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J Clin Virol . Opportunities and challenges for the U.S. laboratory response to highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1)

tetano

Editor, Senior Moderator
J Clin Virol


. 2024 Aug 26:174:105723.
doi: 10.1016/j.jcv.2024.105723. Online ahead of print. Opportunities and challenges for the U.S. laboratory response to highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1)

Benjamin A Pinsky[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Benjamin T Bradley[SUP] 2 [/SUP]



Affiliations
Abstract

On March 25, 2024 an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A H5N1 was identified in dairy cows across multiple farms in the United States. Zoonotic cases originating in individuals with close contact to infected herds and poultry flocks have been subsequently identified. Spillover events such as this raise the specter of recent pandemics including COVID-19 and Mpox and may lead clinical laboratories to assess their capacity for diagnosis of HPAI H5N1. In this review, we detail the origins of the H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b outbreak as well as the existing capacity to identify HPAI H5N1 as influenza A virus by commercially available assays. Furthermore, we highlight the absence of commercially available influenza A H5 subtyping assays and limitations associated with the current 510(k)-cleared assay. This outbreak also serves as an early opportunity to assess the new and unknown regulatory challenges faced by laboratory-developed tests in light of the FDA's final rule on in vitro diagnostic devices. National agencies along with public health and clinical laboratories all serve an essential role in the response to HPAI H5N1. To most effectively utilize each group's strength requires open communication and willingness to embrace novel approaches.

Keywords: Bird flu; H5; H5N1; Highly pathogenic avian influenza; Influenza A.

 
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