambino farm, located just in the boundary of Manaoag to Mapandan town, were examined by TDIP and turned out positive of ebola.
Department of Agriculture Regional Director Cipriano Santiago rushed to the Lambino farm Thursday morning along with officials of the Bureau of Animal Industry and Department of Health and Municipal Health Office to check on the farm.
Joining them in the inspection were veterinary officers in Pangasinan and Manaoag town, the municipal agriculture officer and the Manaoag Police headed by Supt. Mateo Casupang.
Santiago immediately imposed the necessary quarantine on the farm to ensure that henceforth no hogs would be brought out for sale and no other hogs would come in till the same is lifted.
He said this means that the piggery farm would be closely monitored 24 hours a day to ensure that the requirement is strictly followed.
“The public have no reason to panic because henceforth we will not allow any hog to be brought out for sale in the market nor we allow additional stocks to be brought in,” Santiago said.
According to Santiago, the ebola virus that attacked the swine in the Lambino farm is a strain that affects only the hogs but not humans, which means that the matter is not a concern on public health but on animal health.
He called on the people not to panic because the meat of the infected animals can be eaten if washed and cooked thoroughly.
Santiago said that so far, it is only in the Lambino farm in the entire province of Pangasinan where the ebola virus was detected.
He explained that the quarantine is just a precautionary measure to prevent the spread of the disease although he said that the virus is non-transmittable to humans or to other hogs.
Dr. Raymond Veloria, municipal health officer of Manaoag, who was among those who inspected the piggery farm, said based on the findings of the TDIP, most of the swine and piglets in the farm were infected by the virus.
Veloria reported that the farm has 14 sows, 11 boars, 53 growers, 70 weanlings, and 217 pigs for fattening.
The initial inventory showed there were 62 piglets that were found to have diarrhea, he said.
Veloria added that based on these findings, the Municipal Health Office, together with the Department of Health and the DA, recommended that the farm be quarantined for at least one to two months.
However, Veloria said that the people should not panic because ebola virus is non-pathogenic in humans and the infected piglets do not transmit diseases.
Saying that ebola virus came from monkeys and first afflicted Africans, like those from Kenya and Congo, Veloria believed an infected person or hog from those African countries may have carried the virus to the Philippines.
Veloria revealed that per documentation of the ebola virus, it was also detected in farms in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. (PNA)
/scsLvm/lvmicua/rma

http://balita.ph/2008/12/11/pangasin...o-ebola-virus/

[HenryN]

Updated map

http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UT...5,5.603027&z=7

[AlaskaDenise]

Originally Posted by niman

Commentary

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/12...ilippines.html

Commentary

Ebola in Philippine Swine Raises Concerns
Recombinomics Commentary 14:14
December 12, 2008

As of Wednesday evening, Ebola Reston cases were confirmed in four farms in Luzon, the northern Philippines, after six out of 28 hogs tested positive for the virus.

Arthur Yap, Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, allayed fears that the disease will be transferred to humans from infected hogs, Philippine TV network GMA News reported.

There has been no documented case on the virus being transmitted from hogs to humans, said the agriculture chief.

The above comments on Ebola transmission from pigs to humans brings up older stories associated with the swine outbreaks in Sichuan China.

In 2005 there were widespread deaths associated with swine outbreaks, which were considered to be atypical Porcine Productive Respiratory Syndrome (PPRS), even though PPRS had not been associated with fatal human infections.

However, at the time boxun reports suggested the infections were due to an Ebola strain (SZ77) recombinant, which was one of many Ebola strains circulating in China.

Of further note is an 18 nt region of identity between Ebola Zaire and H5N1.

Sequence data on the Ebola isolated from swine in the Philippines (see map) would be useful.


.

[AlaskaDenise]

from: http://www.recombinomics.com/News/07...uan_Ebola.html

An 18 nucleotide region of H5 is found in the Ebola env gene, signaling the exchange of genetic information between H5N1 and Ebola (the sequence is specific for H5N1 isolates). Variations in sequences between Ebola or Marburg strains has been noted and Ebola like other viruses can evolve rapidly via recombination.

That's amazing that different pathogens can recombine like that.

.

[HenryN]

Err on side of caution on Ebola virus – Loren


Senator Loren Legarda, chairperson of the Senate Committees on Agriculture and Food and Health and Demography, said yesterday the government must not spare any effort in containing the Ebola Reston hog virus despite assurance by the department of health and agriculture that it is not transmissible.

"Let’s err on the side of caution in not dismissing this outbreak just because it is said to be non-transmissible from the affected animals to humans," said Loren, adding that the DA should employ stringent measures to ensure that the infected pigs from the four farms in Luzon are not transported for slaughter.
"While it has been asserted by Department of Health (DoH), as well as WHO (World Health Organization) officials, that the Ebola Reston virus is harmless to humans, even when an animal that had harbored it had been consumed, the DoH should do more exhaustive tests and studies," Loren said.
Noting reports that the Ebola Reston virus had been transferred from monkeys to hogs, Loren said health officials should determine its transmissibility to other animals.
She said that lessons learned from the SARS virus, which also emanated from animals at several stages before becoming transmissible to humans, should be considered. The SARS coronavirus infected several types of animals first before crossing the "xenographic" barrier to humans from the civet cats.
The senator also urged the public to make sure they buy pork only from authorized sellers whose products had been properly inspected by the National Meat Inspection Service of the Department of Agriculture.
"As in all meat products, they should be washed and cooked properly to kill bacteria or viruses, if any are present. This basic sanitary practice should be be S.O.P (standard operating procedure) even when this problem had been solved."
The DA had said that pigs infected with the virus had been detected in two commercial farms and two backyard farms in Bulacan, Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija. (Rolly T Carandang)

‘DOUBLE DEAD’ MEAT

A ton of "double dead" meat was seized by City Hall officials at the Balintawak market in Quezon City before dawn yesterday.
Meanwhile, City veterinarian Dr. Ana Marie Cabel, who led police and city hall personnel in the confiscation of the "hot" meat, said the confiscated products have been brought to the Payatas dumpsite for disposal.
Cabel said they will intensify the monitoring and inspection of markets following reports that the Ebola Reston virus infected pigs in four hog farms in Luzon. (Jeffrey G. Damicog)

http://www.tempo.com.ph/news.php?aid=43060

[HenryN]

Testing turns up Ebola virus in pigs

Lisa Schnirring Staff Writer

Dec 11, 2008 (CIDRAP News) – The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) today announced that the Ebola virus has been found in pigs for the first time, a discovery researchers made when they were investigating outbreaks of porcine reproductive respiratory syndrome (PRRS) at several swine producers in the Philippines.
The Ebola virus detected in the swine samples was identified by scientists in the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Plum Island laboratory, which determined in October that it was the Reston subtype, according to a report yesterday from the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). The subtype, which was discovered in 1989 at a primate facility in Reston, Va., among monkeys imported from the Philippines, can sicken monkeys, but does not appear to clinically infect humans.
Juan Lubroth, senior officer in the FAO's animal production and health division, said the findings may help researchers edge closer to finding the reservoir of the Ebola virus, Bloomberg News reported today.
"Since the 1970s, scientists, veterinarians, microbiologists, and physicians have been looking at thousands of species to see if they can find this elusive reservoir, and we have been pretty much empty-handed," he told Bloomberg. "This opens up avenues to delve into the ecology and do more searching."
Philippine health officials have collected serum samples from people who worked with or were exposed to the animals, which revealed no Ebola Reston antibodies, according the OIE report. Animals in the area have been quarantined, and livestock officials will conduct more tests on the animals as soon as they receive swine testing kits from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
The FAO, in its statement today, said it expects that laboratory tools will be developed to test pigs and other animals throughout the Philippines to determine how extensive the Ebola Reston virus is.
It advised against handling pork infected with the Ebola Reston virus, because the risks and consequences of contamination are not known.
The OIE said the affected swine producers noted a sudden mortality increase in the animals in mid 2007, which continued into early 2008. It said the infected pigs had clinical signs that were consistent with atypical PRRS infection, which can be linked to more than one pathogen.
USDA testing showed that the swine samples were 98% similar to the atypical PRRS virus that has been linked to outbreaks in Vietnam and China, the OIE said, adding that morbidity and mortality patterns were also consistent with the same type of virus.
See also:
Dec 11 FAO statement
Dec 10 OIE report
CIDRAP viral hemorrhagic fever overview

http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/con...1108ebola.html

[HenryN]

Originally Posted by AlaskaDenise

from: http://www.recombinomics.com/News/07...uan_Ebola.html



That's amazing that different pathogens can recombine like that.

.

Two RNA viruses in the same cell have lots of possibilities and both influenza and filoviruses infect swine.

[HenryN]

Originally Posted by AlaskaDenise

from: http://www.recombinomics.com/News/07...uan_Ebola.html



That's amazing that different pathogens can recombine like that.

.

1: DL145528	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042408|dbj|DL145528.1||pat|JP|2008504839|104 3[207042408]

2: DL145527	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042407|dbj|DL145527.1||pat|JP|2008504839|104 2[207042407]

3: DL145526	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042406|dbj|DL145526.1||pat|JP|2008504839|104 1[207042406]

4: DL145525	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042405|dbj|DL145525.1||pat|JP|2008504839|104 0[207042405]

5: DL145524	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042404|dbj|DL145524.1||pat|JP|2008504839|103 9[207042404]

6: DL145523	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042403|dbj|DL145523.1||pat|JP|2008504839|103 8[207042403]

7: DL145522	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042402|dbj|DL145522.1||pat|JP|2008504839|103 7[207042402]

8: DL145521	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042401|dbj|DL145521.1||pat|JP|2008504839|103 6[207042401]

9: DL145520	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042400|dbj|DL145520.1||pat|JP|2008504839|103 5[207042400]

10: DL145519	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042399|dbj|DL145519.1||pat|JP|2008504839|103 4[207042399]

11: DL145518	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042398|dbj|DL145518.1||pat|JP|2008504839|103 3[207042398]

12: DL145517	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042397|dbj|DL145517.1||pat|JP|2008504839|103 2[207042397]

13: DL145516	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042396|dbj|DL145516.1||pat|JP|2008504839|103 1[207042396]

14: DL145515	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042395|dbj|DL145515.1||pat|JP|2008504839|103 0[207042395]

15: DL145514	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042394|dbj|DL145514.1||pat|JP|2008504839|102 9[207042394]

16: DL145513	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207042393|dbj|DL145513.1||pat|JP|2008504839|102 8[207042393]

17: DL145363	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207041647|dbj|DL145363.1||pat|JP|2008504839|878[207041647]

18: DL145362	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207041646|dbj|DL145362.1||pat|JP|2008504839|877[207041646]

19: DL145361	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207041645|dbj|DL145361.1||pat|JP|2008504839|876[207041645]

20: DL145360	Reports	Links
COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF gi|207041644|dbj|DL145360.1||pat|JP|2008504839|875[207041644]

[HenryN]

Originally Posted by AlaskaDenise

from: http://www.recombinomics.com/News/07...uan_Ebola.html



That's amazing that different pathogens can recombine like that.

.

LOCUS DL145528 18 bp DNA linear PAT 26-SEP-2008
DEFINITION COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF.
ACCESSION DL145528
VERSION DL145528.1 GI:207042408
KEYWORDS JP 2008504839-A/1043.
SOURCE Ebola virus sp.
ORGANISM Ebola virus sp.
Viruses; ssRNA negative-strand viruses; Mononegavirales;
Filoviridae; Ebola-like viruses; unclassified Ebola-like viruses.
REFERENCE 1 (bases 1 to 18)
AUTHORS Niman,H.L.
TITLE COPY CHOICE RECOMBINATION AND USES THEREOF
JOURNAL Patent: JP 2008504839-A 1043 21-FEB-2008;
HENRY L NIMAN
COMMENT OS Ebola virus
PN JP 2008504839-A/1043
PD 21-FEB-2008
PF 23-JUN-2005 JP 2007520348
PR 16-JUN-2005 US 60/692060,02-JUL-2004 US 60/585306, PR
13-JUL-2004 US 60/587580,21-JUL-2004 US 60/590162 PI henry
l niman
CC
FH Key Location/Qualifiers.
FEATURES Location/Qualifiers
source 1..18
/organism="Ebola virus sp."
/mol_type="unassigned DNA"
/db_xref="taxon:205488"
ORIGIN
1 atttttggtc caatcttg

[HenryN]

Originally Posted by AlaskaDenise

from: http://www.recombinomics.com/News/07...uan_Ebola.html



That's amazing that different pathogens can recombine like that.

.

DL145363
gttcttggtc caatcatg

gb|CY036428.1| Influenza A virus (A/unknown/New York/Sg-00388... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY036424.1| Influenza A virus (A/unknown/New York/Sg-00387... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY036385.1| Influenza A virus (A/unknown/New York/Sg-00377... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY036369.1| Influenza A virus (A/muscovy duck/New Jersey/S... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY036353.1| Influenza A virus (A/unknown/New York/Sg-00369... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU243126.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hebei/706/2005(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU243146.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hebei/126/2005(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|FJ434373.1| Influenza A virus (A/mute swan/Aktau/1460/2006... 36.2 0.66
gb|FJ455820.1| Influenza A virus (A/environment/Qinghai/1/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|FJ436942.1| Influenza A virus (A/swan/Mangystau/3/2006(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY036034.1| Influenza A virus (A/Muscovy duck/New York/620... 36.2 0.66
gb|FJ357069.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/1/2000(H5N2)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|FJ357099.1| Influenza A virus (A/environment/NY/98899-6/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY034758.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Italy/4223-2/2006... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY034679.1| Influenza A virus (A/mute swan/Michigan/451072... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY031001.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/England/N50-92/199... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY030993.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/England/N28/1973(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU636692.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/England/50-92/91(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU636684.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/England/N28/73(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU544248.1| Influenza A virus (A/spur-winged goose/Nigeria... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU544247.1| Influenza A virus (A/white-faced whistling duc... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU544244.1| Influenza A virus (A/spur-winged goose/Nigeria... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU544242.1| Influenza A virus (A/spur-winged goose/Nigeria... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU980494.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MD/898/2002(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY033444.1| Influenza A virus (A/American green-winged tea... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU871921.1| Influenza A virus (A/ruddy turnstone/NJ/327/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU743135.1| Influenza A virus (A/emu/NY/12716/1994(H5N9)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ432045.1| Influenza A virus (A/swine/Fujian/2003(H5N1)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ432037.1| Influenza A virus (A/swine/Fujian/2001(H5N1)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF553330.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Anhui/T5/2006(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF553329.1| Influenza A virus (A/Anhui/T2/2006(H5N1)) hema... 36.2 0.66
emb|AJ621811.3| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Primorie/2621/01(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509026.2| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/822.1/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028981.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Yunnan/1628/2003(... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028972.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Yunnan/971/2002(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028971.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Yunnan/862/2002(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028966.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hunan/378/2003(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028965.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hunan/300/2003(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028964.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hunan/1340/2002(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028960.1| Influenza A virus (A/chukar/Shantou/4690/2003(... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028958.1| Influenza A virus (A/pheasant/Shantou/3535/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028957.1| Influenza A virus (A/partridge/Shantou/2886/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028956.1| Influenza A virus (A/silky chicken/Shantou/541... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028955.1| Influenza A virus (A/silky chicken/Shantou/540... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028954.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shantou/133/2003(... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028952.1| Influenza A virus (A/pheasant/Shantou/4567/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028948.1| Influenza A virus (A/quail/Shantou/3846/2002(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028945.1| Influenza A virus (A/partridge/Shantou/1075/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028940.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shantou/28/2002(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028939.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shantou/9/2002(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028938.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shantou/5746/2001... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028937.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shantou/5738/2001... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028936.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shantou/5526/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028935.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Shantou/5456/2001(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028934.1| Influenza A virus (A/quail/Shantou/5164/2001(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028933.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shantou/4912/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028932.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Shantou/4885/2001(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028931.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shantou/4407/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028930.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Shantou/4325/2001(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028929.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shantou/2535/2001... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028928.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shantou/1930/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028927.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shantou/1437/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028926.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shantou/1101/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028925.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shantou/904/2001(... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU263353.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/27/2003(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU263345.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/12/2003(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB378690.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/201/2007(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF491876.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/ON/499/2005(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF591757.1| Influenza A virus (A/ostrich/South Africa/AI11... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF591749.1| Influenza A virus (A/ostrich/South Africa/AI10... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028235.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Maryland/182/2006... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU224440.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain Mayinga, complete genome 36.2 0.66
gb|AY296077.2| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/NJ/117228-7/2001(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY296078.2| Influenza A virus (A/unknown/NY/118547-11/2001... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU051635.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain Mandza spike glycoprot... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU051634.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain Etoumbi spike glycopro... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU051633.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain CH Lossi spike glycopr... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU051632.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain GOR Ekata spike glycop... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU051631.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain GOR2 Lossi spike glyco... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU051630.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain GOR1 Lossi spike glyco... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF646274.2| Influenza A virus (A/heron/Cicurug/IPB25-RS/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF646272.2| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Leuwiliang/IPB3-RS/2... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF646271.2| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Leuwiliang/IPB4-RS/... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF646270.2| Influenza A virus (A/muscovy duck/Klapanunggal... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF646269.2| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Nagrak/IPB6-RS/2006(... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF646266.2| Influenza A virus (A/muscovy duck/Cileungsi/IP... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607883.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/WA/44242-264/2006... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607894.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MD/185/2003(H5N?)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607890.1| Influenza A virus (A/ruddy turnstone/NJ/114867... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607888.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/105/2000(H5N5)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607886.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/479/2000(H5N3)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607885.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/382/2000(H5N3)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607884.1| Influenza A virus (A/tundra swan/AK/44049-168/... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607882.1| Influenza A virus (A/northern pintail/FL/598/2... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607881.1| Influenza A virus (A/ruddy turnstone/DE/371/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607880.1| Influenza A virus (A/ruddy turnstone/DE/313/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607877.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/OH/345/1988(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607876.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/6/2000(H5N2)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607875.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/410/2000(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607874.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/168/2000(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607873.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/166/2000(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607871.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/113/2000(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607869.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MD/866/2002(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607860.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MD/185/2003(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607859.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MD/865/2002(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607856.1| Influenza A virus (A/wood duck/MD/04-623/2004(... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607855.1| Influenza A virus (A/mute swan/MI/451072-2/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607854.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/PA/454069/2005(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607853.1| Influenza A virus (A/black duck/NC/674-694/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU099317.1| Influenza A virus (A/Canada goose/AK/44075-058... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF405825.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/ON/499/2005(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF205596.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MB/458/2005(H5)) ... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB355929.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/Vac-3/2007... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF646273.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Bojonggenteng/IPB2-... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597269.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Italy/37/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597268.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Italy/36/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597267.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Italy/8/1998(H5N2... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597266.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Italy/208/2000(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597265.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Italy/9097/1997(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597264.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/Italy/392/1997(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597263.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Italy/312/1997(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597262.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Italy/1980/1993(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597261.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Gui Yang/3799/2005(... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597259.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Jiang Xi/1850/2005(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597258.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Jiang Xi/1286/2005(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597256.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Jiang Xi/197820/2003... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597255.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Jiang Xi/6146/2003(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597254.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Yunnan/435/2002(H5N3... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597253.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/819/1980(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597252.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Hong Kong/23/1978(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597251.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/342/1978(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597250.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/698/1979(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597249.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/394/1978(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597248.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/312/1978(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY022621.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Italy/22A/1998(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY022645.1| Influenza A virus (A/teal/Italy/3812/2005(H5N3... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY022637.1| Influenza A virus (A/teal/Italy/3931-38/2005(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY022629.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/Italy/1325/2005(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY022261.1| Influenza A virus (A/poultry/Italy/365/1997(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF670482.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/14/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY022077.1| Influenza A virus (A/poultry/Italy/367/1997(H5... 36.2 0.66
emb|AM040150.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/France/05056a/2005(... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF634332.1| Influenza A virus (A/garganey/SanJiang/160/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF587277.1| Influenza A virus (A/Beijing/01/2003(H5N1)) se... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ826532.3| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/BC/373/2005(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF541407.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Viet Nam/Ncvd8/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF541405.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Viet Nam/Ncvd1/2003(... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF541398.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Viet Nam/342/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
emb|AJ972673.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/France/05057b/2005(... 36.2 0.66
emb|AJ971298.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/France/05054a/2005(... 36.2 0.66
emb|AJ971297.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/France/05066b/2005(... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY021525.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/Italy/1258/2005(H5... 36.2 0.66
emb|AM408214.1| Influenza A virus (A/teal/Germany/WV632/2005(... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY021397.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Italy/3401/2005(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY020229.1| Influenza A virus (A/poultry/Italy/373/1997(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY018949.1| Influenza A virus (A/poultry/Italy/382/1997(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ251447.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Denmark/65047/04(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY017403.1| Influenza A virus (A/poultry/Italy/330/1997(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ914814.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shanxi/2/2006(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997392.1| Influenza A virus (A/swine/Anhui/ca/2004(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997538.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/xv/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997370.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hq/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997361.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hp/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997355.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/ho/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997352.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hn/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997325.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hk/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997253.1| Influenza A virus (A/swine/Henan/wy/2004(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997262.1| Influenza A virus (A/swine/Guangxi/wz/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997218.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Guangxi/wt/2004(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997522.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangdong/xb/2001(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997410.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Zhejiang/bj/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997531.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shanghai/xj/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997513.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/xa/2001(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997547.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/xw/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997377.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hf/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997283.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hd/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997268.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/ha/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997318.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hj/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997308.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hh/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997396.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hunan/fg/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997182.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jiangsu/cz1/2002(... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997147.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/wn/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997133.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/wl/1997(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997122.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/wj/1997(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997219.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Henan/wu/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997111.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/wi/1997(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997094.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hubei/wg/2002(H5N1))... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997087.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/wf/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ191689.1| Influenza A virus (A/curlew/Shandong/61/04(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ191688.1| Influenza A virus (A/golden mountain thrush/Fu... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY015115.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Italy/312/1997(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY015081.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Scotland/1959(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY014984.1| Influenza A virus (A/tern/South Africa/1961(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY014642.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Potsdam/1402-6/1986(... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY014640.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/New Zealand/41/1984(... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY014615.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/205/1977(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ188908.1| Influenza A virus (A/slaty-backed gull/Shandon... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ188906.1| Influenza A virus (A/black bulbul/Fujian/439/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ188905.1| Influenza A virus (A/babbler/Fujian/320/04(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ851561.1| Influenza A virus (A/teal/Italy/3931/2005(H5N2... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ366322.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Vietnam/8/05(H5N1)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ366314.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Vietnam/3/05(H5N1))... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ366306.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Vietnam/1/2005(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ836043.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Huadong/220/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ838509.1| Influenza A virus (A/teal/Italy/3812/2005(H5N3... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ838508.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Italy/3401/2005(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ767725.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shandong/K01/2004... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ497653.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Purwakarta/BBVet-... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ497642.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Malang/BBVet-IV/2... 36.2 0.66
emb|AM087222.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Germany/WV1349/0... 36.2 0.66
emb|AJ632269.3| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/France/03426a/03... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY623430.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Yichang/lung-1/04... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ023145.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/China/1/02(H5N1))... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY747617.1| Influenza A virus (A/swine/Fujian/F1/2001(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ211925.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/luohuo/3/03/(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ211924.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/zhoukou/2/02/(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ201829.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Huadong/1/2000(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY770079.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/489/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY531029.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Denmark/64650/03(... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY747609.1| Influenza A virus (A/swine/Fujian/1/2003(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY684706.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/327/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY653200.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/9/2004(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY646424.1| Influenza virus A (A/swine/Shandong/2/03(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651367.1| Influenza A virus (A/Dk/ST/4003/2003(H5N1)) he... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651362.1| Influenza A virus (A/peregrine falcon/HK/D0028... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651353.1| Influenza A virus (A/Ck/HK/2133.1/2003(H5N1)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651349.1| Influenza A virus (A/Ck/HK/YU22/2002(H5N1)) he... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651348.1| Influenza A virus (A/SCk/HK/YU100/2002(H5N1)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651347.1| Influenza A virus (A/Ck/HK/37.4/2002(H5N1)) he... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651346.1| Influenza A virus (A/Ck/HK/31.2/2002(H5N1)) he... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651345.1| Influenza A virus (A/Gf/HK/38/2002(H5N1)) hema... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY639405.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/China/F3/2004(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF086833.2| Zaire Ebola virus strain Mayinga, complete genome 36.2 0.66
gb|AY995896.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Sweden/64/02(H5N2... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY995895.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Sweden/58/02(H5N3... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY995891.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Sweden/39/02(H5N3... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY995885.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Sweden/21/02(H5N2... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY995884.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Sweden/7/02(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY995883.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Sweden/2/02(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY575877.1| Influenza A virus (A/Ck/HK/YU777/02 (H5N1)) he... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY575876.1| Influenza A virus (A/Ck/HK/61.9/02 (H5N1)) hem... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF046098.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/482/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY354458.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain Zaire 1995, complete g... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY500365.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/England/N28/73 (H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF082036.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hong Kong/915/97(... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF082039.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/698/79(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF082042.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Potsdam/1402-6/86(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF082038.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/205/77(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|U20460.1|IAU20460 Influenza A virus (A/tern/South Africa/6... 36.2 0.66
gb|U20475.1|IAU20475 Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/342/... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY142960.1| Zaire Ebola virus strain Mayinga subtype Zaire... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY296084.1| Influenza A virus (A/ruddy turnstone/NJ/2242/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY296083.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/CA/D0208651-C/02(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY296075.1| Influenza A virus (A/unknown/NY/9899-6/01(H5N2... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241626.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/299/04(H5N... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241625.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/193/04(H5N... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241624.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/101/04(H5N... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241622.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Mongolia/596/01(H5N... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241621.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Mongolia/500/01(H5N... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241620.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/447/00(H5N... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241619.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/69/00(H5N3... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241615.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Miyagi/54/76(H5N3))... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY950236.1| Influenza A virus (A/swan/Guangxi/307/2004 (H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY950235.1| Influenza A virus (A/WildDuck/Guangdong/314/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY950234.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Henan/16/2004 (H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY950233.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Henan/13/2004 (H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY950232.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Henan/12/2004 (H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY950231.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Henan/210/2004 (H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY950230.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Henan/01/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ387854.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Bavaria/1/2005(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ083566.1| Influenza A virus (A/Kalji Pheasant/Bangkok/Th... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ095628.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Shantou/1621/05(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|L11365.1|EBORNA Zaire Ebola virus nucleoprotein, polymeras... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF499101.1| Zaire Ebola virus strain Mayinga, complete genome 36.2 0.66
gb|U31033.1|EVU31033 Zaire Ebola virus envelope glycoprotein ... 36.2 0.66
gb|U28077.1|EVU28077 Zaire Ebola virus strain Zaire95 virion ... 36.2 0.66
gb|U23187.1|EVU23187 Zaire Ebola virus Mayinga strain glycopr... 36.2 0.66
gb|U81161.1|EVU81161 Zaire Ebola virus virion spike glycoprot... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF272001.1| Zaire Ebola virus strain Mayinga, complete genome 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320927.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hong Kongi/86.3/2... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320918.1| Influenza A virus (A/migratory duck/Jiangxi/17... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320917.1| Influenza A virus (A/migratory duck/Jiangxi/16... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320916.1| Influenza A virus (A/migratory duck/Jiangxi/16... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320915.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Shantou/2216/2005(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320914.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shantou/4610/2003(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320893.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Guangxi/2439/2004... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320892.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/2396/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320891.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangxi/2383/2004(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320890.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/2291/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320889.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangxi/2112/2004(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320888.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangxi/1832/2004(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320887.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/1793/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320886.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/1681/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320885.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/1586/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320884.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/1378/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320883.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/1311/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320882.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangxi/1198/2004(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320881.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangxi/1097/2004(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320880.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangxi/914/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320879.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/668/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320876.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Fujian/1042/2005(... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320875.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Fujian/897/2005(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ343151.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hebei/718/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF468837.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Anyang/AVL-1/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY075033.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/380.5/2001... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY075030.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/3014.5/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY075027.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/317.5/2... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF501235.1| Influenzavirus A (A/duck/Shanghai/1/2000) hema... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF501234.1| Influenzavirus A (A/duck/Shanghai/1/2000) hema... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059482.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/3014.8/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059481.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/2986.1/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059480.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/ww491/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059479.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/ww487/2000... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059477.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/ww382/2000... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059476.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/ww381/2000... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059475.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/ww28/2000... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059474.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/ww26/2000... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB212280.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Yokohama/aq10/2003(... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF398418.1|AF398418 Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/3... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF398417.1|AF398417 Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/3... 36.2 0.66
gb|S68489.2| hemagglutinin [H5N1 avian influenza virus, A/tur... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ080022.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Henan/01/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ356886.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Anhui/M(H5N1)) he... 36.2 0.66
emb|AJ305306.1|INA305306 Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Italy/8... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY006028.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Hong Kong/23/1978(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY005575.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/342/1978(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY005969.1| Influenza A virus (A/shorebird/DE/75/2004(H5N7... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY005927.1| Influenza A virus (A/shorebird/DE/101/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY737304.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangdong/173/04(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF364334.1|AF364334 Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Guangdong/3... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102682.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/514/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102681.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/485/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102680.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/532/1997(H5N1))... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102679.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/503/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102678.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/542/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102677.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/491/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102676.1| Influenza A virus (A/HongKong/97/98(H5N1)) hem... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102675.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/507/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102674.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/538/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102673.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/516/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102672.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/488/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102671.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/486/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF046097.1| Influenza A Virus (A/Hong Kong/483/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF046096.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/481/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF046088.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/156/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF082037.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hong Kong/990/97 ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF082035.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/786/97 ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF082034.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/728/97 ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF046099.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/728/97 ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF046080.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/220/97 ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF194992.1|AF194992 Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Italy/909... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF194991.1|AF194991 Influenza A virus (A/Guinea Fowl/Italy... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF194990.1|AF194990 Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Italy/367... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF194169.1|AF194169 Influenza A virus A/Chicken/Italy/312/... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ007623.1| Influenza A virus (A/Anas platyrhynchos/Chany ... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ003215.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jiande/1218/2001(... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585377.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Zhejiang/52/2000(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585376.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shanghai/38/2001(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585375.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/50/2001(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585374.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangdong/40/2000(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585373.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangdong/07/2000(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585372.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Fujian/17/2001(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585371.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Zhejiang/11/2000(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585369.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shanghai/37/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585368.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shanghai/35/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585367.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shanghai/13/2001(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585366.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/53/2002(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585365.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/35/2001(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585364.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/22/2001(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585361.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangdong/12/2000(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585360.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangdong/01/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585359.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Fujian/19/2000(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585358.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Fujian/13/2002(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585357.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Fujian/01/2002(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509039.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/646.3/01 (... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509038.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/573.4/01 (... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509037.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/ww100/01 ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509036.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/76.1/01 (... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509035.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/893.2/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509034.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/891.1/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509033.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/876.1/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509032.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/873.3/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509031.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/879.1/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509030.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/867.1/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509029.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/858.3/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509028.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/830.2/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509027.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/829.2/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509025.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/715.5/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509024.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/SF219/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509023.1| Influenza A virus (A/Pigeon/Hong Kong/SF215/01... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509022.1| Influenza A virus (A/Quail/Hong Kong/SF203/01 ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509021.1| Influenza A virus (A/Silky Chicken/Hong Kong/S... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509020.1| Influenza A virus (A/Pheasant/Hong Kong/FY155/... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509019.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/FY150/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509018.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/YU563/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509017.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/YU562/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509016.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/FY77/01... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221529.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/HongKong/YU562/01... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221528.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/HongKong/YU822.2/... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221527.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/HongKong/YU822.2/... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221526.1| Influenza A virus (A/Pheasant/HongKong/FY155/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221525.1| Influenza A virus (A/Pheasant/HongKong/FY155/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221524.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/HongKong/FY150/01... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221523.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/HongKong/FY150/01... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221522.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/HongKong/NT873.3/... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221521.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/HongKong/NT873.3/... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ343152.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hebei/108/02(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF216737.1|AF216737 Influenza A virus (A/Environment/Hong ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF216729.1|AF216729 Influenza A virus (A/Environment/Hong ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF216721.1|AF216721 Influenza A virus (A/Environment/Hong ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF216713.1|AF216713 Influenza A virus (A/Environment/Hong ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF290443.1|AF290443 Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Ho Chi Minh/... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY590570.1| Influenza A virus (A/white peafowl/Thailand/CU... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF084281.1|AF084281 Influenza A virus (A/HongKong/486/97(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF084280.1|AF084280 Influenza A virus (A/HongKong/483/97(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF084279.1|AF084279 Influenza A virus (A/HongKong/481/97(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098546.1|AF098546 Influenza A virus (A/Silky Chicken/Hon... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098545.1|AF098545 Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/w... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098544.1|AF098544 Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/y2... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098543.1|AF098543 Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/p4... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098542.1|AF098542 Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098541.1|AF098541 Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098540.1|AF098540 Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098539.1|AF098539 Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY684894.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Netherlands/3/99(... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF084532.1|AF084532 Influenza A virus (A/HongKong/485/97(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF144305.1|AF144305 Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Guangdong/1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF148678.1|AF148678 Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangdong/1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF028709.1|AF028709 Influenza A virus (A/HongKong/156/97(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF036356.1|AF036356 Influenza A virus (A/HongKong/156/97(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF046100.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hong Kong/915/199... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF057291.1|AF057291 Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hong Kong... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY741219.1| Influenza A virus (A/tree sparrow/Henan/3/2004... 36.2 0.66

[HenryN]

DL145523
gtttttggtc caatcatg

gb|EU243133.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hebei/102/2005(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU338380.1| Sudan ebolavirus isolate EBOV-S-2004 from Suda... 36.2 0.66
gb|U28134.1|EVU28134 Sudan Ebola virus strain Boniface virion... 36.2 0.66
gb|U23069.1|EVU23069 Sudan Ebola virus Maleo strain glycoprot... 36.2 0.66

[AlaskaDenise]

Are all the ebola sequences from humans, or were any found in other African species, e.g., primates?

.

[Giuseppe Michieli]

I think it's absolutely premature to state that Filoviruses and a member of Orthomyxoviruses recombined to form a new pathogen.

Why doesn't a Paramyxovirus, like Morbillivirus or a Togavirus like Rubivirus?

Further, with the aim to hit the evidence and predict a possible disaster one may speculate in every direction.

But does this exercise help?

In these times, with widespread economic recession and social turmoil in several part of the world, we are all called to maintain a sober behaviour and keep our ghosts and obsession out for some moments.

While research into novel pathogens are of undoubt interest and of great importance for humankind future, we should think to people that have to sustain themselves with agriculture and farming and try to save a bit of confidence in their hard work to survive.

I am sure that this my opinion will be unwelcomed for most part of FT members but I think it's the moment for sincere opinions and mine is absolutely sincere.

While I will accept every suggestion and critics by members and readers, I nonetheless hope at least some of you will convene that a more sober interpretation of facts is also well overdue.

[AlaskaDenise]

Hope this isn't a repeat. I couldn't find it with a FT search.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Researchers report new species of deadly Ebola virus

Lisa Schnirring Staff Writer


Nov 21, 2008 (CIDRAP News) – Researchers from the United States and Uganda today released the first full scientific report on a new Ebola species that struck western Uganda late last year and was linked to 149 suspected cases and 37 deaths, at least 4 of them healthcare providers.

During the midst of the 2007 outbreak the World Health Organization announced Nov 30 that a new subtype of the virus was sickening people in Bundibugyo district.

Researchers published a detailed account today on the discovery and an analysis of genetic findings of the new subtype in the Public Library of Science Pathogens (PLoS Pathogens).

Four Ebola subtypes have previously been identified—Zaire, Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, and Reston—but only the Zaire and Sudan subtypes have been associated with large hemorrhagic fever outbreaks in people in Africa.

The Ebola virus is highly contagious and is lethal in about 50% to 90% of cases.

Initial symptoms include fever, headache, joint and muscle aches, sore throat, and weakness, followed by diarrhea, vomiting, and stomach pain, according to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Some patients have both internal and external bleeding.

There is no vaccine or specific treatment for the disease.

Unusual symptoms point to new species

During the 2007 outbreak, officials were puzzled because patients had unusual initial symptoms such as vomiting and others that resembled malaria, according to previous reports. Officials didn't suspect Ebola right away, because some of the early case patients didn't have external bleeding.

In late November, health officials in Uganda sent 29 blood samples from suspect patients to the CDC. Using a broadly reactive Ebola virus antigen capture assay, the lab determined that eight specimens showed evidence of Ebola infection. However, earlier real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assays for all known Zaire and Sudan Ebola viruses and Marburg viruses had shown that the specimens were negative.

Using a less sensitive but more broadly reactive filovirus RT-PCR assay on one of the specimens, the scientists found more evidence of infection, which suggested the genetic sequence was distinct from the four known Ebola subtypes. In all, 9 of the 29 blood samples were positive for Ebola virus infection, the group reported.

Using a new metagenomics pyrosequencing method developed by 454 Life Sciences, a Roche company based in Branford, Conn., the researchers were able to rapidly sequence 70% of the virus genome to develop a draft sequence that allowed them to quickly develop real-time PCR assays specific to the new virus subtype, according to the report.

The new assays were quickly sent to the Uganda Virus Research Institute to assist with diagnosis of Ebola patients during the rest of the outbreak.

Before comparing the new subtype with other known filoviruses, the research team had to complete the entire genome of the new Ebola subtype as well as that of the Cote D'Ivoire Ebola virus. When comparing all of the species, they found that the newly discovered subtype—which they proposed naming the Bundibugyo Ebola virus—differed from the four existing types.

The investigators reported that the closest relative to the new species is the Cote d'Ivoire subtype, which shows a 32% nucleotide difference.

Unknown drug susceptibility

The group concluded that researchers who are developing vaccines against the Zaire and Sudan Ebola viruses will probably want to do cross-protection studies to determine of the vaccines can be designed to protect against the Bundibugyo subtype.

They said more studies are needed to determine the pathogenicity of the new virus and if antivirals are effective against it. According to initial findings from the outbreak, the case-fatality rate for Bundibugyo Ebola was about 36%, lower than that of the Zaire (80% to 90%) or Sudan (50% to 55%) subtypes.

Identification of the new virus highlights how quickly powerful molecular detection and characterization tools can identify new pathogens, the group wrote. However, they cautioned against solely relying on molecular techniques such as real-time PCR assays for detecting novel biodefense pathogens or conducting surveillance for emerging diseases.

Towner JS, Sealy TK, Khristova ML, et al. Newly discovered Ebola virus associated with hemorrhagic fever outbreak in Uganda. PLoS Pathog 2008 Nov;4(11) (published online Nov 21)[Full text]

See also:
Nov 21 PLoS press release
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2008-11/plos-sdn111908.php
Dec 6, 2007, CIDRAP News story "Suspected cases rise as new Ebola strain strikes Uganda"

.

[AlaskaDenise]

FT thread on this subject from November 2007, based on French research:
http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/sho...ighlight=ebola

.

[sharon sanders]

Originally Posted by ironorehopper

I think it's absolutely premature to state that Filoviruses and a member of Orthomyxoviruses recombined to form a new pathogen.

Why doesn't a Paramyxovirus, like Morbillivirus or a Togavirus like Rubivirus?

Further, with the aim to hit the evidence and predict a possible disaster one may speculate in every direction.

But does this exercise help?

In these times, with widespread economic recession and social turmoil in several part of the world, we are all called to maintain a sober behaviour and keep our ghosts and obsession out for some moments.

While research into novel pathogens are of undoubt interest and of great importance for humankind future, we should think to people that have to sustain themselves with agriculture and farming and try to save a bit of confidence in their hard work to survive.

I am sure that this my opinion will be unwelcomed for most part of FT members but I think it's the moment for sincere opinions and mine is absolutely sincere.

While I will accept every suggestion and critics by members and readers, I nonetheless hope at least some of you will convene that a more sober interpretation of facts is also well overdue.

Thank you Ironorehopper for the comment.

It is very important to post opposing opinions for a productive discussion.

[HenryN]

EBOLA-RESTON, PORCINE - PHILIPPINES (03)
****************************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

[1]
Date: Sun 14 Dec 2008
Source: Philippine Daily Inquirer [edited]
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20081214-177900/Intl-groups-invited-over-Ebola-threat>


International groups invited over Ebola threat
----------------------------------------------
The Department of Agriculture (DA) has invited international health
organizations to conduct a risk assessment of the Ebola-Reston virus
recently discovered in the country. Agriculture secretary Arthur C Yap said
the assessment would determine the extent of the risk or threat of the
virus to animal and human health in the Philippines.

Last week [week of 8 Dec 2008], the DA and Department of Health announced
that 4 hog farms in Luzon had been infected with a low pathogenic strain of
the Ebola-Reston virus. This was the 1st case of Ebola in swine in the
country, and agriculture and health officials assured the public that it
was not a human health issue but an animal health problem. The officials
declared local pork safe for human consumption.

"While we are currently carrying out a similar effort, we are opening our
door to scrutiny by independent globally recognized health organizations to
show that the Philippines is a responsible member of the international
community," said Yap. He said the move was in line with the government
policy of transparency and the effort to engage global authorities in
containing the infection, which has so far been detected in only a few hogs
in certain parts of Luzon.

Davinio Catbagan, director of the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), said the
risk assessment could be conducted by the World Health Organization (WHO),
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), or the Paris-based Office
International des Epizooties (World Animal Health Organization; OIE).

Recently, the DA announced a support program to assist the hog producers
whose livestock were found to have the Ebola-Reston virus. The DA said the
government would also provide incentives to unaffected hog growers to
encourage them to participate in the government program to stamp out the
disease. The DA will field quick-response government teams led by the BAI
to help the growers whose infected hogs will be culled or destroyed. Yap
said the government would provide quarantined farms with feeds and
replacement stocks once the farms had been cleared. Under the support
program, the DA will acquire additional laboratory kits to check the
presence of the virus in swine.

The Ebola-Reston strain is different from the 3 other Ebola subtypes, which
are all potentially fatal to humans. Unlike the Zaire, Ivory Coast, and
Sudan strains, the Reston strain has not caused illness in humans who come
in contact with infected animals. This particular strain was discovered in
the Philippines in 1989 among crab-eating monkeys being exported by the
Laguna-based Ferlite Farms to the Hazleton Laboratories in Reston,
Virginia, USA.

[byline: Amy R Remo]

--
communicated by:
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>

******
[2]
Date: Sat 13 Dec 2008
From: Patricia Doyle <dr_p_doyle@hotmail.com>


re: ProMED-mail Ebola-Reston, porcine - Philippines (02) 20081212.3910
----------------------------------------------------------------------
I wondered why Plum Island had tested pig samples for Ebola-Reston and
wondered if they found the results accidentally.

Normally, would pig samples be tested for Ebola if they were to be used in
vaccine research for PRRS [porcine reproductive respiratory syndrome]?
Perhaps, someone thought the blood samples had come from PRRS, that is,
Primate Resource Referral Service and tested for primate diseases thereby
finding Ebola-Reston in the 6 samples.

I would like to know why the pig samples were tested for a primate disease.
Is it also possible that the Ebola positive result was caused in the lab,
that is, Ebola-Reston in previous sample might have compromised the results
of the pig sample?

I would be very interested in opinions on this subject. It is a very
perplexing case.

--
Patricia A Doyle DVM, PhD
Tropical Agricultural Economics
University of West Indies
<dr_p_doyle@hotmail.com>

[Responses to Dr Doyle's query will be welcomed. It will be also
interesting to note if similar tests, in Plum Island or elsewhere, have
been carried-out in samples of PRRS-suspected porcines in/from other
countries, such as China and Viet Nam. In case affirmative, results would
be appreciated.

Subscribers may wish to visit the webpage of OIE's Working Group (WG) on
Wildlife Diseases at <http://www.oie.int/wildlife/eng/en_wildlife.htm>.
Founded in 1994, the WG informs and advises the OIE on all health problems
relating to wild animals, whether in the wild or in captivity. It has
prepared recommendations and oversees numerous scientific publications on
the surveillance and control of the most important specific wildlife
diseases; member-countries are encouraged to appoint national wildlife
focal points. The WG comprises world-leading scientific experts in their
subject areas, and meets.

In 2006, the WG published a list of diseases in mammals, birds, reptiles,
and amphibians to be covered by the recommended surveillance. The list
comprises 2 sections: the 1st section includes 44 of "OIE listed diseases"
(officially notifiable diseases of domestic animals), which may involve
wildlife as well. The 2nd sector includes "wildlife listed diseases",
namely diseases which are regarded as specifically affecting wildlife, of
which there are 24 in mammals, 8 in birds, 4 in reptiles, and 2 in
amphibians. Outbreaks of such diseases, though not listed as notifiable,
are expected to be reported by means of questionnaires distributed annually
to the member countries. Ebola is included among the mammal diseases of
this 2nd-sector list, which can be downloaded at the webpage above.

See also OIE's DG editorial of October 2008 "Improving wildlife
surveillance for its protection while protecting us from the diseases it
transmits," at <http://www.oie.int:80/eng/edito/en_edito_juil08.htm>.

In order to evaluate the realistic animal- and public-health implications
of the recent findings in the 4 Luzon pig farms, a detailed scientific
report by the investigating laboratory, including results of the agent's
genotyping, is anticipated. - Mod.AS]

[see also:
Ebola-Reston, porcine - Philippines (02) 20081212.3910
Ebola-Reston, porcine - Philippines 20081211.3896
1997
---
Ebola-Reston - Philippines (04) 19970202.0228
Ebola-Reston - Philippines (03) 19970128.0171
Ebola-Reston - Philippines (02) 19970126.0157
Ebola-Reston - Philippines 19970126.0154
1996
---
Ebola Reston - Philippines (5) 19960617.1120
Ebola Reston - Philippines (4) 19960610.1078
Ebola Reston - Philippines (3) 19960430.0832
Ebola Reston - Philippines (2) 19960426.0798
Ebola Reston - Philippines 19960424.0784]

.................arn/mj/sh

[HenryN]

Pork shipment halted

		The shipment was supposed to be the Philippines' first ever pork export, but it was stopped after traces of low pathogenic Ebola-Reston virus were found on some hog farms in the country. -- PHOTO: AP

MANILA- THE Philippines has stopped a shipment of 50,000 tonnes of pork to Singapore after traces of low pathogenic Ebola-Reston virus were found on some hog farms in the country, officials said on Monday.
The shipment was supposed to be the country's first ever pork export. The pork products were set to be sent to Singapore on Dec. 10 when the government voluntarily stopped the shipment due to food safety concerns, said Davinio Catbagan, director of the government's animal industry bureau.
The Philippines has informed Singapore's AgriFood and Veterinary Authority (AVA) about the Ebola-Reston virus among pigs in four northern areas in the country, Mr Catbagan said.
'We're still waiting for their reply,' Mr Catbagan told reporters.
The presence of the Ebola-Reston virus in some pigs in four farms in the country was the first such case anywhere in the world, Caroline-Ann Coulombe, a spokeswoman of the World Health Organisation (WHO) in Manila, told Reuters.
But the WHO still considered the case as a 'low public health risk' because the Ebola virus strain found in the Philippines was not known to be fatal in humans in the past, Ms Coulombe said.
The Philippines has said all tests conducted on workers from the hog farms and butchers from slaughterhouses handling the pigs from the farms yielded negative for the presence of the Ebola-Reston virus.
The Ebola-Reston virus had been previously detected in some Philippine monkeys.
'At the moment, based on historical precedence with the monkeys and based on the fact that the health and agriculture departments have been conducting tests on humans that may have been in contact with the infected pigs during those times, the WHO considers this a low public health risk,' Ms Coulombe said.
She said the WHO was informed about the Ebola-Reston virus among pigs around the third week of November but the infection was discovered as early as May this year. Laboratory results confirming the presence of Ebola-Reston virus were confirmed only in October, said Coulombe, adding the WHO was not aware of the extent of the infection among pigs. -- REUTERS

http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking...ry_314742.html

[HenryN]

Commentary

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/12...s_Testing.html