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High Frequency Trading

kent nickell

Well-known member
High frequency trading seems very similar in its 'usefulness' and high likelihood of abuse as a synthetic CDO squared.....

http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20100509,0,835666.column

Growth of electronic trading a major cause of stock market free fall


By Michael Hiltzik

May 9, 2010

So much for the biggest, safest, most liquid securities market in the world.

Of course we're talking about the U.S. equities market, which used to be described in those glowing terms. But now, after Thursday's trading debacle, the market looks more like a casino ? and not just any casino, but one of those smelly joints with sawdust on the floor, ripped felt on the blackjack tables and loaded dice.


I've been inside casinos like that. I wouldn't think of laying a 10-cent bet with the dealer. So why would I buy stock on an exchange emitting the same odor of rancid beer?

The market's friends, including executives of the various exchanges and some traders with access to turbocharged equipment, would like us to think that the system worked Thursday. This is based on the idea that things could have been a lot worse.

But let's not sugarcoat the event.
When you have the Dow Jones industrial average falling nearly 1,000 points before recovering, including a nausea-inducing collapse of more than 700 points in a matter of minutes; when you have legitimate stocks like Accenture quoted at a penny a share, or about zero percent of their real value; and when therefore you have millions of investors trapped by insane prices, by any rational standard of market performance that's a sin.

Here's another sin: As of the close of business Friday ? 24 hours after the event ? the markets' overseers were still not sure what happened.

Yet the New York Stock Exchange shockingly insisted that its systems worked perfectly well Thursday
because it was able to "slow things down and allow common sense to be inserted into the process," as NYSE Executive Vice President Louis Pastina told Reuters.

I'm not sure where Mr. Pastina detected common sense at work that day. But his observation reminded me vividly of the claim uttered by Richard Whitney, the president of the Big Board, that "the Exchange is a perfect institution." That was in 1933, four years after it had laid its biggest egg of all time, and a few months before Congress, wisely ignoring Whitney's words, created the Securities and Exchange Commission to make the exchange even more perfect.

Although it still isn't clear what caused Thursday's bedlam, we can identify generally where to look. The most obvious place is in the explosive growth of "high-frequency trading," in which traders use computer algorithms to pump billions of dollars in orders onto exchanges in milliseconds. If there are glitches or manipulative aspects to any of those trades, they may be nothing but a puff of electronic smoke before anyone catches them.


High-frequency trading has mushroomed to 70% from 30% of U.S. equity markets over the last few years, Sen. Ted Kaufman (D-Del.), who has been warning about the phenomenon for a year, told me last week.

Much of that trading occurs beyond the reach of market surveillance, so nobody knows the size and shape of the orders, who's placing them and to what end. But even when the trading can be monitored and analyzed, the markets' monitoring systems are hopelessly outgunned in terms of electronic sophistication.

"The problem may not be too much computerization, but too little," says James Angel, an expert in market regulation at Georgetown University and an outside board member of DirectEdge, a new electronic exchange. "We don't have the kind of computerized monitoring that can track this activity in real time."

When a suspect trade shows up on regulators' screens for analysis by a human monitor, Angel observes, "the process can take several minutes. But you can have a high-frequency trading glitch in milliseconds."

Plainly, when computers can outrun human beings by such an enormous margin, the only options for reintroducing sanity to the process is to slow down the computers or speed up the humans. Since the latter must accommodate certain natural limits, the exchanges have tried the former. The NYSE expressed inordinate pride last week in its procedure for shutting down electronic trading in certain stocks so that humans could step in.

One flaw in that process is that only the Big Board imposes such circuit breakers on individual stocks, and there are a dozen or more other exchanges or exchange-like electronic markets that could accept some of the orders backed off by the NYSE. On a day like Thursday, therefore, the equities market can blow at any seam.

That points to another flaw ? the regulatory system. The Securities and Exchange Commission, which has the authority to standardize trading rules across all U.S. markets, has heard warnings for more than a year that the growth of electronic trading had made many of its rules obsolete.


But the SEC doesn't operate at human speed ? it operates at regulatory speed, which can make even the schlubbiest human look like Secretariat.
Over the last year it has held round tables on these trading issues, ordered staff reports and prepared to solicit comments from experts, investors and traders on any rules it might consider.

"We would, of course, study all comments very seriously," SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro told Kaufman in September, sounding much like a priest delivering the last rites to a terminal patient.

"This hasn't been a high priority for them, compared to day-to-day stuff like catching the next Bernie Madoff," Angel, who participated in one of those round tables, told me.

No one would claim that the SEC should plunge into regulation of electronic trading without study. When it shoots first and asks questions later, as it did in its short-sale restrictions during the financial meltdown in 2008, the result can be self-defeating, useless or at best transitory.

But the issue should have been on the front burner long ago.

"Last year, I felt a little lonely raising these concerns," Kaufman said on the Senate floor recently. "But this year, I'm starting to have plenty of company."

That was back in March. I bet he's got a lot more company today.


Michael Hiltzik's column appears Wednesday and Sunday. Reach him at mhiltzik@latimes.com, read past columns at www.latimes.com/hiltzik and follow @latimeshiltzik on Twitter.
 
Re: High Frequency Trading

This is a pretty amazing article and would appear to agree with this statement from a few days ago: ""Karl Denninger said today that essentially the thousand point drop was due to the fact that only the Big Boys are playing the stocks. And with the "robo" system that is currently in place things got out of sync""

There is some alluding in this article to blame a large short sale bet by Taleb as precipitating the meltdown but short selling often gets a bad rap. In a normally functioning market people should be able to vote for (buy) or against (sell) a stock depending on what they think of it. The banks and financial sector (as pointed out by Stiglitz in his book Freefall) wanted to ban short sells on their stocks as then it would only allow people to vote in favor of them....

It would be interesting to see who these firms were: """These funds swooped in on hundreds of cheap stocks, helping push the market higher."" but this seems like a difficult event to have engineered and more like high frequency trading getting out of whack.

It's hard to believe that these high frequency traders make up two-thirds of the market and just make huge trades constantly looking for a slight edge... ie

"""At about 2:40, he and a small team of traders scrambled to close the positions held by the high-speed fund, which trades rapidly between stock indexes and the individual stocks in the index.

Normally, it takes about a fraction of a second to unwind the trades because of the high-powered computers Mr. Narang uses. But as the market plunged, it took about two minutes?an eternity in today's computer-driven market."""

I had never heard of the BATS exchange before.... (it's not available to the individual investor) (also know as a digital swap meet for professional traders http://www.newsweek.com/id/158587/page/1 )

BATS is a stock exchange based in Lenexa, Kansas, a satellite city of Kansas City, Missouri. BATS was founded in June 2005 as an ECN (electronic communication network) and its name stands for Better Alternative Trading System. In early 2009 it became the third largest exchange in the world by volume behind the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ

More on BATS: Starting from scratch, the engineers?BATS employs few Wharton M.B.A.s and a whole bunch of computer-science graduates from Midwestern universities?built a financial vehicle designed for speed. "The operating system, the network, the hardware was a large science project designed to eke out maximum performance," says Ratterman. Speed was essential, because the target audience for BATS wasn't retail investors placing orders to buy 100 shares of IBM. Rather, it aimed to appeal to hedge funds and other trading operations that execute thousands of trades per day. And for folks who seek to capture the microscopic gains available when, for example, a stock's price moves from 9.23 to 9.25, speed really matters.


http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704879704575236771699461084.html?mod=e2tw


Did a Big Bet Help Trigger 'Black Swan' Stock Swoon?

MAY 10, 2010
By SCOTT PATTERSON And TOM LAURICELLA


Shortly after 2:15 p.m. Eastern time last Thursday, hedge fund Universa Investments LP placed a big bet in the Chicago options trading pits that stocks would continue their sharp declines.

On any other day, this $7.5 million trade for 50,000 options contracts might have briefly hurt stock prices, though not caused much of a ripple. But coming on a day when all varieties of financial markets were deeply unsettled, the trade may have played a key role in the stock-market collapse just 20 minutes later.

The trade by Universa, a hedge fund advised by Nassim Taleb, author of "Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable," led traders on the other side of the transaction?including Barclays Capital, the brokerage arm of British bank Barclays PLC?to do their own selling to offset some of the risk, according to traders in Chicago.

Then, as the market fell, those declines are likely to have forced even more "hedging" sales, creating a tsunami of pressure that spread to nearly all parts of the market.

The tidal wave of selling fed into a market already on edge about the economy in Europe. As the selling spread, a blast of orders appears to have jarred the flow of data going into brokerage firms, such as Barclays Capital, according to people familiar with the matter.

Exchanges, in turn, were clogged by huge volumes of offers to buy and sell stocks, say traders and exchange executives. Even before some individual stocks collapsed to just a penny a share, data from the NYSE Euronext's electronic Arca exchange started to appear questionable, say traders.

In the disarray, some huge superfast-trading hedge funds that now provide much of the liquidity for the stock market pulled to the sidelines. The working theory among traders and others involved in the exchange meltdown is that the "Black Swan"-linked fund may have contributed to a "Black Swan" moment, a rare, unforeseen event that can have devastating consequences.

"Universa alone couldn't have caused the meltdown," said Mark Spitznagel, Universa's founder. "We had reached a critical point in the market, and it was poised to collapse." Barclays Capital declined to comment.

As more details of last Thursday's collapse become clear, there is less evidence to suggest a "fat-finger" data-entry error caused the collapse. Instead, the picture is one of a highly rare confluence of events, some linked, some unrelated, that exposed weaknesses in the stock market large and small. Within five minutes, the Dow Jones Industrial Average had lost 700 points as trading seized up in individual stocks such as Procter & Gamble and even exchange-traded mutual funds.

"It did point out that there is a structural flaw," said Gus Sauter, chief investment officer at Vanguard Group. "We have to think through how you preserve the immediacy and yet preserve the liquidity."

The episode highlights a bigger question about the stock market. In recent years, the market has grown exponentially faster and more diverse. Stock trading's main venue is no longer the New York Stock Exchange but rather computer servers run by companies as far afield as Austin, Texas; Kansas City, Mo.; and Red Bank, N.J.

This diversity has made stock-trading cheaper, a plus for both institutional and individual investors. It has also made it more unruly and difficult to ensure an orderly market. Today that responsibility falls largely on a group of high-frequency traders who make up an estimated two-thirds of stock-market volume. These for-profit hedge funds look out for their own investors' interests and not those of investors in the stocks they trade.

Hours before the panic began, there were signs that Thursday was not shaping up to be a humdrum day. By 11 a.m., when the Dow was down only about 60 points, selling volume was unusually heavy. One measure of selling?the percentage of stocks falling without first moving upward?was at its highest since the day the market reopened after the Sept. 11 terror attacks, according to Barclays.

By 2 p.m., financial markets of just about every sort were under significant strain. In Europe, the spillover from the Greek debt crisis led to a huge drop in the euro against the dollar and the Japanese yen, as well as a broad bond-market decline. European banks were charging each other higher interest rates to borrow money.

Some 2,800 miles away from Wall Street, in Santa Monica, Calif., Universa placed its trade.

The trade wasn't out of character for Universa, which has about $6 billion under management. Mr. Taleb, who is an adviser to the firm and an investor, gained fame for "The Black Swan," a book that suggested unlikely events in the financial markets are far more likely than most investors believe.

Universa frequently purchases options contracts that will pay off if the market makes a sharp move lower. It posted big gains in the market selloff of late 2008 and launched a fund last year designed to benefit if inflation surges.

Through the trading desks at Barclays, Universa bought 50,000 options contracts, according to people familiar with the matter. The contracts would pay off about $4 billion should Standard & Poor's 500-stock index fall to 800 in June. It was at 1145 points at the time of the trade.

Back across the country in Chicago, the big trade appeared to have had an immediate ripple in the markets. The traders on the other side of the Universa trade were essentially betting stocks wouldn't post big losses.

But to minimize the risk of losing money, they in turn needed to sell, according to traders.

The more the market fell, the more the traders at places like Barclays had to sell to protect their own positions. This, along with likely dozens of other trades across the market, led to a cascade of selling in the futures markets.

As the stock-trading volume soared, data systems across the stock market began to get clogged. At Barclays Capital, a market data feed that delivers to the firm data on "buy" and "sell" orders went down, although a backup system immediately went online without any impact to the firm.

As the turmoil unfolded, every second saw some 300,000 pieces of stock information?stock prices moves, trades?pour into Barclays's system. A normal peak is some 60,000 ticks a second, says Barclays Capital's head of electronic-trading sales, Brian Fagen, who was monitoring the chaos in the market on his screens.

Large hedge funds were juggling huge positions as volume spiked. Two Sigma Investments LLC, a New York hedge-fund manager that engages in complex trading strategies, saw its highest-volume day since launching in 2001, according to a person familiar with the matter.

By 2:37 p.m., the overload seemed to have taken its toll on the NYSE's Arca electronic-trading system. At that point, its rival, the Nasdaq, owned by NASDAQ OMX Group Inc., detected what it felt was questionable information in the data. It sent out a message saying it would no longer route quotes to Arca.

This step?known as declaring "self-help"?doesn't happen often among the major exchanges. But in the coming minutes, the BATS exchange also stopped automatically routing orders to Arca.


For a crucial set of players?high-frequency-trading hedge funds?all this turmoil was becoming too risky to handle. One fear that would prove all too real was that in the extreme swings, some?but not all?trades would later be canceled, leaving them on the hook for unwanted positions.

Manoj Narang, whose Tradeworx Inc. firm runs a high-frequency trading operation in Red Bank, N.J., began to worry the extreme volatility could lead to painful losses in his fund.

At about 2:40, he and a small team of traders scrambled to close the positions held by the high-speed fund, which trades rapidly between stock indexes and the individual stocks in the index.

Normally, it takes about a fraction of a second to unwind the trades because of the high-powered computers Mr. Narang uses. But as the market plunged, it took about two minutes?an eternity in today's computer-driven market.
Tradebot Systems Inc, a large high-frequency firm based in Kansas City, Mo., was also seeing chaotic action in many of the securities it traded and decided to pull back from the market.

With the high-frequency funds either selling or pulling out of the market, Wall Street brokerage firms pulling back and the NYSE stock exchange temporarily halting trading on some stocks, offers to buy stocks vanished from underneath the market. Normally there can be hundreds of offers to buy the iShares Russell 1000 Growth Index exchange-traded fund, but at 2:46 p.m., there were just four bids north of $14 for a fund that had been trading at $51 minutes earlier, according to data reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

Around 3 p.m., the selling pressure abated. Just as swiftly as the market fell, it recovered ground. One factor behind the swift recovery, traders say, were funds that use computers and formulas to sniff out bargains in the market. These funds swooped in on hundreds of cheap stocks, helping push the market higher.

?Jacob Bunge contributed to this article.
Write to Scott Patterson at scott.patterson@wsj.com and Tom Lauricella at tom.lauricella@wsj.com
 
Re: High Frequency Trading

Some interesting comments to this WSJ article How the 'Flash Crash' Echoed Black Monday

May 6 Selloff Had Parallels to 1987; Electronic Trading Magnified Selling Pressure This Time


5/17/10

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100...WSJ_hps_MIDDLETopStories#articleTabs=comments


"""Free market enthusiasts say that high-frequency trading adds liquidity to the market, but this added liquidity is of little or no value to society for two reasons: 1) during panics, such as the "flash crash," we have seen that this liquidity is immediately shut off, when it is presumably needed the most, and 2) excess liquidity fuels short-term speculation instead of long-term investment, increasing volatility (which high-frequency program trading loves) and therefore increasing the risk/reward ratio even if it doesn't affect corporate performance at all.

Wouldn't it be nice if the SEC actually managed to get ahead of just one market weakness? They need to stop, or at least strongly regulate high-frequency trading now, before they lead to a full-blown meltdown, and the rest of us are stuck saying, again, "we told you so." """

----------------------

"""Chris Georgandellis is right. Everyone is just rushing to the exits. It seems pretty clear by now that our markets have become casinos and when you have people gambling with other peoples money it becomes a wild casino like we have. The day the market dropped 1000 points was just about the only legitimate thing that we have seen in a while. Tons of real money just wanted to sell and there were not many buyers. Thats it. The gamblers are getting scared again and with all the real problems we have and given the miraculous rally over the last 14 months, 1000 point drops may just be an appetizer of whats to come."""

------------------------


"""The WSJ and MSM are doing everything in their power to mollify the public's fear of the bear's return. Software is programmed by humans and humans are prone to emotional responses which are reflected in algorithms. The NYSE may have circuit breakers but it can never stop the onslaught of a bear market. Just follow the credit markets. The ECB bailout is a sign of total desperation. The FDIC is broke and can only go on by borrowing. RE defaults continue at a record pace. The banks have barely started to unload their REO. Muni debt is starting to crack. May 6th was just a primer ... the bear stretching his legs. The Nikkei lost over 80% so far. DOW 2800 anyone? """
 
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