tetano
Editor, Senior Moderator
Emerg Microbes Infect
. 2024 Mar 17:2332667.
doi: 10.1080/22221751.2024.2332667. Online ahead of print. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus of clade 2.3.4.4b isolated from a human case in Chile causes fatal disease and transmits between co-housed ferrets
Joanna A Pulit-Penaloza[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Nicole Brock[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Jessica A Belser[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Xiangjie Sun[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Claudia Pappas[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Troy J Kieran[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Poulami Basu Thakur[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Hui Zeng[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Dan Cui[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Julia Frederick[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Rodrigo Fasce[SUP] 2 [/SUP], Terrence M Tumpey[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Taronna R Maines[SUP] 1 [/SUP]
Affiliations
Clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses have caused large outbreaks within avian populations on five continents, with concurrent spillover into a variety of mammalian species. Mutations associated with mammalian adaptation have been sporadically identified in avian isolates, and more frequently among mammalian isolates following infection. Reports of human infection with A(H5N1) viruses following contact with infected wildlife have been reported on multiple continents, highlighting the need for pandemic risk assessment of these viruses. In this study, the pathogenicity and transmissibility of A/Chile/25945/2023 HPAI A(H5N1) virus, a novel reassortment with four gene segments (PB1, PB2, NP, MP) from North America lineage, isolated from a severe human case in Chile, was evaluated in vitro and using the ferret model. This virus possessed a high capacity to cause fatal disease, characterized by high morbidity and extrapulmonary spread in virus-inoculated ferrets. The virus was capable of transmission to naïve contacts in a direct contact setting, with contact animals similarly exhibiting severe disease, but did not exhibit productive transmission in respiratory droplet or fomite transmission models. Our results indicate that the virus would need to acquire an airborne transmissible phenotype in mammals to potentially cause a pandemic. Nonetheless, this work warrants continuous monitoring of mammalian adaptations in avian viruses, especially in strains isolated from humans, to aid pandemic preparedness efforts.
Keywords: A(H5N1); avian influenza; ferret; transmission.
. 2024 Mar 17:2332667.
doi: 10.1080/22221751.2024.2332667. Online ahead of print. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus of clade 2.3.4.4b isolated from a human case in Chile causes fatal disease and transmits between co-housed ferrets
Joanna A Pulit-Penaloza[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Nicole Brock[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Jessica A Belser[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Xiangjie Sun[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Claudia Pappas[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Troy J Kieran[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Poulami Basu Thakur[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Hui Zeng[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Dan Cui[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Julia Frederick[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Rodrigo Fasce[SUP] 2 [/SUP], Terrence M Tumpey[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Taronna R Maines[SUP] 1 [/SUP]
Affiliations
- PMID: 38494746
- DOI: 10.1080/22221751.2024.2332667
Clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses have caused large outbreaks within avian populations on five continents, with concurrent spillover into a variety of mammalian species. Mutations associated with mammalian adaptation have been sporadically identified in avian isolates, and more frequently among mammalian isolates following infection. Reports of human infection with A(H5N1) viruses following contact with infected wildlife have been reported on multiple continents, highlighting the need for pandemic risk assessment of these viruses. In this study, the pathogenicity and transmissibility of A/Chile/25945/2023 HPAI A(H5N1) virus, a novel reassortment with four gene segments (PB1, PB2, NP, MP) from North America lineage, isolated from a severe human case in Chile, was evaluated in vitro and using the ferret model. This virus possessed a high capacity to cause fatal disease, characterized by high morbidity and extrapulmonary spread in virus-inoculated ferrets. The virus was capable of transmission to naïve contacts in a direct contact setting, with contact animals similarly exhibiting severe disease, but did not exhibit productive transmission in respiratory droplet or fomite transmission models. Our results indicate that the virus would need to acquire an airborne transmissible phenotype in mammals to potentially cause a pandemic. Nonetheless, this work warrants continuous monitoring of mammalian adaptations in avian viruses, especially in strains isolated from humans, to aid pandemic preparedness efforts.
Keywords: A(H5N1); avian influenza; ferret; transmission.