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Nat Commun . Using drivers and transmission pathways to identify SARS-like coronavirus spillover risk hotspots

tetano

Editor, Senior Moderator
Nat Commun


. 2023 Oct 27;14(1):6854.
doi: 10.1038/s41467-023-42627-2. Using drivers and transmission pathways to identify SARS-like coronavirus spillover risk hotspots

Renata L Muylaert[SUP] 1 [/SUP], David A Wilkinson[SUP] 2 [/SUP], Tigga Kingston[SUP] 3 [/SUP], Paolo D'Odorico[SUP] 4 [/SUP], Maria Cristina Rulli[SUP] 5 [/SUP], Nikolas Galli[SUP] 5 [/SUP], Reju Sam John[SUP] 6 [/SUP], Phillip Alviola[SUP] 7 [/SUP], David T S Hayman[SUP] 8 [/SUP]



Affiliations
Abstract

The emergence of SARS-like coronaviruses is a multi-stage process from wildlife reservoirs to people. Here we characterize multiple drivers-landscape change, host distribution, and human exposure-associated with the risk of spillover of zoonotic SARS-like coronaviruses to help inform surveillance and mitigation activities. We consider direct and indirect transmission pathways by modeling four scenarios with livestock and mammalian wildlife as potential and known reservoirs before examining how access to healthcare varies within clusters and scenarios. We found 19 clusters with differing risk factor contributions within a single country (N = 9) or transboundary (N = 10). High-risk areas were mainly closer (11-20%) rather than far ( < 1%) from healthcare. Areas far from healthcare reveal healthcare access inequalities, especially Scenario 3, which includes wild mammals and not livestock as secondary hosts. China (N = 2) and Indonesia (N = 1) had clusters with the highest risk. Our findings can help stakeholders in land use planning, integrating healthcare implementation and One Health actions.


 
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