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Anti-viral resistance in 2009 A/H1N1 flu - historical compilation of news

Re: U.S. - First Tamiflu-resistant swine flu (Singapore ex-Hawaii)

Re: U.S. - First Tamiflu-resistant swine flu (Singapore ex-Hawaii)

Commentary

Silent Spread of Tamiflu Resistant Pandemic H1N1 Confirmed

Recombinomics Commentary 14:26
August 15, 2009

A Health Ministry spokesperson said that the isolated case involved a patient who fell sick towards the end of May and was admitted to hospital for isolation and treatment.

The patient was infected by a Tamiflu-susceptible strain of the virus and treated with Tamiflu. The resistant strain emerged during treatment and was detected through laboratory testing but by then the patient had already improved clinically.

The above comments provide additional detail on the first confirmed case of Tamiflu resistance in a swine pandemic H1N1 case. The H274Y was identified in an NA sequence, A/Singapore/57/2009, which was recently deposited by the CDC, along with the HA and MP sequences. All three were clearly from the swine H1N1 pandemic strain, but the presence of H274Y in NA signaled oseltamivir resistance. The sample was from a 28F and was collected May 30, consistent with the description of the above Health Ministry spokesperson.

The MOH website provided a great deal of detail on the initial confirmed cases and contacts. The first confirmed case was May 27, and the third confirmed case matched the description associated with Singapore/57. The only 28F confirned patient ib Singapore in late May / early June was an American who was working in Singapore, She arrived from Honolulu via Tokyo on a flight that arrive just before midnight (23:53) on the night of May 26. Although she did not feel well during the flight, she was not detected by the fever scanners at the airport. However, the next she was transported by ambulance and arrive at the hospital in the afternoon of the 27th, and tested H1N1 positive on the afternoon (16:10) of the 28th.

The NA sequence from the 28th has not been made public, but the comments above indicate the sample was Tamiflu sensitive, It is not clear if treatment began the 27th (upon admission to the hospital), or the 28th, following confirmation of H1N1, because the MOH website does not mention Tamiflu treatment. The patient was described as having a mild case, and was discharged May 31st.

However, the sample collected on May 30th had H274Y, which was 3 days after admission or 2 days after confirmation, indicating the H274Y was silently spreading since it was not detected in the May 28th sample. Detection in the May 30th sample indicates that the H274Y was already present in May 28, but not detected, based on the comments by the spokesperson above, supporting silent spread which is detected in samples collected after Tamiflu treatment.

Although the May 28th sample was Tamiflu sensitive, the May 30th sample had H274Y in the NA sequence, as well as a polymorphism in the HA sequence that was subsequently detected in California and New York in the US, as well as Guangdong Province in China, Mexico City, Stockholm, and the first fatal case in Sao Paulo, Brazil (see list here), raising concerns of silent spread of H274Y worldwide.

The presence of H274Y in a minor species would explain the failure to find H274Y in the above locations, but its presence just below the detection level in untreated patient may explain the recent increases in fatalities. Agencies have repeatedly cited the lack of H274Y detection, leading to the widespread use of Tamiflu in H1N1 in positive cases, including the two immuno-suppressed patents in the state of Washington, where H274Y was detected for the first time in the United States. In those two patients H274Y was not detected until the patients either had a reoccurrence of symptoms or a failure to respond to treatment. The resistance was found in August, even though both patients developed resistance weeks or months earlier. These detection delays and recent reports of patients, who were resistant in May and June, raise concern that the number of samples with H274Y is significantly higher that the 11 confirmed cases thus far. Media reports have described in at least one patient in Thailand, and earlier media reports described multiple cases in Texas along the Mexican border.

However, the detection of H274Y in the sample collected a few days after the start of treatment in the patient in Singapore suggests the actual incidence is much higher than the reported or withheld cases described by WHO, and a more intense screening program is critical, especially of samples collected after the start of osletamivir treatment and the increasingly common fatal cases.

.
 
Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

Oseltamivir- and Amantadine-Resistant Influenza Viruses A (H1N1) (EID, abstract, edited)

[Original Full Document: LINK. EDITED.]

DOI: 10.3201/eid1506.081357
Suggested citation for this article: Cheng PKC, Leung TWC, Ho ECM, Leung PCK, Ng AYY, Lai MYY, et al. Oseltamivir- and amantadine-resistant influenza viruses A (H1N1). Emerg Infect Dis. 2009 Jun; [Epub ahead of print]

Oseltamivir- and Amantadine-Resistant Influenza Viruses A (H1N1)

Peter K.C. Cheng, Tommy W.C. Leung, Eric C.M. Ho, Peter C.K. Leung, Anita Y.Y. Ng, Mary Y.Y. Lai, and Wilina W.L. Lim

Author affiliation: Centre for Health Protection, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, People?s Republic of China


Surveillance of amantadine and oseltamivir resistance among influenza viruses was begun in Hong Kong in 2006. In 2008, while both A/Brisbane/59/2007-like and A/Hong Kong/2652/2006-like viruses (H1N1) were cocirculating, we detected amantadine- and oseltamivir-resistance among A/Hong Kong/2652/2006-like viruses (H1N1), caused by genetic reassortment or spontaneous mutation.

-
-----
 

Attachments

Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

WHO | Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - update 62 (revised 21 August 2009)

Weekly update

As of this week, there have been more than 182,000 laboratory confirmed cases of pandemic influenza H1N1, 1799 deaths, in 177 countries and territories have been reported to WHO.

As more and more countries have stopped counting individual cases, particularly of milder illness, the case number is significantly lower than the actually number of cases that have occurred. However, through the WHO monitoring network, it is apparent that rates of influenza illness continue to decline in the temperate regions of the southern hemisphere, except in South Africa where pandemic influenza H1N1 appeared slightly later than the other countries of the region. Active transmission is still seen in some later affected areas of Australia, Chile and Argentina even as national rates decrease.

Areas of tropical Asia are reporting increasing rates of illness as they enter their monsoon season, as represented by India, Thailand, Malaysia, and Hong Kong, four places in the region which have active surveillance programs. Tropical regions of Central America, represented by Costa Rica and El Salvador, are also seeing very active transmission.

In the northern temperate zones, overall rates are declining in both North America and Europe though the virus is still found across a wide area throughout both regions and pockets of high activity are being reported in 3 U.S. states and a few countries of Western Europe.

It has been noted throughout the temperate zones of the southern hemisphere, which are now passing out of their winter season, that when pandemic H1N1 began to circulate, the relative importance of seasonal strains, represented by H3N2 in nearly all countries, rapidly diminished and pandemic H1N1 became the dominant strain. Some seasonal H1N1 strains were reported but were even less common than seasonal H3N2. It is too early to tell if this co-circulation of multiple strains will continue into the coming season of the Northern Hemisphere but it appears very likely that pandemic H1N1 will be the dominant influenza virus in the early part of the winter months.

Many countries including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. have noted that their indigenous peoples appear to be at increased risk of severe disease related to pandemic influenza. While it still has not been clearly determined how much of the increased risk observed in these groups is due to issues related to access to care, high rates of chronic medical conditions that are known to increase risk, or other factors, countries with indigenous and other vulnerable populations should carefully evaluate the situation and consider ways to mitigate the impact of the pandemic in the coming season in these populations.

WHO has also been notified of 12 cases of oseltamivir resistant virus. These isolates have a mutation in the neuraminidase (referred to as H275Y) that confers resistance to oseltamivir, though the viruses remain sensitive to zanamivir. Of these 8 have been associated with oseltamivir post exposure prophylaxis, one with treatment of uncomplicated illness, and two have been from immunocompromised patients receiving oseltamivir treatment. These isolated cases have arisen in different parts of the world (Japan 4, USA 2, China, Hong Kong SAR China 2, and 1 in Denmark, Canada, Singapore and China), and there are no epidemiological links between them. There is also no evidence of onward transmission from these cases.
-
<cite cite="http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_08_21/en/index.html">WHO | Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - update 62 (revised 21 August 2009)</cite>
 
Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

Flu antivirals: the good news (they work), the bad news (not very well), the good news in the bad news (we're not likely to lose much)

Category: Antivirals ? Influenza treatment
Posted on: August 11, 2009 6:53 AM, by revere


Yesterday (today as I am writing this) the British Medical Journal published another Cochrane meta-analysis on the efficacy of neurimminidase inhibitor antivirals (the only two in use now, being oseltamivir [Tamiflu] and zanimivir [Relenza]). Their conclusions have made the news, so I guess I should cast my baleful eye on their handiwork. I think there is less here than meets the eye, but first let's look at what meets the eye.


This is a meta-analysis, that is, an analysis of other analyses, the other analyses in this case being drug trials of Tamiflu or Relanza in children. So it's an observational study of experimental studies, if you follow me.



"Experimental" in this context means studies on children where the investigators control the treatment assignment (an antiviral or a placebo or no treatment). In essence, it is a review article of other studies where the authors employ various qualitative and quantitative techniques to combine results to come up with a summary of the studies, taken together. It's more complicated than that, but that's the general idea. It's potentially better than the kind of reviews of the literature commonly done because it is very explicit about what kinds of analyses will be included and the methods of weighting the results are also explicit and often quite sophisticated. I say potentially better because it takes a very narrow view of the subject, only allowing data from scientific studies of a particular kind. The Cochrane consortium last looked at this question in 2005 and this article looks at what has been learned in the interim, clearly with an eye on the swine flu pandemic now underway. All of the analyses they looked at were for seasonal flu, not pandemic flu. How generalizable this is to pandemic flu is unclear, but it is reasonable to think it has relevance.


There were only four studies meeting their strict eligibility criteria in this time period using antivirals to treat flu in children, two for each antiviral. The total number of children in the treatment studies was just under 1800, about two thirds of whom had virologically confirmed flu. Two thirds of those had influenza A. The rest had flu B. There was no differentiation of flu A subtypes. Three more studies used antivirals (two Relenza, one Tamiflu) as post exposure prophylaxis (just under 900 children). The studies were randomized trials involving children less than 12 who had flu (either clinically suspected or virologically confirmed) but not sick enough to be hospitalized. Thus the conclusions say nothing about the efficacy of these drugs for really sick children, although this is not clear from the news reports (example from the BBC: "The antiviral drugs being used to treat swine flu do not appear to work well in children, say UK researchers." This also fails to mention this was not a study of the use of these drugs for swine flu.)


I've never been much of a fan of antivirals as a way to deal with pandemic flu, but that's because I'm a public health person, not a clinician. My interest is in things that work on the population level, not applied at the level of the individual. In addition I was never impressed by how well these drugs worked. At times I even wondered if they worked at all were we to take a hard look at them (many of the studies were financed by the drug companies and we now know this is often a tainted source). Antivirals aren't like antibiotics, where you can sometimes work almost miraculous cures. If they work, they work at the margins. With those prejudices of mine as background, I can state that one clear message of the 2005 review and this one is that both of these drugs work to some extent. You wouldn't get that idea at all if all you read was the news headlines (the BBC again: Flu drugs 'unhelpful' in children). They not only work, but they work on every single measure examined: reduction of time with symptoms (.5 days to 1.5 days); time of illness (.4 days to 1.5 days), where this was defined as resolution of all symptoms and resolution of fever and return to school or normal activities; reduction in cough or fever (1.3 days for Tamiflu, "reduced incidence of moderate or severe cough" at day five with Relenza); reduction in asthma exacerbation; improvement in pulmonary function; reduction in antibiotic use; reduction in otitis media (middle ear infection) at day 10; and in confirmed secondary cases with an infected index case (reduction in transmission of about 8%).



In some of these outcomes the differences were not statistically significant, but in no instance -- not a single one I was able to see in this paper -- was there an outcome that wasn't consistent with the drugs working. Remember that the authors were surveying less than 3000 children divided up into seven studies, each of varying quality and different outcomes. The most plausible explanation for a lack of statistical significance given the consistent pattern and the biology is that there was insufficient statistical power. It is certainly false and absolutely incorrect to say that the outcomes that were not statistically significant showed no effect. In every instance they showed an effect of the drug in the right direction. In some instances the alternative explanation of random variation remained on the table along with a real effect.


In trying to make the jump from this review to the current swine flu situation there are other issues to contend with. Anywhere from 2% to 20% of the children in these trials had gotten seasonal flu vaccination, which could well have modulated the severity of their illness and the response to antivirals. This is especially pertinent in trying to extrapolate to populations of children in the initial stages of this pandemic, where none of them will have been vaccinated. Second, as already noted, none of these children were sick enough to be hospitalized. The marginal improvement in these community residing patients may look very different in very sick children who are on the margin between needing vents or no vents or even a fatal outcome. Nor do we know much about children with serious underlying medical conditions. That is work that remains to be done and some of it is happening now. Third, we know little about the efficacy of these drugs across flu A and flu B or between subtypes of flu A. Are there significant differences? We know that the neuriminidase protein on the virus looks different in different subtypes (there are at least two main NA subgroups) but we don't know much about the effect of those differences on antiviral efficacy. Moreover it is likely that many of these children were infected with viruses resistant to Tamiflu. So far the swine flu virus remains sensitive.


While we fear this paper will lead to misinterpretation and we think it has been oversold, it does raise some very important questions. It presents clear evidence these drugs work, but do they work well enough? In the Big Picture, for most patients the improvement is not very significant (although for individuals a day or more gained without symptoms is not just a tunafish sandwich). Tamiflu has some adverse effects, most commonly nausea and vomiting. That's not fun, either. When told of this, my daughter declined the Tamiflu she was offered when she came down with the virus.



Finally, there is the prospect that unwise use will promote resistance and deprive us of one of the few therapies we have for swine flu. This is not a simple issue. To have the greatest chance of success these drugs should be used relatively early in the course of the illness, often before anyone knows which direction it is headed. If we wait to use them only when the patient goes sour, they will have lost much of their potential efficacy. On the other hand, suppose we do lose their use because the virus develops resistance. The current seasonal H1N1 is almost entirely resistant to Tamiflu (but not Relenza) and we have managed quite well without it. That's the silver lining to the fact these are not miracle drugs. If you lose them, you aren't losing the ability to work a miracle. It's the good news in the bad news.


The real take home lesson in the BMJ paper is that for seasonal flu these drugs work for children but not well enough to rely on them for much. We don't know whether this is also true for swine flu and for very sick children, but studies now underway which will likely provide some data. How much of what this paper provides will turn out to be of any use remains to be seen.
Meanwhile, caveat lector.
 
Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news



By MARIA CHENG
ASSOCIATED PRESS

</SCRIPT itxtvisited="1">
  • LONDON ? Healthy people who catch swine flu do not need antivirals like Tamiflu, but the young, the old and the pregnant surely do, the World Health Organization declared today in new advice to doctors.
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The UN health agency said people who are otherwise healthy with mild to moderate cases of swine flu or regular flu don?t need the popular drug, calling the medical evidence for giving it to those people ?low quality.?
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But people thought to be at risk for complications from swine flu ? children less than five years old, pregnant women, people over age 65 and those with other health problems like heart disease, HIV or diabetes ? should definitely get the drug, WHO said.



WHO also recommended that all patients, including children, who have severe or worsening cases of swine flu, with breathing difficulties, chest pain or severe weakness, should get Tamiflu immediately, perhaps in higher doses than now used.

The advice contradicts some current government policies, such as those in England, whose health agency liberally hands out Tamiflu to healthy people with swine flu. Since the British set up a national flu service in July to deal with the surge of swine flu cases, Tamiflu has been available to anyone suspected of having the disease, including healthy people.


At its summer peak, British authorities guessed there were about 110,000 new cases of swine flu, also known as H1N1, every week. The number of new cases dropped last week to about 11,000, but the fall/winter flu season has not yet begun.

Boasting that Britain had the world?s largest supply of Tamiflu, enough to cover 80% of its nearly 61 million people, Health Minister Andy Burnham promised the drug would be available to anyone who needed it.

Britons who call the national flu line can get Tamiflu without ever seeing a doctor ? it is given out by call center operators who have no medical training. Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales decided not to participate in the swine flu phone line.

On its swine flu Web site, the Department of Health says ?the government has decided to offer the antivirals Tamiflu or Relenza to everyone confirmed with swine flu.?

To stop people fraudulently getting Tamiflu, the web site says ?the government is relying on the public to use the system responsibly.?

Some experts have criticized that approach, warning that blanketing the population with Tamiflu increases the chances of resistant strains emerging.

Flu expert Hugh Pennington of the University of Aberdeen called the strategy ?a very big experiment? and said England?s approach was out of step with the rest of the world. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, for instance, says antivirals must be prescribed by a health care professional.

Pennington called for the national flu line to be dismantled because Tamiflu should be used more sparingly.

?This approach increases the likelihood of a resistant strain and that is not a risk worth running,? Pennington said.

Officials have already found widespread drug resistance in seasonal strains of H1N1 flu and worry that might also crop up with swine flu. So far, only a handful of Tamiflu-resistant swine flu strains have been found.


WHO said most patients infected with swine flu worldwide recover within a week without any medical treatment. Still, about 40% of the severe swine flu cases are occurring in previously healthy children and adults, usually under 50 years of age.
WHO has estimated that as many as 2 billion people could become infected over the next two years with swine flu ? nearly one-third of the world?s population.:tiphat:http://www.freep.com/article/200908...for-young--old--pregnant&template=fullarticle
 
Re: EuroFlu - Weekly Electronic Bulletin - Influenza Surveillance

Re: EuroFlu - Weekly Electronic Bulletin - Influenza Surveillance

EuroFlu - Bulletin Review: Low or moderate influenza activity and an overall decrease in the number of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus detections (August 21, 2009, edited)

EuroFlu - Weekly Electronic Bulletin Week 33 : 10/08/2009-16/08/2009 - 21 August 2009, Issue N? 319

Low or moderate influenza activity and an overall decrease in the number of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus detections


Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus detections were first reported in the European Region in week 18/2009 and as of week 24/2009 bulletins present developments involving this strain. As of 19 August 2009, 47 of the 53 countries in the WHO European Region have reported to WHO confirmed cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection, in compliance with their obligations under the International Health Regulations. Ninety fatalities associated with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection were reported in nine countries. An overview of the global pandemic (H1N1) 2009 situation is available, as of 13 August 2009.


Summary:

In week 33/2009, a total of 793 detections of A(H1N1)v influenza were reported. The number of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus detections in Europe was highest in week 30, and has decreased since week 31. All countries reported low or moderate influenza activity based on normal or slightly increased levels of ILL/ARI consultations. Twenty-two countries reported pandemic A(H1)v as the dominant virus.


Epidemiological situation - week 33/2009:

For the intensity indicator, the national network levels of influenza-like illness (ILI) and/or acute respiratory infection (ARI) were low or moderate in all countries. For the geographical spread indicator, Austria, England, Israel and Sweden reported widespread activity, while other countries reported local or no activity. Of 23 countries reporting the impact of the pandemic, Ireland reported moderate impact. All other countries reported low impact, i.e. demands on health care services were not above usual levels (click here for definitions).


Cumulative epidemiological situation - weeks 16-33/2009:

Until week 25/2009, detections of pandemic H1N1 influenza had not caused increased levels of ILI or ARI in countries of the European Region. An increase in influenza activity has been observed for England, Luxembourg, Turkey (26/2009), Wales (27/2009), Northern Ireland (29/2009), Malta, Norway, Ireland (30/2009), Israel and Austria (31/2009), and the Netherlands (32/2009). Around week 32 an increase in ILI rates was observed for Norway. While the ILI rate for Norway has been elevated over the last few weeks, the proportion of ILI cases (i.e. sentinel specimens) with detectable virus is very low. The rise in ILI therefore is likely to represent increased public concern for influenza and does probably not indicate a substantial rise in the incidence of infection.


Virological situation - week 33/2009:

The total number of respiratory specimens collected by sentinel physicians in week 33/2009 was 480 of which 40 (8%) were positive for influenza virus: all 40 were type A (35 subtype H1v, 1 subtype H3 and 4 not subtyped). In addition, 1012 non-sentinel source specimens (e.g. specimens collected for diagnostic purposes in hospitals or as part of enhanced surveillance for pandemic (H1N1) 2009) were reported positive for influenza virus: 1010 type A (793 subtype H1v, 38 subtype H1, six subtype H3 and 173 not subtyped) and two type B. Of the total influenza A virus detections that were subtyped in week 33/2009 (N=837), 95% were the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. In Portugal the number of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus detections is substantially increasing (click here). In many other countries the number of detections is decreasing or levelling off.


Cumulative virological situation - weeks 16/2009-33/2009:

Of 13878 virus detections (sentinel and non-sentinel) since week 16/2009, 13316 (96%) were type A, 8958 subtype H1v, 348 subtype H3, 293 subtype H1 and 3717 not subtyped) and 562 (4%) were type B.

Based on the antigenic and/or genetic characterisation of 4609 influenza viruses reported from week 40/2008 to week 33/2009, 2640 (57%) were A/Brisbane/10/2007 (H3N2)-like, 155 (3%) A/Brisbane/59/2007 (H1N1)-like, 32 (1%) B/Florida/4/2006-like (B/Yamagata/16/88 lineage) and 1066 (23%) as B/Malaysia/2506/2004 or B/Brisbane/60/2008-like (B/Victoria/2/87 lineage) (click here). A total of 716 (16%) were pandemic H1N1, A/California/7/2009-like, the current virus strain recommended by WHO for pandemic vaccine preparation (click here).

Antiviral susceptibility reports from week 40/2008 to 32/2009 have shown all type B influenza viruses to be sensitive to oseltamivir and zanamivir, all A(H3N2) viruses to be susceptible to oseltamivir and zanamivir but resistant to M2 inhibitors, while for seasonal A(H1N1) viruses 98% were resistant to oseltamivir, 100% sensitive to zanamivir and 99% sensitive to M2 inhibitors.

All pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses have been susceptible to zanamivir and resistant to M2 inhibitors, while only a single case of oseltamivir resistance has been reported in Denmark (click here).


Comment:

In week 33/2009 influenza activity was of low or moderate intensity across the European region. Widespread activity was reported for Austria, Israel, England and Sweden. A peak in Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus detections was observed around week 30 for Europe as a whole (click here) and is decreasing for a number of countries in week 33/2009, possibly due to some countries switching to virological monitoring rather than testing of all cases. The impact on health care services is currently considered moderate in Ireland and low in other countries.

For more information about the situation in Europe, please go to the dedicated web pages of WHO (click here) and ECDC (click here). EuroFlu provides data for the global situation updates on the WHO headquarters website (click here).


Background:

The EuroFlu Bulletin presents and comments on influenza activity in the 53 countries of the WHO European Region. Of these countries, 23 reported both clinical and virological data, six reported virological data only and seven reported clinical data only in week 33/2009. The spread of influenza viruses and their epidemiological impact in Europe are being monitored by WHO Regional Office for Europe in Copenhagen (Denmark), in collaboration with the WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza in London (UK).

(...)

Network comments (where available)

  • Azerbaijan. Consultation data is cumulative for Baku, Ganja, Sumgayit, Mingechever and Shirvan Cities only.
  • Italy. The data collected this week confirmed the trend towards decrease in the H1N1v influenza lab-confirmed cases, if compared to the previous weeks. Starting from 30th week, Italian policy has been changed: a syndromic surveillance has been implemented and only a limited number of samples have been collected from particular FLU cases (i.e. severe hospedalized cases, in-country transmission cases).
  • Switzerland. 144 A(H1N1)v viruses were detected in specimens collected by non-sentinel physicians in week 33/2009. 136 A(H1N1)v viruses were detected in week 32/2009, 100 in week 31/2009, and 109 A(H1N1)v, as well as 2 A(H3) and 1 B in week 30/2009.
-
<cite cite="http://www.euroflu.org/cgi-files/bulletin_v2.cgi">EuroFlu - Bulletin Review</cite>
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

LOCUS GQ499337 1410 bp cRNA linear VRL 21-AUG-2009
DEFINITION Influenza A virus (A/Washington/28/2009(H1N1)) segment 6
neuraminidase (NA) gene, complete cds.
ACCESSION GQ499337
VERSION GQ499337.1 GI:256383636
DBLINK Project:37813
KEYWORDS .
SOURCE Influenza A virus (A/Washington/28/2009(H1N1))
ORGANISM Influenza A virus (A/Washington/28/2009(H1N1))
Viruses; ssRNA negative-strand viruses; Orthomyxoviridae;
Influenzavirus A.
REFERENCE 1 (bases 1 to 1410)
AUTHORS Deyde,V., Sheu,T., Okomo-Adhiambo,M., Hillman,M., Barnes,J.,
Garten,R., Klimov,A., Gubareva,L. and Cox,N.
TITLE Oseltamivir-Resistant Novel Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Infection in
Immunosuppressed Patients Receiving Oseltamivir Therapy
JOURNAL Unpublished
REFERENCE 2 (bases 1 to 1410)
AUTHORS Deyde,V., Sheu,T., Okomo-Adhiambo,M., Hillman,M., Barnes,J.,
Garten,R., Klimov,A., Gubareva,L. and Cox,N.
TITLE Direct Submission
JOURNAL Submitted (21-AUG-2009) WHO Collaborating Center for Surveillance,
Epidemiology and Control of Influenza, Influenza Division, Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Road, N.E.,
Atlanta, GA 30333, USA
COMMENT Swine influenza A (H1N1) virus isolated during human swine flu
outbreak of 2009. For more information, see http://www.cdc.gov/.

Some of the information does not have GenBank feature identifiers
and is being provided in the comment section.

##EpifluData-START##
Isolate A/Washington/28/2009
Subtype H1N1
Segment_name NA
Host_gender M
Host_age 18
Passage_history X
Adamantane_resistance resistant
Zanamivir_resistance sensitive
Oseltamivir_resistance resistant
Country USA
State/Province Washington state
Collection_day 14
Collection_month 7
Collection_year 2009
Isolate_note Human case of H1N1 pandemic influenza with
Oseltamivir Resistance.
EPI_accession EPI191936
Lineage swl
##EpifluData-END##
FEATURES Location/Qualifiers
source 1..1410
/organism="Influenza A virus (A/Washington/28/2009(H1N1))"
/mol_type="viral cRNA"
/strain="A/Washington/28/2009"
/serotype="H1N1"
/host="Homo sapiens; gender: M; age: 18"
/db_xref="taxon:667724"
/segment="6"
/country="USA: Washington state"
/collection_date="14-Jul-2009"
gene 1..1410
/gene="NA"
CDS 1..1410
/gene="NA"
/codon_start=1
/product="neuraminidase"
/protein_id="ACU78208.1"
/db_xref="GI:256383637"
/translation="MNPNQKIITIGSVCMTIGMANLILQIGNIISIWISHSIQLGNQN
QIETCNQSVITYENNTWVNQTYVNISNTNFAAGQSVVSVKLAGNSSLCPVSGWAIYSK
DNSVRIGSKGDVFVIREPFISCSPXECRTFFLTQGALLNDKHSNGTIKDRSPYRTLMS
CPIGEVPSPYNSRFESVAWSASACHDGINWLTIGISGPDNGAVAVLKYNGIITDTIKS
WRNNILRTQESECACVNGSCFTVMTDGPSNGQASYKIFRIEKGKIVKSVEMNAPNYYY
EECSCYPDSSEITCVCRDNWHGSNRPWVSFNQNLEYQIGYICSGIFGDNPRPNDKTGS
CGPVSSNGANGVKGFSFKYGNGVWIGRTKSISSRNGFEMIWDPNGWTGTDNNFSIKQD
IVGINEWSGYSGSFVQHPELTGLDCIRPCFWVELIRGRPKENTIWTSGSSISFCGVNS
DTVGWSWPDGAELPFTIDK"
ORIGIN
1 atgaatccaa accaaaagat aataaccatt ggttcggtct gtatgacaat tggaatggct
61 aacttaatat tacaaattgg aaacataatc tcaatatgga ttagccactc aattcaactt
121 gggaatcaaa atcagattga aacatgcaat caaagcgtca ttacttatga aaacaacact
181 tgggtaaatc agacatatgt taacatcagc aacaccaact ttgctgctgg acagtcagtg
241 gtttccgtga aattagcggg caattcctct ctctgccctg ttagtggatg ggctatatac
301 agtaaagaca acagtgtaag aatcggttcc aagggggatg tgtttgtcat aagggaacca
361 ttcatatcat gctcccccty ggaatgcaga accttcttct tgactcaagg ggccttgcta
421 aatgacaaac attccaatgg aaccattaaa gacaggagcc catatcgaac cctaatgagc
481 tgtcctattg gtgaagttcc ctctccatac aactcaagat ttgagtcagt cgcttggtca
541 gcaagtgctt gtcatgatgg catcaattgg ctaacaattg gaatttctgg cccagacaat
601 ggggcagtgg ctgtgttaaa gtacaacggc ataataacag acactatcaa gagttggaga
661 aacaatatat tgagaacaca agagtctgaa tgtgcatgtg taaatggttc ttgctttact
721 gtaatgaccg atggaccaag taatggacag gcctcataca agatcttcag aatagaaaag
781 ggaaagatag tcaaatcagt cgaaatgaat gcccctaatt attactatga ggaatgctcc
841 tgttatcctg attctagtga aatcacatgt gtgtgcaggg ataactggca tggctcgaat
901 cgaccgtggg tgtctttcaa ccagaatctg gaatatcaga taggatacat atgcagtggg
961 attttcggag acaatccacg ccctaatgat aagacaggca gttgtggtcc agtatcgtct
1021 aatggagcaa atggagtaaa aggattttca ttcaaatacg gcaatggtgt ttggataggg
1081 agaactaaaa gcattagttc aagaaacggt tttgagatga tttgggatcc gaacggatgg
1141 actgggacag acaataactt ctcaataaag caagatatcg taggaataaa tgagtggtca
1201 ggatatagcg ggagttttgt tcagcatccg gaactaacag ggctggattg tataagacct
1261 tgcttctggg ttgaactaat cagagggcga cccaaagaga acacaatctg gactagcggg
1321 agcagcatat ccttttgtgg tgtaaacagt gacactgtgg gttggtcttg gccagacggt
1381 gctgagttgc catttaccat tgacaagtaa
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

LOCUS GQ499335 1410 bp cRNA linear VRL 21-AUG-2009
DEFINITION Influenza A virus (A/Washington/29/2009(H1N1)) segment 6
neuraminidase (NA) gene, complete cds.
ACCESSION GQ499335
VERSION GQ499335.1 GI:256383632
DBLINK Project:37813
KEYWORDS .
SOURCE Influenza A virus (A/Washington/29/2009(H1N1))
ORGANISM Influenza A virus (A/Washington/29/2009(H1N1))
Viruses; ssRNA negative-strand viruses; Orthomyxoviridae;
Influenzavirus A.
REFERENCE 1 (bases 1 to 1410)
AUTHORS Deyde,V., Sheu,T., Okomo-Adhiambo,M., Hillman,M., Barnes,J.,
Garten,R., Klimov,A., Gubareva,L. and Cox,N.
TITLE Oseltamivir-Resistant Novel Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Infection in
Immunosuppressed Patients Receiving Oseltamivir Therapy
JOURNAL Unpublished
REFERENCE 2 (bases 1 to 1410)
AUTHORS Deyde,V., Sheu,T., Okomo-Adhiambo,M., Hillman,M., Barnes,J.,
Garten,R., Klimov,A., Gubareva,L. and Cox,N.
TITLE Direct Submission
JOURNAL Submitted (21-AUG-2009) WHO Collaborating Center for Surveillance,
Epidemiology and Control of Influenza, Influenza Division, Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Road, N.E.,
Atlanta, GA 30333, USA
COMMENT Swine influenza A (H1N1) virus isolated during human swine flu
outbreak of 2009. For more information, see http://www.cdc.gov/.

Some of the information does not have GenBank feature identifiers
and is being provided in the comment section.

##EpifluData-START##
Isolate A/Washington/29/2009
Subtype H1N1
Segment_name NA
Host_gender F
Host_age 47
Passage_history X
Adamantane_resistance resistant
Zanamivir_resistance sensitive
Oseltamivir_resistance resistant
Country USA
State/Province Washington state
Collection_day 28
Collection_month 7
Collection_year 2009
Isolate_note Human case of H1N1 pandemic influenza with
Oseltamivir resistance.
EPI_accession EPI191938
Lineage swl
##EpifluData-END##
FEATURES Location/Qualifiers
source 1..1410
/organism="Influenza A virus (A/Washington/29/2009(H1N1))"
/mol_type="viral cRNA"
/strain="A/Washington/29/2009"
/serotype="H1N1"
/host="Homo sapiens; gender: F; age: 47"
/db_xref="taxon:667723"
/segment="6"
/country="USA: Washington state"
/collection_date="28-Jul-2009"
gene 1..1410
/gene="NA"
CDS 1..1410
/gene="NA"
/codon_start=1
/product="neuraminidase"
/protein_id="ACU78206.1"
/db_xref="GI:256383633"
/translation="MNPNQKIITIGSVCMTIGMANLILQIGNIISIWISHSIQLGNQN
QIETCNQSVITYENNTWVNQTYVNISNTNFAAGQSVVPVKLAGNSSLCPVSGWAIYSK
DNSVRIGSKGDVFVIREPFISCSPLECRTFFLTQGALLNDKHSNGTIKDRSPYRTLMS
CPIGEVPSPYNSRFESVAWSASACHDGINWLTIGISGPDNGAVAVLKYNGIITDTIKS
WRNNILRTQESECACVNGSCFTVMTDGPSNGQASYKIFXIEKGKIVKSVEMNAPNYYY
EECSCYPDSSEITCVCRDNWHGSNRPWVSFNQNLEYQIGYICSGIFGDNPRPNDKTGS
CDPVSSNGANGVKGFSFKYGNGVWIGRTKSISSRNGFEMIWDPNGWTGTDNNFSIKQD
IVGINEWSGYSGSFVQHPELTGLDCIRPCFWVELIRGRPKENTIWTSGSSISFCGVNS
DTVGWSWPDGAELPFTIDK"
ORIGIN
1 atgaatccaa accaaaagat aataaccatt ggttcggtct gtatgacaat tggaatggct
61 aacttaatat tacaaattgg aaacataatc tcaatatgga ttagccactc aattcaactt
121 gggaatcaaa atcagattga aacatgcaat caaagcgtca ttacttatga aaacaacact
181 tgggtaaatc agacatatgt taacatcagc aacaccaact ttgctgctgg acagtcagtg
241 gttcccgtga aattagcggg caattcctct ctctgccctg ttagtggatg ggctatatac
301 agtaaagaca acagtgtaag aatcggttcc aagggggatg tgtttgtcat aagggaacca
361 ttcatatcat gctccccctt ggaatgcaga accttcttct tgactcaagg ggccttgcta
421 aatgacaaac attccaatgg aaccattaaa gacaggagcc catatcgaac cctaatgagc
481 tgtcctattg gtgaagttcc ctctccatac aactcaagat ttgagtcagt cgcttggtca
541 gcaagtgctt gtcatgatgg catcaattgg ctaacaattg gaatttctgg cccagacaat
601 ggggcagtgg ctgtgttaaa gtacaacggc ataataacag acactatcaa gagttggaga
661 aacaatatat tgagaacaca agagtctgaa tgtgcatgtg taaatggttc ttgctttact
721 gtaatgaccg atggaccaag taatggacag gcctcataca agatcttcar aatagaaaag
781 ggaaagatag tcaaatcagt cgaaatgaat gcccctaatt attactatga ggaatgctcc
841 tgttatcctg attctagtga aatcacatgt gtgtgcaggg ataactggca tggctcgaat
901 cgaccgtggg tatctttcaa ccagaatctg gaatatcaga taggatacat atgcagtggg
961 attttcggag acaatccacg ccctaatgat aagacaggca gttgtgatcc agtatcgtct
1021 aatggagcaa atggagtaaa aggattttca ttcaaatacg gcaatggtgt ttggataggg
1081 agaactaaaa gcattagttc aagaaacggt tttgagatga tttgggatcc gaacggatgg
1141 actgggacag acaataactt ctcaataaag caagatatcg taggaataaa tgagtggtca
1201 ggatatagcg ggagttttgt tcagcatccg gaactaacag ggctggattg tataagacct
1261 tgcttctggg ttgaactaat cagagggcga cccaaagaga acacaatctg gactagcggg
1321 agcagcatat ccttttgtgg tgtaaacagt gacactgtgg gttggtcttg gccagacggt
1381 gctgagttgc catttaccat tgacaagtaa
 
Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

Conditions Under Which Predispensing of Antiviral Drugs to Individuals at High Risk of Death from Pandemic Influenza Is Expected to Save Lives

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<input class="" dir="" id="knol-subtitle-input" style="display: none;" maxlength="250" type="text">


In this Knol we consider the net benefits of predispensing antivirals to high-risk individuals during an influenza pandemic, where the measure of the benefit is the number of lives saved by antivirals in the whole population. Predispensing has two potential benefits: first, individuals to whom antivirals have been predispensed may be able to initiate treatment earlier than if they had to wait to obtain and fill a prescription, reducing their risk of progression to severe disease. Second, if demand exceeds supply, predispensing to high-risk individuals increases the chance that the course will be used by a high-risk, rather than a low-risk individual. The disadvantage of predispensing is that a course may be sequestered by a person who does not need it (because s/he does not become infected) or wastes it (using it for something other than influenza). We derive mathematical conditions under which the advantages outweigh the disadvantages and suggest that for individuals at considerably higher than average risk of death from pandemic influenza (for example, greater than approximately 5x the population average risk), predispensing of antivirals up to perhaps 20% of the total antiviral stockpile is very likely to result in a net savings of life. Data to parameterize this model are limited, but we believe such a policy would be robust to a reasonable range of uncertainty, and we note that decisions about predispensing will need to be made before definitive data are available. More precise estimates of the relative risk of death for groups beyond pregnant women are urgently needed for decision making about prioritization of antivirals, vaccines and other countermeasures


A key objective for the response to the autumn wave of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 (H1N1pdm) in the Northern Hemisphere is to reduce severe morbidity and mortality that would result from an unmitigated pandemic. Broadly, such responses may be divided into two groups: (a) efforts to reduce population-wide transmission of the virus and thereby protect individuals from becoming infected, either permanently or for a period of time until vaccines become widely available , and (b) efforts to protect individuals at particularly high risk of complications from becoming infected or, if infected, from developing severe disease. Here we focus our consideration on the United States, though most of what is said applies more widely. Options for the first group of interventions for H1N1pdm are limited in the short term. Vaccine availability in the US will likely start in September, but it will likely be late 2009 or early 2010 before a substantial fraction of the population can be immunized, most likely by 2 doses of vaccine 3 weeks apart. In two of the three 20<sup>th</sup> century pandemics, the peak of the fall wave was in September or October in most places [1], and a repeat of that scenario would mean that vaccines were not available early enough, in large enough numbers, to substantially affect epidemic spread. Social distancing measures have been to a large extent ruled out in the United States, as exemplified by guidance from the US CDC to try to keep schools open even in the face of ongoing transmission [2]. Antiviral stockpiles in the US are generally judged too small to be used for substantial reductions in transmission, so are mainly being used for treatment and for prophylaxis of health care workers.
With small amounts of vaccine and antivirals available, it is well understood that they are best used to reduce severe morbidity and mortality in groups at high risk, rather than to try to slow transmission [3][4]. Pregnant women are at approximately 4-fold higher risk of hospitalization from H1N1pdm than the general population, and they are overrepresented among fatal cases [5]. Other high risk groups have also been identified by health authorities, though the extent of their relative risks has not been published. Predispensing antiviral drugs to individuals in such groups ? so that these medications are available to high-risk persons at the time they first become symptomatic with H1N1pdm infection, without the need to seek a prescription or fill it in a time of possible scarcity ? may be a valuable strategy to reduce their risk of severe disease or mortality. Predispensing here is defined as a policy (most likely implemented by an individual physician) of prescribing and urging a patient to fill the prescription for a course of neuraminidase inhibitor in advance of any known infection with H1N1pdm. The patient would be instructed to begin self-treatment (possibly following communication with the physician) at early signs of possible H1N1pdm infection.
Here we define conditions under which predispensing a defined quantity of antivirals, one course each to a defined subset of the population at high risk of death from H1N1pdm infection, would provide a net benefit in terms of reducing total mortality compared to a policy of not predispensing the courses, and leaving them in state and national stockpiles for use by prescription, either by mild outpatient cases or by severe, hospitalized patients.


Benefits and harms of predispensing
We assume here that we seek to optimize the number of lives saved (i.e. minimize the number of lives lost) due to H1N1pdm. For clarity we speak throughout this paper of ?lives saved?; however, with suitable modifications to the definitions of all terms, we could equally attempt to prevent hospitalizations or intensive care admissions. There are at least two possible benefits, and two harms, to predispensing. The first benefit of predispensing is that a patient possessing a predispensed course of antivirals will likely begin therapy earlier in the course of H1N1pdm infection than one who has not and must therefore acquire a prescription (possibly including a visit to a physician) and fill it, thereby most likely delaying treatment. This benefit accrues whether or not there is a shortage of antivirals, since it simply reflects the time required to acquire and fill the prescription. A second possible benefit occurs if the demand for antivirals exceeds supply, so that not all patients who attempt to acquire antivirals can do so. In this situation, predispensing a course assures that it is in the hands of someone who, if untreated, would be likely to develop severe disease, rather than (potentially) going to someone who will not likely develop severe disease, and whose benefit from taking the antiviral would therefore be less.
The first harm of predispensing also occurs only if total demand for antivirals exceeds supply, namely, a predispensed course is unavailable to anyone who may need it other than the person who has received it. If demand exceeds supply, this means one more person, possibly someone who would benefit greatly from having the antiviral, who is unable to obtain it. An additional harm of predispensing is the possibility that a predispensed course will be used inappropriately (say, to treat non-influenza infection). This harm is not considered separately in our analysis but is modeled as a reduced benefit of predispensing, as we describe below.
To assess the net benefit or harm from predispensing, we define some notation, summarized in Table 1. We divide the total population into two groups: a high-risk group for which we are considering predispensing, and the general population, which is comprised of all individuals not in the high-risk group. These constitute respectively a proportion q (high risk) and 1-q (general population) of the total population. Within the general population, risks may vary, so some individuals may be at higher risk than others. All quantities in our notation are defined as proportion of the total population, hence lie between 0 and 1. Let T be the total supply of antivirals (as a proportion of the population); thus, if enough antivirals are available for treatment of 20% of the population, then T=0.2 . Let D be the demand for antivirals in the general population, that is the number of individuals not at high risk who would receive antiviral treatment in the general population if supply were not limited; in practice, some of this demand may be unmet as the supply is constrained. Let
chart
be the probability of dying from the infection over the whole course of the epidemic in the whole population (if no antivirals are used); the death probability in a high risk group is
chart
. Note that these death probabilities are not conditional on infection (i.e., are not case-fatality proportions) but are unconditional, reflecting the risk of infection times the risk of dying from infection. Here the number
chart
is the relative risk of dying in a high risk group compared to the general population.
chart
can be estimated from the existing epidemic data while
chart
may be hard to estimate a priori; as we shall see,
chart
is factored out of our equations and need not be known. Let
chart
be the probability that a course of antivirals obtained from a stockpile during the epidemic would save a life of a person who would die otherwise. We assume that this probability is the same between high-risk individuals and members of the general population. This key assumption may be incorrect, and is discussed later. Let
chart
be the probability that a predispensed course of antivirals would save a life of a high risk person who would die otherwise.
chart
can be thought of as the ?relative benefit? in preventing mortality of receiving a predispensed course of antivirals for a high risk person who takes it, compared to receiving a non-predispensed course.
chart
captures the benefit of early vs. delayed treatment; however,
chart
also may be reduced to the extent that a predispensed course is taken for non-influenza illness, in which case it cannot save a life. Thus
chart
exceeds one to the extent that early treatment is better than delayed treatment, but it is decremented in proportion to the probability that the course is wasted before it is needed.

Let
chart
be the total number of people in the general population who would die during the epidemic and whose lives would be saved if they received antivirals upon demand during the course of the epidemic. Since the total number of people in the total population who would die during the epidemic and whose lives would be saved if they received antivirals during the course of the epidemic is
chart
, clearly
chart
. We make additional assumptions about how the probability of receiving antivirals behaves if demand exceeds supply; these are made explicit in Appendix A.



TABLE 1: Parameters of the model, as a proportion of the total population (including high-risk and general populations)

<table style="border: medium none ; border-collapse: collapse; width: 6.2in;" border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="446"> <tbody><tr> <td style="width: 80.45pt;" valign="top" width="80"> Parameter
</td> <td style="width: 365.95pt;" valign="top" width="366"> Definition
</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 80.45pt;" valign="top" width="80">
chart


</td> <td style="width: 365.95pt;" valign="top" width="366"> Supply of antivirals, before predispensing, as a fraction of total population size
</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 80.45pt;" valign="top" width="80">
chart


</td> <td style="width: 365.95pt;" valign="top" width="366"> Number of antiviral courses used by the general population (
chart
) or total population (
chart
) if no supply constraint, as fraction of the total population size

</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 80.45pt;" valign="top" width="80">
chart


</td> <td style="width: 365.95pt;" valign="top" width="366"> Total number of lives in the general population that would be saved under no predispensing, if no supply constraint
</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 80.45pt;" valign="top" width="80">
chart

</td> <td style="width: 365.95pt;" valign="top" width="366"> Proportion of persons in the high risk group to whom predispensing of one course is considered, hence also the number of courses considered for predispensing, as a fraction of the total population
</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 80.45pt;" valign="top" width="80">
chart

</td> <td style="width: 365.95pt;" valign="top" width="366"> Probability that a course of antivirals obtained during the epidemic would save a life of a person who would die otherwise, absent any predispensing
</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 80.45pt;" valign="top" width="80">
chart

</td> <td style="width: 365.95pt;" valign="top" width="366"> Relative benefit (in terms of probability of saving life) for a high risk person to be treated early (with a predispensed course) compared to being treated with a non-predispensed course. Thus
chart
is the probability that a predispensed course of antivirals would save a life of a high risk person who would die otherwise
</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 80.45pt;" valign="top" width="80">
chart

</td> <td style="width: 365.95pt;" valign="top" width="366"> Death rate from the epidemic in the whole population, if no antivirals were used
</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 80.45pt;" valign="top" width="80">
chart

</td> <td style="width: 365.95pt;" valign="top" width="366"> Ratio between the death rate in the high risk group and the general population.
</td> </tr> </tbody></table>
With this notation in place, we can define the conditions under which it is advantageous to predispense 1 course each to a proportion
chart
of the population. Our main result is the following:
MAIN RESULT: Predispensing saves more lives than not predispensing when any of the following conditions hold:
(i) Supply of antivirals exceeds demand even after predispensing, and
chart
.
(ii) Demand
chart
in the general population exceeds supply even without predispensing, and the following conditions are met:
chart
and
chart

(iii) Supply exceeds demand without predispensing, but after predispensing, demand exceeds supply, and the following conditions are met:
chart
and
chart
.
(iv) The above results show that even if demand cannot be predicted, predispensing is advantageous when
chart
and
chart


The justification of this result and the assumptions underlying it are presented in Appendix B. Condition (iv) tells us when a group is at high enough risk that it is worth predispensing to them even if we have no idea of the expected antiviral demand.
This result can be seen graphically in Figure 1, which considers a hypothetical case in which there is a supply adequate for
chart
of the population, and predispensing to
chart
of the total population is under consideration. Also, we assume that treatment of a high-risk person with a predispensed course is twice as likely to be life-saving as treatment with a non-predispensed course, because predispensing allows earlier initiation of treatment (
chart
). The far left side shows low levels of demand, in which there is no harm to predispensing, so predispensing to any group may be beneficial. At the far right, competition for antivirals is strong, so it is beneficial to predispense even to a group that gets modest benefit from antivirals. In the middle, when demand is similar to supply, it is beneficial to predispense only to groups that benefit disproportionately from antivirals (
chart
).

<table class="tr-caption-container" style="text-align: center;" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: left;">FIGURE 1: Predispensing is beneficial (shaded area) when
chart
exceeds a certain threshold that depends on the projected demand. Here a supply adequate for
chart
of the population is assumed, and predispensing to
chart
of the total population is under consideration. Also, we assume that treatment of a high-risk person with a predispensed course is twice as likely to be life-saving as if treatment is with a non-predispensed course, because predispensing allows earlier initiation of treatment (
chart
). For low projected demand (below
chart
), there is no harm to predispensing, and predispensing even to groups that will gain below-average benefit from antivirals is better than no predispensing. For very high projected demand, (
chart
near 1), predispensing is beneficial even for very modest values of
void%280%29;
, because competition for antivirals is strong, and predispensing has a relative benefit compared to acquisition by ill persons. For projected demand comparable to the supply (
chart
), predispensing is valuable only for groups for whom antivirals are considerably more valuable than the general population, because each course predispensed comes at the expense of someone else who could use it, yet it does not strongly increase the chance that a high-risk individual gets treated (since that individual would likely receive a course anyway without predispensing).

</td></tr></tbody></table> Figure 2 shows an equivalent plot for the case where there is no intrinsic benefit to predispensing, because a predispensed course is no more likely to save a life than a non-predispensed one. Here, again there is an advantage to predispensing to even moderate risk groups if demand is high or low, but if demand is similar to supply, then predispensing is not advantageous. For reasons elaborated below, we consider it likely that this is an extreme case and that in reality
chart
.



<table class="tr-caption-container" style="text-align: center;" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">
FIGURE 2: If predispensed courses are no more likely to be lifesaving than non-predispensed courses taken by the same person, the conditions for benefits of predispensing are more restrictive. Parameters are as in figure 1, except that treatment of a high-risk person with a predispensed course is equally likely to be life-saving as treatment is with a non-predispensed course (
chart
). In particular, in this situation if demand=supply, it is never beneficial to predispense a course, since it may go to someone who does not need it, and it confers no benefit purely from being predispensed
</td></tr></tbody></table>

Finally, we note that while it is beneficial to predispense antivirals if either of the conditions in the Main Result are met, it is not true in general that the benefit increases with the quantity of antivirals predispensed. Under certain conditions it would be better to predispense to a subset of the high-risk population. This is discussed further in Appendix C, where a simple criterion is given ensuring that each successive predispensed dose increases the net benefit, provided that the quantity of antivirals predispensed is not too large.
Interpretation of these Conditions
Predispensing is most advantageous for groups that have the highest mortality rate (high
chart
) and that benefit most from predispensed antivirals compared to non-predispensed ones (high
chart
). These factors capture the demand-independent aspect that it is useful to position antivirals with individuals who can be most helped by having them close at hand, rather than getting them after they become ill. A second benefit of predispensing is to ensure access of antivirals to those who will benefit the most from them. This benefit is greatest when demand is very high, because in such circumstances the high-risk individuals are very likely to need antivirals, but not to get them. Thus the benefits of predispensing are greatest for larger values of
chart
,
chart
, and
chart
. The costs of predispensing ? lost opportunities for individuals who do not receive predispensed courses ? are zero when demand is low enough (as all who need the antivirals can receive them) then increase, but not as fast as the benefits. Qualitatively, then, predispensing is most advantageous when demand is very high or very low, and least likely to be advantageous when demand just exceeds supply. Even there, however, if the benefit of a predispensed course is significantly larger than that of a non-predispensed course, predispensing is valuable for individuals who can benefit more from treatment than the general population.
Risks of Predispensing
The major risk of predispensing is that courses that would otherwise be life-saving (when used from the stockpile) will be predispensed, then not used by someone for whom they would be more likely to be life-saving. We can consider what has been written so far from another perspective: this risk is most acute when demand is near supply (
chart
) , when individuals not in the group to be predispensed would benefit from treatment by predispensed antivirals which won?t be used, and when predispensing and consequent early use are not very beneficial (reducing
chart
).
The idea of predispensing was previously considered in the context of pre-pandemic sale of antiviral ?Medkits,? special packaging of oseltamivir or zanamivir for home storage to be saved until a pandemic occurred. A number of concerns were raised concerning such Medkits, resulting eventually in a lack of approval by the Food and Drug Administration (www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/08/minutes/2008-4385m1-final.pdf). The risk of inappropriate use or wastage was prominent among these concerns. One key difference between pre-pandemic distribution of antivirals and predispensing just prior to an anticipated wave of pandemic influenza is that the time frame for wastage is much shorter in the present case ? only the time from when the antivirals are predispensed until the time when the individual becomes infected with influenza and needs them. In the pre-pandemic setting, this might be years, while in the present case ? considering only the upcoming epidemic wave ? the time scale is only a matter of a few months. This consideration makes wastage a less compelling argument. Thus, we expect that
chart
will primarily reflect the advantage of early vs. delayed treatment (for which there is some evidence, although not for mortality) [6].
It is also worth mentioning that unlike the situation with antibacterial medications ? which can promote drug resistance even when used to treat non-bacterial infections, because of their effect on bystander flora [7], anti-influenza drugs do not promote resistance when used to treat non-influenza infections. Thus, the concern that predispensing could lead to inappropriate use and thereby to resistance may have some basis (if real influenza infections are treated suboptimally) but is not in the same category as the equivalent risk for antibacterial drugs.
Implications for Decision Making
On current evidence, we believe that there are likely to be groups in the population for whom the relative risk of death or of other severe outcomes, such as hospitalization, substantially exceeds 1. These groups include pregnant women[5] and some of the other high-risk groups http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/recommendations.htm. We believe it is also plausible to expect that predispensed antivirals are more likely to be life-saving (or to prevent hospitalizations or other severe outcomes) than those that are not predispensed (
chart
), because wastage is relatively unlikely given the short time frame between when predispensing could occur and when the main wave of the epidemic is likely to come, and because early treatment is likely to have benefits in preventing progression to more severe disease. Precise data will not be available to evaluate this assumption in time for decision making, so educated opinion will be the only basis for decision making. We have found (E. Goldstein et al., Unpublished Data) from studies of a US city that approximately 20% of individuals with confirmed H1N1pdm infection took antivirals within 48 hours of infection. Predispensing should be able to increase this proportion to well above 40%. We proceed on the assumption that antivirals are twice as likely to save a life if predispensed than if received by normal channels.
One additional assumption that should be highlighted is that, as used in the absence of predispensing, antivirals are equally likely to save the life of a treated member of the general population who would die without treatment, and of a treated member of the high-risk group who would die without treatment. If treatment is less effective among members of high risk groups who would die without treatment, then the benefits of predispensing are reduced; if it is more effective, they may be increased.
Under these assumptions, then predispensing to members of groups at very high risk of fatal outcome (say at least 5 times the population average) will be beneficial, for almost any level of demand, if supply is adequate for 20% of the population (a reasonable estimate given current US stockpiles and the need to reserve some for health care worker prophylaxis). Moreover, if demand is either less than or considerably more than supply of antivirals, predispensing to groups with relative risk of death larger than 1 but less than 5 will be beneficial. While we do not know how to predict demand, we believe that the first two conditions are likely to occur for pregnant women and other risk groups, especially for those with mobility or other impairments that make it difficult for them to obtain rapid medical attention. One reason to expect that demand may be less than the antiviral supply is the experience in New Zealand, one country in the Southern Hemisphere for which population-based general practitioner consultation rates are available. In that country, where the winter epidemic appears to be concluding, only approximately 1% of the population has consulted their GP for influenza-like illness (http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/indexmh/influenza-a-h1n1-update-138-180809). This may indicate that attack rates will be relatively low in the autumn wave in the Northern Hemisphere, though there are many differences between New Zealand and Northern Hemisphere countries, including over-the-counter availability of oseltamivir in New Zealand, which may reduce consultation rates in New Zealand.
At present there are no published statistics on which groups are at highest risk of severe outcome (hence most likely to have high
chart
), except pregnant women (4) . Such data are urgently needed to prioritize many types of interventions, including vaccination and antiviral predispensing. Once such data (or estimates) are available, we would recommend predispensing to all members of groups at very high risk of death (say more than 10), on the grounds that this will be beneficial except for the rather unlikely case of no relative benefit (
chart
) and supply closely matching demand (
chart
). We would recommend strong consideration of predispensing for groups with relative risk of death greater than 3-4, on the grounds that this will surely be beneficial, as long as
chart
, for almost any level of demand. We would, however, recommend that the total proportion of the stockpile predispensed be limited (perhaps to 20% of the stockpile or less), first because there is the possibility that risk groups will change if the virus changes, and second for the reason described in the next paragraph.
In the setting of a rapidly emerging autumn wave of pandemic influenza in developed countries of the Northern Hemisphere that already possess significant antiviral stockpiles, predispensing of a portion of these stockpiles to individuals at high risk of severe outcome of infection may be a means to prevent death and other severe outcomes by improving the efficiency of use of a limited stockpile.
The conditions defined in this paper guarantee that predispensing is beneficial in terms of decreasing the mortality provided certain assumptions about temporal patterns of antiviral distribution hold. The most flexible assumption we require is assumption b) in Appendix A. This assumption may be violated under the following scenario: antiviral supply nears depletion and only the most severe cases get antivirals. To deal with such a scenario, we recommend to set aside a certain quantity of antivirals for safekeeping. Our conditions would then need to be evaluated against the rest of the stockpile.


In summary, we urge rapid identification of the groups at highest risk of death, long-term intensive care stays, or hospitalization, using the best available clinical data, and we urge public health bodies, professional organizations and providers to encourage members of the highest risk groups to obtain antivirals as soon as possible for use during an autumn pandemic wave.

http://knol.google.com/k/edward-gol...1uji2pldf66z5/1?collectionId=28qm4w0q65e4w.1#
 
Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/

Antiviral Resistance:
Since October 1, 2008, 1,146 seasonal influenza A (H1N1), 245 influenza A (H3N2), 650 influenza B, and 376 2009 influenza A (H1N1) viruses have been tested for resistance to the neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir and zanamivir). Also, 1,151 seasonal influenza A (H1N1), 245 influenza A (H3N2), and 431 2009 influenza A (H1N1) viruses have been tested for resistance to the adamantanes (amantadine and rimantadine). The results of antiviral resistance testing performed on these viruses are summarized in the table below.

Samples tested (n) Resistant Viruses,
Number (%) Samples tested (n) Resistant Viruses, Number (%) Samples tested (n) Resistant Viruses, Number (%)
Oseltamivir Zanamivir Adamantanes
Seasonal Influenza A (H1N1) 1,146 1,141 (99.6%) 1,146 0 (0) 1,151 6 (0.5%)
Influenza A (H3N2) 245 0 (0) 245 0 (0) 245 245 (100%)
Influenza B 650 0 (0) 650 0 (0) N/A* N/A*
2009 Influenza A (H1N1) 853 4** (0.5) 376 0 (0) 431 431 (100%)
*The adamantanes (amantadine and rimantadine) are not effective against influenza B viruses.
**Two screening tools were used to determine oseltamivir resistance: sequence analysis of viral genes or a neuraminidase inhibition assay.


4?

Hmm...

http://www.citizen-times.com/apps/pb...EWS01/90821104

ASHEVILLE ? A Buncombe County youth who tested positive last month for swine flu was one of two campers at Camp Blue Star in Henderson County found to be resistant to flu medication.


Both campers became ill with H1N1 last month while receiving Tamiflu following exposure to other ill campers, according to a news release from the Buncombe County Health Center. Both campers have since recovered.


State public health officials said caregivers across the state are being reminded that use of antiviral medications as prevention may be considered for persons with higher risk of complications or for health care workers with an unprotected exposure to influenza.


Overuse of an antiviral drug increases the likelihood for developing resistance to the treatment, according to the news release. Antiviral treatment is recommended for all patients with confirmed, probable or suspected cases of 2009 influenza H1N1 virus infection who are hospitalized or who are at higher risk for influenza complications.




http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/n...ow/4921406.cms
Another worrying trend has been that WHO has also been notified of 12 cases of oseltamivir resistant virus. These isolates have a mutation that confers resistance to oseltamivir or Tamiflu, the anti-viral of choice globally against H1N1.



http://www.blueridgenow.com/article/...st-in-country-

The first cases of swine flu resistant to Tamiflu in the country came from a Henderson County camp.

Two campers from Camp Blue Star in Henderson County are resistant to Tamiflu, an antiviral for the swine flu.

One camper resides in Buncombe County and the other lives in Florida.

?Both are fine,? said Tom Bridges, Health Director for the Henderson County Health Department.

The campers became ill with swine flu in July while receiving Tamiflu for exposure to other ill campers. Both had mild illness and have since recovered. The two cases were discovered by the CDC through testing of samples submitted by Henderson County Health Department through the N.C. State Laboratory of Public Health. Camp Blue Star completed all camp sessions planned and is now closed for the season.


State Epidemiologist Megan Davies said that care givers across the state are being reminded that use of antivirals as prevention may be considered for persons at higher risk of complications due to flu or for health care workers with an unprotected exposure to influenza.

However, watching carefully for symptoms after an exposure and treating early if symptoms develop could be an appropriate alternative in these settings. Overuse of an antiviral drug increases the likelihood for developing resistance to that treatment.


?When it comes to the use of antivirals, our primary concern is that they be used for those who really need them,? Davies said. ?Healthy people who are exposed to the flu don?t need to take antivirals for prevention.?


Antiviral treatment is recommended for all patients with confirmed, probable or suspected cases of 2009 influenza swine flu virus infection who are hospitalized or who are at higher risk for influenza complications.


?Most infections with swine flu are uncomplicated and resolve without treatment,? Davies said. ?And the best way to prevent the spread of flu is to continue following the precautions you?ve heard before; wash your hands frequently with soap and water or alcohol-based hand rub, cover your mouth and nose when coughing or sneezing, avoid close contact with those who are sick and stay at home if you are sick.
 
Re: 2 further cases of Tamiflu resistance

Re: 2 further cases of Tamiflu resistance

Raleigh, NC-- State public health officials are asking health care providers across the state to adhere to guidance pertaining to the use of antivirals for the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus. Caregivers are being reminded that the use of oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and zanamivir (Relenza) as a preventative measure should be limited to people at higher risk for influenza complications and the health care workers who care for them.

The call for strict adherence to CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) and state medical treatment guidelines comes on the heels of CDC testing two North Carolina viral samples found to have resistance to oseltamivir. Both samples, taken in July, were from people who were receiving oseltamivir as a preventative measure after they had been exposed to others who had the virus. Both had mild illness and have since recovered. The two cases were discovered by the CDC through testing of samples submitted by the N.C. State Laboratory of Public Health.

"When it comes to the use of antivirals, our primary concern is that they be used for those who really need them," State Epidemiologist Megan Davies said. "Healthy people who are exposed to the flu don't need to take antivirals for prevention."

Dr. Davies said that care givers across the state are being reminded that use of antivirals as prevention may be considered for persons at higher risk for complications due to flu or for health care workers with an unprotected exposure to influenza. However, watching carefully for symptoms after an exposure and treating early if symptoms develop could be an appropriate alternative in these settings, and could reduce the potential for developing antiviral resistance.

Antiviral treatment is recommended for all patients with confirmed, probable or suspected cases of 2009 influenza H1N1 virus infection who are hospitalized or who are at higher risk for influenza complications.

"Most infections with the novel H1N1 are uncomplicated and resolve without treatment," Dr. Davies said. "And the best way to prevent the spread of flu is to continue following the precautions you've heard before; wash your hands frequently with soap and water or alcohol-based hand rub, cover your mouth and nose when coughing or sneezing, avoid close contact with those who are sick, and stay at home if you are sick."

More information about use of antivirals is found at: www.epi.state.nc.us/epi/gcdc/H1N1flu.html. For general information about influenza, please visit: www.flu.nc.gov.

http://www.digtriad.com/news/health/article.aspx?storyid=129182&catid=8
 
Re: 2 further cases of Tamiflu resistance

Re: 2 further cases of Tamiflu resistance

2 NC campers resistant to Tamiflu

Overuse of antiviral drug increases odds of vaccine rejection

<SCRIPT type=text/javascript>var collab_title = '2 NC campers resistant to Tamiflu';</SCRIPT><!-- /HEADLINE --><!-- MAIN PHOTO --><!-- /MAIN PHOTO --><!-- BYLINE -->
NYT Regional Media Group


<!-- /BYLINE --><!-- PUBDATE -->Published: Saturday, August 22, 2009 at 3:15 a.m.
Last Modified: Friday, August 21, 2009 at 10:00 p.m.
<!-- /PUBDATE -->HENDERSONVILLE, N.C. -- The nation's first cases of H1N1 resistant to Tamiflu came from a Henderson County camp, health officials said Friday.

<!--
AC =
--><!-- GRAY BOX ARTICLE CONTENT--><!-- /GRAY BOX ARTICLE CONTENT-->Two campers from Camp Blue Star in Henderson County are resistant to Tamiflu, an antiviral drug used to treat the swine flu.
One camper resides in Buncombe County, and the other lives in Florida.
The campers became ill with H1N1 in July while receiving Tamiflu for exposure to other ill campers. Both had mild illness and have since recovered.
"Both are fine," said Tom Bridges, health director for the Henderson County Health Department.
The two cases were discovered by the federal Centers for Disease Control through testing of samples submitted by the Henderson County Health Department through the N.C. State Laboratory of Public Health. Camp Blue Star has completed all summer camp sessions and now is closed for the season.
Other camps in Henderson County reported cases of swine flu as well as campers and staff with flu-like symptoms over the summer. In June, three cases of swine flu were confirmed in counselors at Camp Judaea, and five children at Camp Ton-A-Wandah had flu-like symptoms.
Now that there is a resistance to Tamiflu, health officials are alerting caregivers across the state.
State Epidemiologist Megan Davies is reminding them that the use of antivirals as prevention might be considered for people at higher risk of complications or for health care workers with an unprotected exposure to influenza.
However, watching carefully for symptoms after an exposure and treating early if symptoms develop could be an appropriate alternative in these settings. Overuse of an antiviral drug increases the likelihood for developing resistance to that treatment, she said.
"When it comes to the use of antivirals, our primary concern is that they be used for those who really need them," Davies said. "Healthy people who are exposed to the flu don't need to take antivirals for prevention."
Antiviral treatment is recommended for all patients with confirmed, probable or suspected cases of H1N1 virus infection who are hospitalized or who are at higher risk for influenza complications.
"Most infections with swine flu are uncomplicated and resolve without treatment," Davies said. "And the best way to prevent the spread of flu is to continue following the precautions you've heard before: Wash your hands frequently with soap and water or alcohol-based hand rub, cover your mouth and nose when coughing or sneezing, avoid close contact with those who are sick and stay at home if you are sick."
More information about H1N1 prevention can be found at www.buncombecounty.org. Information about antivirals can be found at www.epi.state.nc.us/epi/gcdc/H1N1flu.html.

http://www.goupstate.com/article/20...ICLES?Title=2-NC-campers-resistant-to-Tamiflu
 
Re: 2 further cases of Tamiflu resistance

Re: 2 further cases of Tamiflu resistance

Overuse of antiviral drug increases odds of vaccine rejection:banghead:
 
Re: 2 further cases of Tamiflu resistance

Re: 2 further cases of Tamiflu resistance

<a rel="nofollow" href="http://www.recombinomics.com/News/08220901/H274Y_NC.html">Commentary</a>
 
Re: 2 further cases of Tamiflu resistance

Re: 2 further cases of Tamiflu resistance

Dr. Niman

This quote is from another forum, but it is tied to this discussioin:

"The official report confirms the UK government plans to set up mass graves for the victims of the swine flu pandemic.

It is predicted that if no concrete measures are taken for preventing the spread of swine flu, the number of swine flu victims will reach to two billion worldwide in 2011 that will undoubtedly result in deaths of 10 to 20 percent of the patients."


And in my reading in your and others post I remember that there were studies using the H5N1 on different test animal cycling the virus from one infected animal to the next subject aminal. The result use that the virus became more virilant as it use passed on.

Now my 2 questions:
1. As the H1N1 virus continues to spread and as it picks up more resistance will it reach a 10 to 20 percent kill ability?
2. Why is the UK posting this and not the US and other countries?
 
Re: 2 further cases of Tamiflu resistance

Re: 2 further cases of Tamiflu resistance

Dr. Niman

This quote is from another forum, but it is tied to this discussioin:

"The official report confirms the UK government plans to set up mass graves for the victims of the swine flu pandemic.

It is predicted that if no concrete measures are taken for preventing the spread of swine flu, the number of swine flu victims will reach to two billion worldwide in 2011 that will undoubtedly result in deaths of 10 to 20 percent of the patients."

And in my reading in your and others post I remember that there were studies using the H5N1 on different test animal cycling the virus from one infected animal to the next subject aminal. The result use that the virus became more virilant as it use passed on.

Now my 2 questions:
1. As the H1N1 virus continues to spread and as it picks up more resistance will it reach a 10 to 20 percent kill ability?
2. Why is the UK posting this and not the US and other countries?
I don't think there is much evidence for numbers that high. The number infected will likelyreach the billions, but 10-20% CFR for that many infections is much less likely.
 
Re: 2 further cases of Tamiflu resistance

Re: 2 further cases of Tamiflu resistance

<a rel="nofollow" href="http://www.recombinomics.com/News/08220902/H274Y_WA_NC.html">Commentary</a>
 
Re: U.S. - First Tamiflu-resistant swine flu (Singapore ex-Hawaii)

Re: U.S. - First Tamiflu-resistant swine flu (Singapore ex-Hawaii)

http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/...u-resistant-h1n1-may-have-spread-in-singapore

SINGAPORE, Aug 22 ? Resistance to Tamiflu has been detected in a patient in Singapore who was down with the pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) bug. Similar cases have also emerged in Hong Kong, China, Japan, Canada, the United States and Denmark.
When the novel strain first appeared in April, the antiviral worked well against it. The World Health Organisation (WHO) feels that these instances of it not working are isolated cases of resistance that have developed because Tamiflu had been used at lower, prophylactic doses in people who might have been exposed to the bug.
Because these so-called contacts were, in fact, already infected, the lower doses turned out to be suboptimal, which allowed resistance to emerge. There is no proof that resistance is circulating in the community at large, the WHO asserts.
Yet there is at least one documented case of a 16-year-old girl who fell ill while travelling from San Francisco to Hong Kong on June 11. Though she declined Tamiflu, an isolate from her was found to carry the H274Y mutation, which signals Tamiflu-resistance.
She was, however, not the world?s first case of such resistance, an honour belonging to a woman seen in Denmark in late June. When she got home from Britain, she was given Tamiflu prophylaxis. Yet she still fell ill on the fifth day of taking Tamiflu. H274Y was detected in her isolate.
Could she have been infected in Britain by someone carrying mainly Tamiflu-sensitive bugs but also a small population of resistant bugs? In that case, suboptimal Tamiflu dosage might have suppressed enough of the sensitive bugs to prevent any clinical symptoms. Over the five days, however, the resistant bugs could have replicated enough to predominate and thus cause clinical illness.
But if this is so, then the mutation must already have been circulating in Britain ? which, however, has not reported any cases of Tamiflu resistance yet. Alternatively, she might have caught the resistant bug in Denmark itself, during the five days when she was well and ambulant.
One reason for suspecting community circulation of the resistant bug is that 98 per cent of all seasonal H1N1 bugs now carry H274Y. If patients are infected with both strains, that mutation could jump from seasonal flu to pandemic flu. But the WHO insists there is no evidence this has occurred, so all resistant cases must have emerged because of suboptimal Tamiflu dosages.
There are signs of community circulation in the US, at least. First, the genomics of the Hong Kong isolate where no Tamiflu was used suggests that the infection originated in the US.
Second, it was revealed only this month that a May 30 isolate taken from a young American woman returning to Singapore from Honolulu carried H274Y.
Flying on May 26, she fell ill on board the plane, was hospitalised here on May 27, was confirmed to be a H1N1 case on May 28, but was discharged on May 31 feeling well.
Although her May 28 sample was Tamiflu-sensitive, her May 30 sample had H274Y. Two days is probably too short an interval for resistance to develop from any suboptimal dosages of Tamiflu. At any rate, as a confirmed case, she would have been given the full dosage.
Thus it is entirely possible that she was infected in the US with both the sensitive and resistant strains, which her immune defences could have cleared quickly, so she was discharged fairly quickly.
Third, on Aug 15, the US authorities sent out an urgent report to physicians that two intensive care patients in Washington state who had been infected last month and treated aggressively with Tamiflu were found to have bugs with H274Y.
These four cases suggest that H274Y may already be circulating in the US. It is possible we are seeing relatively few of these isolates for a technical reason: All published genomes are consensus sequences of DNA. That is, the base that is considered to occupy a specific position on the genome is the one that occurs most frequently. But it needs do so 100 per cent of the time.
If a base occurs in only 10 per cent of viral particles, it isn?t likely to show up in the published sequence. It is only when a base occurs in, say, half the cases that it might appear in the consensus sequence.
If H274Y were found in, say, 10 per cent of viral particles, it won?t appear in the consensus sequence of samples taken from a patient prior to Tamiflu being used. Once Tamiflu is employed, the population of sensitive bugs would be drastically reduced. However, those with H274Y would flourish.
Thus, although it was already around prior to Tamiflu being used, the resistant bug would not be detected. After the drug is employed, however, the resistant bugs can grow to greater numbers than the sensitive ones, rendering them detectable.
Of course, if more samples are taken before Tamiflu is used, H274Y might be detected more often. Such comprehensive surveillance, however, would consume too much resources.
History suggests it was limited testing that enabled Tamiflu-resistance in seasonal Influenza A (H1N1) to creep up on the world unawares. The first instance of that was detected in Norway in spring last year.
By the 2008/2009 season, however, it was found in 98 per cent of bugs worldwide. Yet a re-testing of old samples showed that H274Y was already widespread by the autumn of 2007. This means it was circulating in the community before it was first detected in Norway last year.
Is history repeating itself? If so, Singapore should be stocking up on Relenza, the other antiviral that still works. ? Straits Times
 
Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

Tamiflu-resistant H1N1 may have spread in Singapore
SINGAPORE, Aug 22 ? Resistance to Tamiflu has been detected in a patient in Singapore who was down with the pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) bug. Similar cases have also emerged in Hong Kong, China, Japan, Canada, the United States and Denmark.

When the novel strain first appeared in April, the antiviral worked well against it. The World Health Organisation (WHO) feels that these instances of it not working are isolated cases of resistance that have developed because Tamiflu had been used at lower, prophylactic doses in people who might have been exposed to the bug.

Because these so-called contacts were, in fact, already infected, the lower doses turned out to be suboptimal, which allowed resistance to emerge. There is no proof that resistance is circulating in the community at large, the WHO asserts.

Yet there is at least one documented case of a 16-year-old girl who fell ill while travelling from San Francisco to Hong Kong on June 11. Though she declined Tamiflu, an isolate from her was found to carry the H274Y mutation, which signals Tamiflu-resistance.

She was, however, not the world?s first case of such resistance, an honour belonging to a woman seen in Denmark in late June. When she got home from Britain, she was given Tamiflu prophylaxis. Yet she still fell ill on the fifth day of taking Tamiflu. H274Y was detected in her isolate.

Could she have been infected in Britain by someone carrying mainly Tamiflu-sensitive bugs but also a small population of resistant bugs? In that case, suboptimal Tamiflu dosage might have suppressed enough of the sensitive bugs to prevent any clinical symptoms. Over the five days, however, the resistant bugs could have replicated enough to predominate and thus cause clinical illness.

But if this is so, then the mutation must already have been circulating in Britain ? which, however, has not reported any cases of Tamiflu resistance yet. Alternatively, she might have caught the resistant bug in Denmark itself, during the five days when she was well and ambulant.

One reason for suspecting community circulation of the resistant bug is that 98 per cent of all seasonal H1N1 bugs now carry H274Y. If patients are infected with both strains, that mutation could jump from seasonal flu to pandemic flu. But the WHO insists there is no evidence this has occurred, so all resistant cases must have emerged because of suboptimal Tamiflu dosages.

There are signs of community circulation in the US, at least. First, the genomics of the Hong Kong isolate where no Tamiflu was used suggests that the infection originated in the US.

Second, it was revealed only this month that a May 30 isolate taken from a young American woman returning to Singapore from Honolulu carried H274Y.

Flying on May 26, she fell ill on board the plane, was hospitalised here on May 27, was confirmed to be a H1N1 case on May 28, but was discharged on May 31 feeling well.

Although her May 28 sample was Tamiflu-sensitive, her May 30 sample had H274Y. Two days is probably too short an interval for resistance to develop from any suboptimal dosages of Tamiflu. At any rate, as a confirmed case, she would have been given the full dosage.

Thus it is entirely possible that she was infected in the US with both the sensitive and resistant strains, which her immune defences could have cleared quickly, so she was discharged fairly quickly.

Third, on Aug 15, the US authorities sent out an urgent report to physicians that two intensive care patients in Washington state who had been infected last month and treated aggressively with Tamiflu were found to have bugs with H274Y.

These four cases suggest that H274Y may already be circulating in the US. It is possible we are seeing relatively few of these isolates for a technical reason: All published genomes are consensus sequences of DNA. That is, the base that is considered to occupy a specific position on the genome is the one that occurs most frequently. But it needs do so 100 per cent of the time.

If a base occurs in only 10 per cent of viral particles, it isn?t likely to show up in the published sequence. It is only when a base occurs in, say, half the cases that it might appear in the consensus sequence.

If H274Y were found in, say, 10 per cent of viral particles, it won?t appear in the consensus sequence of samples taken from a patient prior to Tamiflu being used. Once Tamiflu is employed, the population of sensitive bugs would be drastically reduced. However, those with H274Y would flourish.

Thus, although it was already around prior to Tamiflu being used, the resistant bug would not be detected. After the drug is employed, however, the resistant bugs can grow to greater numbers than the sensitive ones, rendering them detectable.

Of course, if more samples are taken before Tamiflu is used, H274Y might be detected more often. Such comprehensive surveillance, however, would consume too much resources.

History suggests it was limited testing that enabled Tamiflu-resistance in seasonal Influenza A (H1N1) to creep up on the world unawares. The first instance of that was detected in Norway in spring last year.

By the 2008/2009 season, however, it was found in 98 per cent of bugs worldwide. Yet a re-testing of old samples showed that H274Y was already widespread by the autumn of 2007. This means it was circulating in the community before it was first detected in Norway last year.

Is history repeating itself? If so, Singapore should be stocking up on Relenza, the other antiviral that still works. http://malaysiainsider.net/index.php/world/35750-tamiflu-resistant-h1n1-may-have-spread-in-singapore
 
Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

Tamiflu resistance in pandemic influenza - historical compilation of news

WNC youths show resistance to flu medication
Staff Reports ? August 22, 2009 12:15 AM

ASHEVILLE ? A Buncombe County youth who tested positive last month for swine flu was one of two campers at Camp Blue Star in Henderson County found to be resistant to flu medication.

Both campers became ill with H1N1 last month while receiving Tamiflu following exposure to other ill campers, according to a news release from the Buncombe County Health Center. Both campers have since recovered.

State public health officials said caregivers across the state are being reminded that use of antiviral medications as prevention may be considered for persons with higher risk of complications or for health care workers with an unprotected exposure to influenza.

Overuse of an antiviral drug increases the likelihood for developing resistance to the treatment, according to the news release. Antiviral treatment is recommended for all patients with confirmed, probable or suspected cases of 2009 influenza H1N1 virus infection who are hospitalized or who are at higher risk for influenza complications.

http://www.citizen-times.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090822/NEWS01/90821104
 
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