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DRC – 17th Ebola Outbreak (Bundibugyo virus) - Government | W.H.O. | Africa CDC | News - May 2026+

Images translated by Google​

SitRep N°184/MVE-BDBV/14/11/2026​

  • November 15, 2026
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Haut-Uélé -

Translation Google

DRC: Medical community loses another doctor to Ebola in Isiro

Tue 17/11/2026 - 13:08

The 17th Ebola virus disease outbreak continues to claim lives among the medical community in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Dr. Élysée Nako died on the evening of Monday, November 16, at the Ebola Treatment Center (ETC) of the Isiro General Referral Hospital, the capital of Haut-Uélé province, from complications of the disease, according to several local sources.

The death was confirmed by SCM-ONG (Save the Medical Profession), an organization that defends the interests, rights, and unity of healthcare professionals in the DRC. His passing is a painful loss for his family, loved ones, and the medical community.

The death of Dr. Élysée Nako comes after several other healthcare professionals have died from this epidemic. On November 5th, Justin Kataliko, a nurse at the Les Bernardins clinic in Beni, North Kivu, also died from Ebola virus disease.

A few days earlier, two young Congolese doctors had succumbed to the epidemic within two days. Dr. Safari Samuel died on October 29 in Lwemba, in Ituri province, while Dr. Marie-France Shogogo died on October 28 at the Ebola Treatment Center in Beni, North Kivu.

This series of deaths also brings to mind that of Dr. Charles Mbusa Munyumu, a neurosurgeon at the Matanda Secondary Hospital in Butembo. He died on August 10, 2026, from Ebola at the Katwa Treatment Center. He was considered the only neurosurgeon practicing in the city of Butembo, where he specialized in the treatment of brain disorders and strokes.

These successive deaths occur against a backdrop of persistent difficulties in the Ebola response. Health professionals have notably reported shortages of equipment necessary for treating patients and protecting healthcare workers.

Josué Mutanava, in Goma

 
Translation Google

Tshopo: Tragic end to an infant's fight against Ebola at the Kisangani Ebola Treatment Center

Tue 17/11/2026 - 13:28

The Ebola treatment center in Kisangani recorded the death of a 12-day-old infant on Tuesday, November 17th. The infant had arrived for treatment eight days after birth. Upon arrival at the center, health authorities reported that the infant was the 100th case of Ebola recorded in Tshopo province.

The baby tested positive for Ebola last Thursday. He was eight days old when he arrived at the hospital, shortly after the death of his mother, who also succumbed to Ebola. According to health sources, three other members of his family had died from Ebola before the baby's death.

According to these sources, the Ebola Treatment Center (ETC) in Kisangani has recorded a worrying number of deaths in recent days. A teacher also died of Ebola this Monday at the ETC, two days after her mother died from the same illness. Prior to these two deaths, the same family had already suffered two other Ebola-related fatalities.

In Kisangani, the response is facing community resistance.

"The first difficulty is the relationship with the community. So far, there are many people who do not agree with the existence of Ebola. Others think that this disease does not exist or that it is a situation created to embezzle money. This mistrust complicates our work," said a health worker.

The Ebola treatment center in Kisangani has treated 256 patients since it opened last September. Of these, 74 have tested positive for the disease, while others are suspected cases. Currently, 17 patients are being treated at the center, including 11 suspected cases.

Gaston MUKENDI, in Kisangani

 

Translation Google​

Ebola in Haut-Uélé: the second wave of the epidemic begins in the province (a doctor)​


November 17, 2026

Isiro, November 17, 2026 (ACP).- The presentation of patients at the Ebola treatment center (ETC) at the Isiro general reference hospital has been estimated as a second wave of the Ebola epidemic in the Haut-Uélé province, in the North-East of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), by the ETC manager, following the continuation of the presentation of confirmed patients on a large scale.

"There is a second wave of the Ebola epidemic that has started again in the Isiro health zone, in the Haut-Uele province, because there was a lull of about three (3) weeks, during which we thought we had stabilized the situation, but we knew that Isiro alone cannot eradicate this epidemic, because there are still problems in the neighboring health zones."

" said director David Kamalu, manager of the Ebola treatment center, and medical director of the Isiro General Referral Hospital, on Tuesday.

"The unique aspect here is that the Ebola treatment center (ETC) in Isiro, located at the general referral hospital, is somewhat standardized compared to other ETCs in other health zones. This means that even though Isiro is trying to stabilize the situation, we can still have patients coming from other health zones, and that's what makes Isiro unique," he added.

Speaking about the current situation at the Ebola treatment center in the Isiro General Referral Hospital, the medical director stated that many patients continue to present themselves and there are suspected and confirmed cases.

“The response is evolving; we now have thirteen (13) patients in the treatment center, including seven (7) confirmed cases and six (6) suspected cases whose results are pending. We are receiving new cases every day, and some are even presenting at a very advanced, critical stage, which does not facilitate the downward trend or reduction of confirmed cases and the fall of the epidemiological curve,” explained Dr. Kamalu.

The health professional called on the population to obey the established rules to protect themselves and others, in order to eradicate the disease.

ACP/ BK/BANG

 
Translation Google

Insecurity and Ebola lead to the closure of several health facilities in Mambasa

Published on Fri, 20/11/2026 - 10:26 | Modified on Fri, 20/11/2026 - 10:26

Several health facilities have closed in the Mambasa territory of Ituri province over the past three months due to insecurity linked to attacks by ADF rebels and the Ebola epidemic. Speaking on Thursday, November 19, health authorities stated that this situation significantly reduces access to healthcare for thousands of residents and further complicates the treatment of patients in the region.

In the Mambasa-Centre health zone, seven of the seventeen health centers in the area are currently closed. These include the health centers in Molokayi, Banane, Bandisende, Pede, Nduye, Malembi, and Bongupanda.

According to the area's chief medical officer, several healthcare providers have fled their posts due to the persistent insecurity caused by incursions from ADF rebels.

Adding to this insecurity is the pressure exerted by the Ebola epidemic, which also affects the capacity of the health structures that are still operational to cope.

Four private health posts, including Grâce Babovi, Babokoti, and Bénédiction, have also ceased operations. According to health authorities, some staff members were infected while treating suspected Ebola cases due to a lack of adequate protective equipment. Others have died.

This situation increases the vulnerability of populations who already struggle to access basic medical services.

At Mambasa General Referral Hospital, the Ebola Treatment Centre (ETC) is facing a shortage of beds and a growing influx of patients.

The closure of several health facilities reduces the possibilities for referral and care of patients in the region.

The situation is also worrying in the Niania health zone.

At PK 51, the Juhudi health center was burned down in a context marked by resistance from some residents to Ebola response activities.

Furthermore, the Bafwakoa health center closed after an attack attributed to the ADF, which caused the displacement of the population of this

locality.

Even though some residents are gradually starting to return to their villages, access to healthcare remains very limited.

A call for the rehabilitation of healthcare facilities

Faced with this crisis, several local actors are advocating for the reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure and the reopening of closed health centers.

According to them, the restoration of health services is essential to improve the care of the sick, strengthen the response against Ebola and meet the needs of populations affected by insecurity in this part of Ituri.

 
Translation Google

20/11/2026

Bundibugyo virus can cause asymptomatic infections in pigs, raising new questions in the context of the Ebola outbreak

Bertrand Neveux

Bundibugyo virus can cause asymptomatic infections in pigs, raising new questions in the context of the Ebola outbreak

Domesticated pigs can be infected with the Bundibugyo virus, shedding the infectious virus while showing few or no clinical signs, and can transmit the infection to other pigs. A new study argues that pigs should now be included in "One Health" surveillance, although their role in natural transmission to humans remains to be proven.

Bundibugyo virus (BDBV)—an *Orthoebolavirus* first identified in Uganda in 2007—causes Ebola virus disease, with reported case fatality rates ranging from 25% to 51%. This issue gained particular significance during the severe 2026 outbreak that affected the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda.

Pigs can harbor asymptomatic infections

Experimental studies show that pigs inoculated with BDBV via the oronasal route developed a productive infection, with the virus detected in respiratory and lymphoid tissues.

More importantly, sentinel pigs housed alongside them tested positive via PCR and showed seroconversion, demonstrating pig-to-pig transmission under experimental conditions. Yet, the disease remained generally mild, or even entirely absent. Most of the animals remained clinically normal, with the exception of occasional transient fever and limited respiratory and lymph node lesions.

This combination of "infection, viral shedding, and limited clinical signs" is of epidemiological importance, as infected animals could go unnoticed.

Viral shedding can persist for several days.

BDBV RNA was detected in upper respiratory tract samples from day 1 to day 10 post-infection, while saliva samples from the group remained positive until day 8. A secondary peak of nasal viral RNA reached approximately 1.4 × 10⁶ copies/mL on day 5, confirming active viral replication.

This presents a potential occupational risk for livestock farmers, transporters, and slaughterhouse workers exposed to oral or nasal secretions, blood, or tissues. However, experimental susceptibility does not prove that pigs currently serve as a reservoir or a source of human infection in the field.

Serology suggests broader exposure to filoviruses.

This review also cites a study of 888 pigs in Guinea, in which antibodies reactive to the ebolavirus nucleoprotein were detected in 48.7% to 50% of the animals across two outbreak sites.

Because these antibodies showed cross-reactivity with several *Orthoebolavirus* species, these findings cannot be attributed specifically to BDBV. Nevertheless, they suggest that certain pig populations in West Africa may be naturally exposed to filoviruses or related viruses.

The natural reservoir remains uncertain. Bats remain significant candidates in the ecology of filoviruses, yet no species has been definitively identified as the natural reservoir for BDBV. Experimental infection studies conducted on Egyptian fruit bats have shown limited viral replication, with no detectable viremia. This uncertainty makes the investigation of intermediate or amplifying hosts particularly important.

A key, unanswered question is whether natural infection in pigs occurs frequently enough to be of epidemiological significance. Current data indicate that pigs are susceptible, can shed the virus, and are capable of transmitting BDBV in experimental settings. However, it has not yet been demonstrated that they maintain the virus in the wild or that they transmit it to humans.

The logical next step, therefore, is to implement targeted surveillance of pigs in areas surrounding affected communities.

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The research paper from the link above:

Animals and Zoonoses​

Date: Available online 12 August 2026
Review article
Open access
Under a Creative Commons license
Get rights and content

Research progress in animal infection and zoonotic aspects of Bundibugyo virus​


Yubo Yang a, Zongzhao Yang b
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10.1016/j.azn.2026.08.004

Abstract​

Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) causes hemorrhagic fever in humans with a case fatality rate of 25%–51%. In recent years, breakthrough progress has been made in animal infection studies. This review focuses on domestic swine as a newly identified susceptible host and its public health significance, and summarizes animal models including ferrets, nonhuman primates, and bats. Domestic swine are highly susceptible to BDBV, can shed the virus asymptomatically, and exhibit intraspecies transmission. Antibody positivity rates against filovirus nucleoprotein in West African pig populations reach 48.7%–50.0%, suggesting widespread natural exposure to filoviruses (potentially including BDBV or antigenically related viruses). The ferret is the only small animal model that can be lethally infected with BDBV without viral adaptation, and nonhuman primates provide a reliable platform for vaccine evaluation. Regarding pathogenic mechanisms, BDBV exhibits significant differences from Zaire Ebola virus that appear to contribute to its lower virulence; however, the underlying mechanisms require further investigation. Domestic swine, as a potential amplifying host, pose a threat to pig farming and public health. It is recommended to strengthen surveillance of domestic swine within the international “One Health” framework. The ferret model represents an ideal platform for vaccine and drug evaluation, and the long-term sequelae in BDBV survivors require continued medical attention. This review aims to provide a scientific reference for ecological research on BDBV and the development of relevant prevention and control strategies.
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Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus- Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya and Nigeria​

20 November 2026

Situation at a glance​

Since the publication of the previous Disease Outbreak News on 6 November 2026, additional confirmed cases and deaths have been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While some areas have seen a slight decline in cases, sustained, high-level transmission continues overall in the country. As of 17 November 2026, a total of 11 613 confirmed cases, including 5678 deaths (crude case fatality ratio: 48.9%), have been reported across 68 health zones in eight provinces, with active transmission ongoing in 48 health zones. Ituri and Nord Kivu remain the most affected provinces, while Sud-Kivu and Sud Ubangi have not reported cases for more than 42 days. The high proportion of deaths occurring in communities, meaning outside of dedicated treatment centres, especially among young children, continues to highlight challenges in early case detection and timely access to appropriate care. Of the 720 deaths reported since 28 October (last three weeks), 452 occurred in communities and 268 in treatment centres. Since the last Disease Outbreak News, no new cases have been reported from Kenya or Nigeria; and no new country has reported confirmed cases. Both countries have started a 42-day countdown to declare the end of their outbreaks. However, the high-level transmission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo calls for continued need for readiness in the region, including cross-border surveillance, points of entry monitoring, timely case detection and coordinated preparedness and response measures. Six months into the outbreak of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the response has expanded significantly, but further scale up is needed, with rising insecurity remaining the greatest obstacle to the expansion of operations. The next phase must prioritize quality, reach and community trust, alongside sustained funding, coordination and security to save lives and end the outbreak. On 18 November 2026, the Director-General of WHO, concurring with the advice of the IHR Emergency Committee formulated at its third meeting, on 17 November 2026, determined that the event continues to constitute a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). Updated recommendations to the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and all other States Parties will be issued in the coming days.

Description of the situation​



Cases have been reported in five countries since the declaration of the outbreak on 15 May 2026: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda. The outbreaks in France and Uganda have been controlled since August, while Kenya and Nigeria continue with heightened surveillance as they count down to 42 days, completing two maximum incubation periods since the last confirmed cases were either discharged or medically evacuated from the country.

On 26 October 2026, Switzerland reported the medical evacuation of the case, who received medical care in Geneva, Switzerland. The patient recovered and was discharged on 11 November testing PCR-negative for Bundibugyo virus for a second time.

On 18 November 2026, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland reported that a medically evacuated health and care worker from the Democratic Republic of the Congo had recovered and been discharged from hospital.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

An additional 945 confirmed cases, including 480 confirmed deaths, have been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since the previous Disease Outbreak News was published.

In the last 21-day period, as of 17 November, 1417 new confirmed cases were reported, with Ituri accounting for 668 (13% decrease) cases, Nord Kivu for 635 (8% increase) cases, Haut-Uélé for 90 (13% increase) cases, Tshopo for 20 (47% decrease) cases and Nord-Ubangi for four cases. No new cases were reported in Bas-Uélé, Sud Kivu or Sud-Ubangi during that period.

As of 17 November, cumulative confirmed cases have reached 11 613, including 5678 deaths and 3148 recoveries. The overall crude CFR is 48.9%.

Confirmed cases have now been identified in 68 health zones across eight provinces. Forty-eight of the 68 affected health zones reported at least one new case during the preceding 21 days, while 20 reported no recent cases. Beni, Bunia, and Mandima have reported the highest number of cases and deaths in the preceding 21 days. Ituri remains the most extensively affected province, with 28 of 36 health zones reporting cases during this outbreak, followed by Nord Kivu (17/34), Haut-Uélé (8/13), Tshopo (7/23), Bas-Uélé (4/11), Nord-Ubangi (2/11), Sud Kivu (1/34) and Sud-Ubangi (1/16). Watsa in Haut-Uélé province is the most recently affected health zone, reporting 11 confirmed cases.

Six months into the BVD outbreak, the response has expanded significantly, but transmission remains persistent and geographically widespread. WHO, the national Government and partners have strengthened surveillance, treatment, laboratory capacity and community engagement, yet high community mortality, insecurity, displacement and a fragile health system continue to undermine progress.

The next phase will need to focus on scaling up, but also on improving the reach, quality and impact of the response. Early detection, quality care, contact tracing, infection prevention and community trust remain critical. Sustained funding, strong coordination and safe access to communities will be essential.

The third International Health Regulations (IHR) Emergency Committee meeting regarding the epidemic of BVD in the Democratic Republic of the Congo took place on 17 November. Following the advice of the Committee, the Director-General agreed that the ongoing outbreak remains a PHEIC. Updated recommendations to the government of the DRC and all other States Parties will be issued in the coming days and reported in the next Disease Outbreak News publication.

Figure 1. Classification of health zones reporting confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as of 17 November 2026

BVD DRC map

While Nord Kivu reported the highest number of cases in the last seven days (235 cases (40% increase compared to the previous seven days) as of 17 November), Ituri remains the most affected province since the outbreak was declared, with 7946 cumulative confirmed cases and 3751 deaths, with CFR of 47%. Nord Kivu follows with 2996 confirmed cases and 1654 deaths, and continues to record the highest provincial CFR, at 55%. Haut-Uélé has reported 534 cases and 231 deaths, while Tshopo has recorded 109 cases and 35 deaths. The less-affected provinces continue to report substantially fewer cases, but transmission persists in several of them. The continued occurrence of cases across multiple provinces shows that the outbreak remains geographically active even as intensity varies between health zones. Sud-Kivu and Sud Ubangi have not reported cases for more than 42 days.

As of 17 November 2026, the average proportion of contacts seen daily over the previous 14-day period is 81%, remaining below the required threshold of 95% for a daily average of the proportion of contacts seen over the previous 14-day period. Two provinces were at or above the 95% threshold: Bas-Uele (100%, 56/56) and Nord-Ubangi (99%, 140/138) Five provinces were below the threshold: Haut-Uélé (86%; 1741/1495), Ituri (86% (9564/11 104), Nord-Kivu (77%; 16 015/12 313), Tshopo (68%; 720/526), and Sud-Ubangi (63%; 127/80). Strengthened contact follow-up is required, particularly in provinces below the target, to achieve the minimum threshold of 95%.

Figure 2: Number of confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease cases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of notification, as of 17 November 2026

BVD Epi curve

Figure 3: Number of deaths among confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease cases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by date of notification, as of 17 November 2026

BVD Epi curve 2

Kenya

As of 17 November 2026, the cumulative confirmed cases reported in Kenya are nine, including two deaths, with a crude CFR of 22.2%. All eight secondary cases were epidemiologically linked to the imported index case and associated with one cluster (four family members of the index case and four health and care workers). All seven hospitalized cases have recovered and been discharged (the last case was discharged on 11 November). A 42-day countdown is underway and includes heightened surveillance.

There is currently no evidence of transmission outside this cluster, and there have been no new confirmed cases since 19 October 2026. Additionally, all eight secondary cases were already under quarantine as known contacts when they developed symptoms.

As of 17 November, of the 135 cumulative contacts identified since the first confirmed case, eight subsequently became confirmed cases and nine contacts left Kenya (relevant National IHR Focal Points were notified). All have completed the 21-day follow-up on 11 November 2026.

Figure 4: Number of confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease cases in Kenya, by date of notification, as of 17 November 2026

BVD epi curve Kenya

Nigeria

On 20 October 2026, Nigeria reported one laboratory-confirmed imported case of BVD in the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. On 26 October 2026, Switzerland reported the medical evacuation of the case, who received medical care in Geneva, Switzerland. The patient recovered and was discharged on 11 November, following two PCR-negative test results for Bundibugyo virus.

As of 13 November, a cumulative of 62 contacts had been identified in Nigeria for follow-up and all the contacts have completed the 21-day follow-up period. National authorities, with support from WHO and partners, have intensified contact tracing, case investigation and infection prevention and control measures, including the provision of essential supplies and personal protective equipment for health workers. Investigations are ongoing to establish the likely source of infection and reconstruct the travel and exposure history of the imported case. WHO has urged countries across the region to strengthen surveillance, laboratory diagnostic capacity, rapid response readiness and cross-border preparedness to mitigate the risk of further transmission.


Epidemiology​

Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir.

Human infection is thought to initially occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person-to-person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces and materials. Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with deceased individuals.

The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and infected individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and, in some cases, haemorrhagic manifestations.

The CFR from the previous two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012, were 30% and 50%, respectively.

Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation. Outbreak control relies on rapid case identification and investigation, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.

Since first detected in May 2026, this BVD outbreak has rapidly evolved into a large and geographically expanding epidemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with sustained transmission, high mortality and an increasing risk of further international spread. The current outbreak is the second documented Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak in the country, after the 2012 outbreak, and the largest Ebola disease outbreak ever recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo irrespective of virus species. The population at greatest risk of exposure is concentrated in communities living in and moving through the health areas with active transmission.

Public health response​

For detailed information about the ongoing public health response actions by the Ministry of Health, WHO and partners please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa: Ongoing outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo | WHO | Regional Office for Africa.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are continuing to implement and coordinate extensive public health measures. These include disease surveillance; laboratory testing; IPC; clinical care; community engagement; research; logistics; and support for response interventions and essential health services, including for the ongoing concurrent humanitarian crisis; engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas. A substantial scale-up is ongoing across all response pillars to get ahead of the outbreak.

Kenya

On 11 November 2026, Kenya discharged its last confirmed BVD case after two negative tests, released the remaining contacts from quarantine, and began the 42-day countdown to declaring the end of the outbreak. Following the start of the 42-day countdown, Kenya has maintained cross-border surveillance and screening at all designated points of entry.

Nigeria

Nigeria has maintained a high level of alert for BVD since the outbreak began in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in May 2026. As of 13 November, all identified contacts had completed the 21-day follow-up period.

Following the medical evacuation of the case on 26 October, the country is continuing with the 42-days countdown to declare the end of the outbreak and is maintaining heightened surveillance.

WHO risk assessment​

On 17 November 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the BVD outbreak. The risk assessment categorizes States Parties into five groups based on population mobility from areas with community BVD transmission and response capacity.

The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the only State Party with currently documented community transmission, remains very high, reflecting the intensity and geographic expansion of the outbreak, ongoing undetected transmission, community deaths, health-care transmission, insecurity, laboratory constraints, gaps in community engagement and funding, and the continued potential for national spread.

The risk for States Parties with confirmed cases but without community transmission, including Kenya and Nigeria, is assessed as high, given the potential for onward and secondary transmission following importation, challenges in early detection, uncertainty around transmission chains, and the continued possibility of additional introductions.

The risk is also assessed as high for States Parties with substantial population connectivity to areas with community transmission, or with moderate connectivity but low response capacity. High population mobility, formal and informal cross-border movement, the possibility of undetected importation, variable surveillance and response capacities, and humanitarian and access constraints increase the likelihood of delayed detection and onward transmission.

The risk for States Parties with substantial connectivity but high response capacity is assessed as low. Although importation remains possible because of travel and other connections with affected areas, strong health systems and demonstrated outbreak-response capacities reduce the likelihood of sustained community transmission.

Finally, the risk for all other States Parties remains low. Transmission remains concentrated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with no evidence of sustained transmission beyond the country. However, further international exportation remains possible, requiring continued surveillance, preparedness, rapid detection and containment of any imported cases.

WHO advice​

Based on the currently available information, WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, States Parties experiencing and/or responding to the public health event. The Temporary Recommendations issued to States Parties on 24 August 2026 underscore the importance of coordinated outbreak control, strengthened cross‑border collaboration, and sustained surveillance and preparedness to prevent further regional spread and ensure an effective public health response. Rapid recognition of cases, testing and optimized supportive care can reduce mortality, and improve community perceptions and acceptance of health care within the response.

Following the advice formulated by the IHR Emergency Committee regarding the epidemic of BVD in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Director-General of WHO determined that the event continues to constitute a PHEIC. An updated set of Temporary Recommendations will be issued to States Parties, and this will be reported in the next Disease Outbreak News publication.
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