tetano
Editor, Senior Moderator
Med Law Rev. 2017 Jan 23. pii: fww047. doi: 10.1093/medlaw/fww047. [Epub ahead of print]
[h=1]Influenza Virus Research and EU Export Regulations: Publication, Proliferation, and Pandemic Risks.[/h] Enemark C[SUP]1[/SUP].
[h=3]Author information[/h]
[h=3]Abstract[/h] An influenza pandemic would be a global health emergency, and laboratory-based research on influenza viruses is an important component of worldwide efforts to prevent and prepare for this. There are concerns, however, that publishing the findings of such research might sometimes increase the risk of a pandemic caused by a laboratory accident or the deliberate release of a deadly virus. This article addresses the challenge of governing scientific information sharing, with regard to public health benefits and risks, from an export-control perspective. The discussion focuses on research findings produced in 2011 by a team of influenza virologists in the Netherlands, and on the Dutch Government's unprecedented decision to regard the intended publication of these findings as being subject to European Union regulations on the export of 'dual-use' items. I argue that, when a government is uncertain about whether the benefits of publishing particular research findings in a scientific journal outweigh the risks, a process of selectively disseminating those findings should be available as an alternative to official censorship.
? The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press; all rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.
[h=4]KEYWORDS:[/h] Bioterrorism; Dual-use dilemma; European Union; Export controls; Pandemic influenza; Research
PMID: 28119338 DOI: 10.1093/medlaw/fww047
[PubMed - as supplied by publisher]
[h=1]Influenza Virus Research and EU Export Regulations: Publication, Proliferation, and Pandemic Risks.[/h] Enemark C[SUP]1[/SUP].
[h=3]Author information[/h]
[h=3]Abstract[/h] An influenza pandemic would be a global health emergency, and laboratory-based research on influenza viruses is an important component of worldwide efforts to prevent and prepare for this. There are concerns, however, that publishing the findings of such research might sometimes increase the risk of a pandemic caused by a laboratory accident or the deliberate release of a deadly virus. This article addresses the challenge of governing scientific information sharing, with regard to public health benefits and risks, from an export-control perspective. The discussion focuses on research findings produced in 2011 by a team of influenza virologists in the Netherlands, and on the Dutch Government's unprecedented decision to regard the intended publication of these findings as being subject to European Union regulations on the export of 'dual-use' items. I argue that, when a government is uncertain about whether the benefits of publishing particular research findings in a scientific journal outweigh the risks, a process of selectively disseminating those findings should be available as an alternative to official censorship.
? The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press; all rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.
[h=4]KEYWORDS:[/h] Bioterrorism; Dual-use dilemma; European Union; Export controls; Pandemic influenza; Research
PMID: 28119338 DOI: 10.1093/medlaw/fww047
[PubMed - as supplied by publisher]