Treyfish
Moderator
AFRICAN SWINE FEVER - GEORGIA (08)
[The following e-mail, addressed to the FAO, dealing with the current
African Swine fever situation in Georgia as seen by a visiting
Physician and his views on needed actions, has been copied to us. We
have taken the liberty to extract information pertaining to
unpublished on-the-ground observations. -- Mod. AS].
[1]
Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2007
From: Andreas Valentiner
I have traveled repeatedly throughout the entire country [Georgia]
recently, with the exception of the southern Ossetian Region.
I happened to be able to see the recent developments in regard to
African Swine Fever [ASF] from about the time of the publication of
the Combined Report of FAO/EC and OIE [end June 2007] till now.
My observations regarding ASF in Georgia, especially referring to the
executed containment efforts and the subsequent spread of the disease
to conflict regions within GEO could have been gathered by any
accidental tourist [I am a physician by profession].
The entire region south of the Inguri River [i.e. close to a conflict
zone in GEO] features lots of roaming cattle, pigs and poultry on
roads and
streets, unperturbed by vehicle traffic flowing around them [and by
the official ban of pigs outside of stables].
ProMED-mail posting 20070615.1954 of 15 Jun 2007 stated (excerpt):
"Very active steps are being taken to impose movement quarantines and
road search and disinfection sites for vehicles". Having had the
experience of going through several exclusion zones I came across
multiple variations of disinfection attempts [I documented some of
them by photography and/or video] [and] would like to contribute that
the above was a very euphemistic statement. None of the disinfection
points did more than spraying the outside [sic] wall of the tires,
there was no real dip to drive through, and several posts were
obviously deserted.
I could not observe a single checkpoint, where goods were inspected
for prohibited produce.
The GEO military executed extensive movement exercises along the
trunk road of Georgia, connecting several ASF areas as depicted on
published FAO maps, without any observable disinfection stops.
The areas shown as unaffected on the FAO maps were, until recently
apparently indeed both free from ASF, however without proper
surveillance and diagnostic [PCR] capabilities.
The latter is unfortunate, because these areas also provide
territorial continuity to the Russian Federation, which cannot afford
to allow
the animal disease to progress into their country for apparent reasons.
The Head of Veterinary Services in the Region of Abkhazia reported
that he had recently sent a contribution to FAO, OIE and ISID which
explained the animal health situation in his area of responsibility,
informed about the laboratory identified for sample examination and
stated his requirements.
He did not receive a reply in kind [e-mail], nor were his information
published. [ProMED-mail is unaware of a communication, sent to ISID
or to ProMED-mail from Abkhazia on the ASF situation or on any animal
health issue. - Mod. AS].
From a professional point of view any procrastination of support
needed will inevitably lead to repercussions between the affected
parties. While it is understood that curbing ASF is a difficult feat,
open-minded and professional cooperation should overcome political
stand-off, when all parties will gain from it, or -- even more
convincing -- not to cooperate will cause great political and
economical damage in the end to all parties not communicating now.
Being and remaining responsible are the GEO Authorities, which should
visibly attempt to open available channels of communication and extend
their assisting hand.
ASF constitutes the "dress rehearsal" for Avian Influenza when
looking at conceivable Public Health Sector Response.
The de-facto Abkhazian Authorities were not fully aware of the array
of UN Agencies and other International Organizations observing,
monitoring
and advising on the recent ASF outbreak. They were in fact very
reluctant to go public on the Web at all. You all should grant them
as a minimum a
response, if not a publication of their contribution and requests for
assistance.
Visibility and open communication might be in fact the prime and
greatest assets to overcome a difficult situation, not only in terms
of fighting an animal disease.
--
Andreas Valentiner
Otto Nagel Str 17
14467 POTSDAM
Germany
*****
[2]
Date: Sat 11 Aug 2007
Source: Kavkazski Uzel [trans. by Corr.ARS, abridged and edited]
<http://kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/news/id/1194291.html>
Georgia denies the pollution of rivers in Abkhazia by corpses of infected pigs
No signs of African swine fever [ASF] have been found in Upper
Abkhazia (Kodori Gorge), in the territory controlled by the Georgian
authorities. Accordingly, the information on the involvement of
Georgia in the pollution of Kodori River and the Black Sea is
groundless.
According to recent reports, ASF has been spreading in Abkhazia.
Denials have been published by the Abkhazian authorities. There were
rumors about pig corpses with Georgian origins, polluting the river
Kodor in Abkhazia. These rumors were denied by Georgia, but other
sources said that sampled corpses were found infected by tests
carried out by the all-Russian Scientific Research Institute of
Veterinary Virology and Microbiology.
Previous reports, since May 2007, said that about 21 000 pigs died in
Georgia due to ASF; cases were recorded in virtually all regions of
eastern and western Georgia, except in the highlands of the country's
Black Sea Adjara and autonomy. According to the Ministry of
Agriculture in Georgia there are about one million head of hogs, and
all of them face the disease.
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>
[Abkhazia, currently a de facto state separated from Georgia by
Russian forces, has been subject to territorial disputes involving
Georgia and the Russian Federation since the early 1990s.
See map, which shows also the Kodori river, at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/olmedia/1585000/images/_1586409_abkhazia3_map300.gif>.
The above (abridged) newswire is rather blurred, reflecting the
intermingling of epidemiology and politics in the Transcaucasian
pressure cooker; a matter for international concern. An EC/FAO/OIE
experts mission paid a visit to Georgia in June 2007; see their
report and recommendations in 20070627.2066.
Georgia initially reported the ASF outbreak to the OIE on 5 Jun 2007.
Follow-up reports were submitted on 19 Jun 2007, 21 Jun 2007 and 13
Aug 2007.
The last follow-up report, dated 13 Aug 2007, includes the following
(summarised) information. Notably, it is similar to the information
in the previous reports.
Number of outbreaks: 45
Susceptible: 419 960
Cases: 51 773
Deaths: 51 773
Destroyed: 12 956
Slaughtered: 0
For a summary of all (4) Georgia's reports to the OIE, with map, see
<http://www.oie.int/wahid-prod/public.php?page=event_summary&reportid=5720>.
It will be interesting to note if and which changes in the
epidemiology of ASF in Georgia have been observed since June 2007.
ProMED-mail will appreciate receiving any piece of information on the
ASF situation in Transcaucasia, particularly from
territories/entities which are not members of the OIE, such as
Abkhazia. Received information will be disseminated, to enable
enhancement of regional cooperative efforts to combat the common foe,
ASF, for which the support of the international community is vital. -
Mod.AS].:tiphat: http://tinyurl.com/35trvn
[The following e-mail, addressed to the FAO, dealing with the current
African Swine fever situation in Georgia as seen by a visiting
Physician and his views on needed actions, has been copied to us. We
have taken the liberty to extract information pertaining to
unpublished on-the-ground observations. -- Mod. AS].
[1]
Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2007
From: Andreas Valentiner
I have traveled repeatedly throughout the entire country [Georgia]
recently, with the exception of the southern Ossetian Region.
I happened to be able to see the recent developments in regard to
African Swine Fever [ASF] from about the time of the publication of
the Combined Report of FAO/EC and OIE [end June 2007] till now.
My observations regarding ASF in Georgia, especially referring to the
executed containment efforts and the subsequent spread of the disease
to conflict regions within GEO could have been gathered by any
accidental tourist [I am a physician by profession].
The entire region south of the Inguri River [i.e. close to a conflict
zone in GEO] features lots of roaming cattle, pigs and poultry on
roads and
streets, unperturbed by vehicle traffic flowing around them [and by
the official ban of pigs outside of stables].
ProMED-mail posting 20070615.1954 of 15 Jun 2007 stated (excerpt):
"Very active steps are being taken to impose movement quarantines and
road search and disinfection sites for vehicles". Having had the
experience of going through several exclusion zones I came across
multiple variations of disinfection attempts [I documented some of
them by photography and/or video] [and] would like to contribute that
the above was a very euphemistic statement. None of the disinfection
points did more than spraying the outside [sic] wall of the tires,
there was no real dip to drive through, and several posts were
obviously deserted.
I could not observe a single checkpoint, where goods were inspected
for prohibited produce.
The GEO military executed extensive movement exercises along the
trunk road of Georgia, connecting several ASF areas as depicted on
published FAO maps, without any observable disinfection stops.
The areas shown as unaffected on the FAO maps were, until recently
apparently indeed both free from ASF, however without proper
surveillance and diagnostic [PCR] capabilities.
The latter is unfortunate, because these areas also provide
territorial continuity to the Russian Federation, which cannot afford
to allow
the animal disease to progress into their country for apparent reasons.
The Head of Veterinary Services in the Region of Abkhazia reported
that he had recently sent a contribution to FAO, OIE and ISID which
explained the animal health situation in his area of responsibility,
informed about the laboratory identified for sample examination and
stated his requirements.
He did not receive a reply in kind [e-mail], nor were his information
published. [ProMED-mail is unaware of a communication, sent to ISID
or to ProMED-mail from Abkhazia on the ASF situation or on any animal
health issue. - Mod. AS].
From a professional point of view any procrastination of support
needed will inevitably lead to repercussions between the affected
parties. While it is understood that curbing ASF is a difficult feat,
open-minded and professional cooperation should overcome political
stand-off, when all parties will gain from it, or -- even more
convincing -- not to cooperate will cause great political and
economical damage in the end to all parties not communicating now.
Being and remaining responsible are the GEO Authorities, which should
visibly attempt to open available channels of communication and extend
their assisting hand.
ASF constitutes the "dress rehearsal" for Avian Influenza when
looking at conceivable Public Health Sector Response.
The de-facto Abkhazian Authorities were not fully aware of the array
of UN Agencies and other International Organizations observing,
monitoring
and advising on the recent ASF outbreak. They were in fact very
reluctant to go public on the Web at all. You all should grant them
as a minimum a
response, if not a publication of their contribution and requests for
assistance.
Visibility and open communication might be in fact the prime and
greatest assets to overcome a difficult situation, not only in terms
of fighting an animal disease.
--
Andreas Valentiner
Otto Nagel Str 17
14467 POTSDAM
Germany
*****
[2]
Date: Sat 11 Aug 2007
Source: Kavkazski Uzel [trans. by Corr.ARS, abridged and edited]
<http://kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/news/id/1194291.html>
Georgia denies the pollution of rivers in Abkhazia by corpses of infected pigs
No signs of African swine fever [ASF] have been found in Upper
Abkhazia (Kodori Gorge), in the territory controlled by the Georgian
authorities. Accordingly, the information on the involvement of
Georgia in the pollution of Kodori River and the Black Sea is
groundless.
According to recent reports, ASF has been spreading in Abkhazia.
Denials have been published by the Abkhazian authorities. There were
rumors about pig corpses with Georgian origins, polluting the river
Kodor in Abkhazia. These rumors were denied by Georgia, but other
sources said that sampled corpses were found infected by tests
carried out by the all-Russian Scientific Research Institute of
Veterinary Virology and Microbiology.
Previous reports, since May 2007, said that about 21 000 pigs died in
Georgia due to ASF; cases were recorded in virtually all regions of
eastern and western Georgia, except in the highlands of the country's
Black Sea Adjara and autonomy. According to the Ministry of
Agriculture in Georgia there are about one million head of hogs, and
all of them face the disease.
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>
[Abkhazia, currently a de facto state separated from Georgia by
Russian forces, has been subject to territorial disputes involving
Georgia and the Russian Federation since the early 1990s.
See map, which shows also the Kodori river, at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/olmedia/1585000/images/_1586409_abkhazia3_map300.gif>.
The above (abridged) newswire is rather blurred, reflecting the
intermingling of epidemiology and politics in the Transcaucasian
pressure cooker; a matter for international concern. An EC/FAO/OIE
experts mission paid a visit to Georgia in June 2007; see their
report and recommendations in 20070627.2066.
Georgia initially reported the ASF outbreak to the OIE on 5 Jun 2007.
Follow-up reports were submitted on 19 Jun 2007, 21 Jun 2007 and 13
Aug 2007.
The last follow-up report, dated 13 Aug 2007, includes the following
(summarised) information. Notably, it is similar to the information
in the previous reports.
Number of outbreaks: 45
Susceptible: 419 960
Cases: 51 773
Deaths: 51 773
Destroyed: 12 956
Slaughtered: 0
For a summary of all (4) Georgia's reports to the OIE, with map, see
<http://www.oie.int/wahid-prod/public.php?page=event_summary&reportid=5720>.
It will be interesting to note if and which changes in the
epidemiology of ASF in Georgia have been observed since June 2007.
ProMED-mail will appreciate receiving any piece of information on the
ASF situation in Transcaucasia, particularly from
territories/entities which are not members of the OIE, such as
Abkhazia. Received information will be disseminated, to enable
enhancement of regional cooperative efforts to combat the common foe,
ASF, for which the support of the international community is vital. -
Mod.AS].:tiphat: http://tinyurl.com/35trvn