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New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

The RSPB said it was "exceedingly unlikely" that
wild birds would be implicated in the new outbreak

On the other hand they are probably correct. Wild birds are unlikely to be implicated by any form of direct proof. For that you would need a sample from the source. If the source turns out to be commercial poultry then there is a good chance it will be traced back one step. If the source was a wild bird then it will never be found - no smoking gun. Net result no confirmed wild bird infections. Not at all the same thing as no infections from wild birds.
 
Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

The RSPB said it was "exceedingly unlikely" that
wild birds would be implicated in the new outbreak
What did they say about H5N1 at the swannery? The sequence data clearly indicated the swans were infected by multiple introductions by wild birds.

The current H7 infection was in free range hens.

The credibility of the RSPB is ZERO (at best).
 
Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

Obvious. There are veterinarians not medics, although strict collaboration is established. We are one of the greatest poultry producers in EU and without proper surveillance no one chicken survived to continuing avian influenza exposure.

The point is: epizootics by H7 strains are more common that usually stated by the media sources.

There is an ongoing circulation of these viruses among poultry and wild birds and thus epizootics recurrence isn't a news at all.

Human exposure isnt' an exception event but perhaps is common.

One should emphasize this to put in the correct perspective the acutal events.
Although epizootic infections may be more common, so are human infections/ The H7 assay is abysmal.
 
Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

From the RSPB:
Given that at this time of year, wildfowl are largely absent from the area, it is highly unlikely that wild birds are connected to the outbreak.
 
Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

Life is filled with patterns.

Since I'm not familiar with the people, birds, lifestyles or business practices in Oxfordshire, I wouldn't rule out causes other than migratory birds.

If the birds aren't there now, then it's possible they weren't there last year at the almost exactly same time, nor the year before.

I suppose it is possible there were some late-comers; or the occasional one passing over shed virus.

I think it's a mistake to be so focused on one issue that others are over-looked.
 
Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

Given that at this time of year, wildfowl are largely absent from the area, it is highly unlikely that wild birds are connected to the outbreak.

This is a strange statement. I come from Oxfordshire and my mother still lives there. She is an RSPB member and avid bird watcher and I can assure you there are plenty of wild fowl year round. We lived near Henley-on-Thames and there are no shortage of ducks, geese and swans on the Thames. The link has a photo of the bridge at Henley taken at about this time of year. Try and count the waterfowl.
 
Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

Life is filled with patterns.

Since I'm not familiar with the people, birds, lifestyles or business practices in Oxfordshire, I wouldn't rule out causes other than migratory birds.

If the birds aren't there now, then it's possible they weren't there last year at the almost exactly same time, nor the year before.

I suppose it is possible there were some late-comers; or the occasional one passing over shed virus.

I think it's a mistake to be so focused on one issue that others are over-looked.
Please. There is ZERO evidence of trade. The outbreak actually began three weeks ago and again the bird watchers really have ZERO credibility on avian influenza.
 
Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

Since they are laying hens, I would imagine they are confined. And since it's a fairly big operation, they should also have biosecurity in place.

As far as trade, here's this quote:
Bird gatherings are banned and all other movements of birds and some products are banned in the whole of the Temporary Control Zone.

I wonder what "products"?

JJackson, since your mother is a member, maybe she can find out why they would make such a statement.

After the recent sequence fiasco, it's hard to know what to believe unless a person has actual knowledge.
 
Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

Since they are laying hens, I would imagine they are confined. And since it's a fairly big operation, they should also have biosecurity in place.

As far as trade, here's this quote:


I wonder what "products"?

JJackson, since your mother is a member, maybe she can find out why they would make such a statement.

After the recent sequence fiasco, it's hard to know what to believe unless a person has actual knowledge.
WRONG. There is a VERY long history on wild birds and the movement of avian infleunza. The bird watchers have a VERY long and consistant record. H7 and H5N1 outbreaks are not new nor are the responses and fairy tales of the bird watchers.
The avian influenza outbreaks (especially with free range poultry) is VERY clear, as were the sequences of H7N2 (or the Qinghai sequences when the bird watchers were claiming trade from ASIA!).
 
Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

Mixin I am normally an RSPB fan, they do a great job in protecting and preserving the habits of our wild birds, particularly those key refuelling spots used by migratory birds. I this instance they seem to think they are protecting birds by stopping them from being blamed for disease outbreaks but this is misguided. I have posted on this before - somewhere - but I think they should be arguing that if the wetlands, and other important habitats, were better protected form encroachment by development then there would be less interactions between waterfowl and domestic poultry or people. This is just nature doing its thing; wild birds are victims just like poultry and humans claiming otherwise is pointless and may be counter productive. On being an RSPB member; she is one of many and will only get referred to the website.
 
Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

Is there any information on testing and testingprocedures in the UK, after the outbreaks of H7? Look and you shall find? Don't look and you shall not find?

Snip from the Dutch report on the study after the H7 outbreak in 2003:

Routine serological tests failed to detect any antibodies, even in the
group of persons with confirmed avian influenza virus conjunctivitis.


A modification of the haemagglutination assay was developed, based on
observations that avian influenza viruses favour binding to red blood cells
from horses rather than turkeys (5).

As at least 50 percent of the people exposed to infected poultry had H7
antibodies detectable with the modified assay
, it was estimated that
avian influenza A/H7N7 virus infection
occurred in at least 1000, and perhaps as many as 2000 people.

The seroprevalence of H7 antibodies in people without contact with infected
poultry, but with close household contact to an infected poultry worker,
was 59 percent. This suggests that the population at risk for avian
influenza was not limited to those with direct contact to infected poultry,
and that person-to-person transmission may have occurred on a large scale.

Specificity of the unconventional assay was confirmed by the absence of
reactivity in sera from 100 controls recently vaccinated with influenza
vaccine (2002/2003) (specificity 100 percent).

Assay specificity was further supported by the results of the cohort study:
having measurable antibodies was associated with having conjunctivitis (RR
1.72; 95 percent CI 0.99-2.99), and a lower proportion of the exposed
persons who took prophylactic antiviral medication developed antibodies
(corrected OR 0.48; 95 percent CI 0.25-0.89).


http://www.promedmail.org/pls/otn/f...,F2400_P1001_USE_ARCHIVE:1001,20050106.0034,Y
 
Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

[See this Italian experience]

Serological Analysis of Serum Samples from Humans Exposed to Avian H7 Influenza Viruses in Italy between 1999 and 2003

Simona Puzelli,1 Livia Di Trani,2 Concetta Fabiani,1 Laura Campitelli,1
Maria Alessandra De Marco,3 Ilaria Capua,4 Jean Francois Aguilera,5
Maria Zambon,5 and Isabella Donatelli1
1Department of Infectious, Parasitic and Immuno-Mediated Diseases
and 2Department of Food and Animal Health, Istituto Superiore di Sanita`,
Rome, 3Istituto Nazionale per la Fauna Selvatica, Ozzano Emilia, Bologna,
and 4Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie, Legnaro, Padova, Italy;
5Centre for Infection, Health Protection Agency, London, United Kingdom
(See the editorial commentary by Hayden and Croisier, on pages XXX?
XX.)

We evaluated the potential for avian-to-human transmission of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) and highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H7N1 and LPAI H7N3 viruses that were responsible for several outbreaks of influenza in poultry in Italy between 1999 and 2003.

A serological survey of poultry workers was conducted by use of a combination of methods.

Evidence of anti-H7 antibodies was observed in 3.8% of serum samples collected from poultry workers during the period in 2003 when LPAI H7N3 virus was circulating.

These findings highlight the need for surveillance in people occupationally exposed to avian influenza viruses, so that they can be monitored for the risk of avian-to-human transmission during outbreaks of avian influenza caused by both LPAI and HPAI viruses.

Birds, particularly those in the order Anseriformes, are the natural reservoir of all influenza A viruses, and this supports the hypothesis that new pandemic strains in humans are of avian origin [1].

The introduction of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) from the wild bird reservoir to domestic poultry may be of concern, because of the increased opportunity for human transmission, either through a process of genetic reassortment between avian and human strains during mixed infections or
by direct transmission from birds to humans.

Indeed, during the past 8 years, infection of humans with AIVs of 3 subtypes (H5, H7, and H9) has been described [1].

In particular, during an outbreak of avian influenza (AI) in poultry farms, highly pathogenic AI (HPAI) H7N7 virus caused 89 human infections and 1 death in The Netherlands in 2003 [2].

Human infections with H7N3 virus were also reported in British Columbia in
2004 [3] and were associated with outbreaks of influenza caused by both low pathogenic AI (LPAI) and HPAI viruses in poultry in the same Canadian regions.

Serological evidence of bird-tohuman transmission of AIVs has been described [1, 4].

Between 1999 and 2003, several outbreaks of influenza caused by LPAI and HPAI H7N1 and by LPAI H7N3 viruses occurred in poultry in regions of northern Italy where the majority of the national commercial poultry is raised [5].

To evaluate the possibility of transmission of AIVs to humans, we performed a serological analysis of serum samples from individuals exposed
to AIVs during outbreaks of AI caused by LPAI and HPAI H7N1 and LPAI H7N3 viruses.

Subjects, materials, and methods.
Between August 1999 and July 2003, a total of 983 serum samples were collected from workers in several categories of labor at different farms located in the Veneto and Lombardy regions of Italy (table 1).

Serum samples were collected as part of either the ongoing public health
measures to evaluate the possibility of bird-to-human transmission of AIVs or a European collaborative study to conduct serosurveillance in poultry workers.

Informed consent was obtained from subjects, and ethical approval was obtained fromlocal ethics committees in Lombardy and Veneto for the retrospective serosurveillance studies.

All subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire for which they noted the type of work they did with poultry and any respiratory tract illnesses they had during the AI epizootics.

For epizootic 4, serum samples were collected 11 year after the last outbreak of AI caused by an H7N1 LPAI virus in Veneto (table 1), because of delays in obtaining ethical approval and permission for the data and serum sample collection.

Serum samples were collected at least 15 days after the onset of each epizootic and were stored at 20C until tested for antibodies against H7N1 (A/Ty/It/2676/99 and A/Ty/It/3889/99) or H7N3 A/Ty/It/214845/02) virus.

H7 viruses selected for testing were egg-grown LPAI viruses that were antigenically representative of viruses circulating at the relevant farms during the period in question.

Serum samples were assayed using several different serological techniques. Each serum sample was tested by hemagglutination inhibition (HI) and microneutralization (MN) assays [6, 7].

If a serum sample was considered to be positive for either test, Western blot (WB) analysis by use of purified egggrown H7 virus and/or baculovirus-expressed H7 hemagglutinin (HA) was performed.

Each serum sample was tested at least twice in separate MN assays that were performed in duplicate with a starting dilution of 1:10, in accordance with methods described elsewhere [6], and serum samples that repeatedly had titers 120 were considered to be reactive in the MN assays.

All MN assays were performed with MDCK cells derived from the European Cell Culture Collection lineage.

The HI test was performed with live viruses and horse red blood cells (HRBCs), in accordance with procedures described elsewhere [7]. A titer of 10 was considered to be a positive result in the HI assays. The single radial hemolysis (SRH) assay was performed using turkey erythrocytes sensitized with A/Ty/It/2676/99 antigen, as described elsewhere [8].

Positive and negative control serum samples were included for each batch of plates in each assay, and serum samples were tested in parallel with control plates, which were prepared with all components except virus.

Serum samples were considered to be positive only if they had reactive zones with diameters 13.5 mm. Antiserum from immunized animals (goat, ferret, sheep, chicken, rabbit, and turkey) were used as positive controls in the HI, MN, and SRH assays, and monoclonal antibody 2E6G7 specific for H7 HA was also used in the WB analysis.

In the WB analysis, samples containing 150 mg of viral protein were heated in SDS sample-reducing buffer at 70C for 10 min and were loaded into each well of an SDS-PAGE system (4%?12% Bis-Tris gel, NuPage Novex, in MOPS running buffer and the XCell SureLock Mini-Cell system; all from Invitrogen).

After electrophoresis, the gels were blotted onto precut Hybond ECLNitrocellulose membranes (Amersham Life Sciences) by use of the XCell II Blot Module (Invitrogen), in accordance with the manufacturers? instructions. The blots were incubated with either subjects? serum samples at a dilution of 1:200 or monoclonal antibody at a dilution of 1:10, and then they were incubated with horseradish peroxidase?conjugated anti-species antibody at a dilution of 1:2000, and antigen-antibody binding was detected with the ECL fluorescence system (Amersham Life Sciences).

Results.
Serum samples were tested against H7N1 and H7N3 viruses (table 1). When tested by MN, HI, and SRH assays, all 798 serum samples collected between 1999 and 2002 from epizootics 1?4, which involved H7N1 viruses, showed no evidence of antibody to H7N1 virus.

H7N3 viruses were not circulating during this time period. When tested by MN and HI assays, serum samples collected after epizootic 4, which involved H7N1 virus, showed no evidence of antibody to H7N1 or H7N3 virus.

A total of 185 serum samples collected during epizootics 5 and 6, which involved H7N3 virus, were also tested against H7N1 and H7N3 viruses by MN and HI assays. Seven serum samples (3.8%) were clearly reactive as assessed by MN assays to both viruses, with higher titers to H7N3, and 4 of 7 serum samples were reactive as assessed by HI assays, with higher titers to H7N3. When these 7 serum samples were tested in WB analysis
against purified H7N1, H7N3, and baculovirus-expressed HA from H7N1 A/Ty/It/3889/99 or H7N3 A/Ty/It/214845/02, all 7 also showed clear reactivity to H7 HA, in contrast to serum samples that did not show any reactivity by HI and MN assays (figure 1).

We therefore concluded that these subjects showed unequivocal serological evidence of exposure to or infection with H7 viruses.

Questionnaire data for the seropositive subjects indicated that 3 were male and 3 were female, and all were 35?62 years old. No questionnaire data were available for 1 of these 7 seropositive subjects.

The seropositive subjects came from different farms in a single province of Brescia (Lombardy) or in a single province of Verona (Veneto). All of the seropositive subjects had close direct physical contact with either turkeys or chickens in poultry housing, which was described as being a dusty environment.

Only 1 had clinical symptoms of conjunctivitis at the time of the AI epizootics. Six of the seronegative subjects reported a history of conjunctivitis but did not show any serological reactivity to H7 HA. None of the 7 seropositive subjects reported a history of influenzalike illness (ILI) during the AI epizootics, although 14 seronegative subjects reported ILI symptoms. No data were collected regarding sickness due to any other cause during the AI epizootics.

Discussion.
Beginning in March 1999, an LPAI H7N1 virus circulated mainly in Veneto and Lombardy; from the end of 1999 to April 2000, an HPAI H7N1 virus, which evolved from the LPAI virus by mutation, circulated and was responsible for devastating outbreaks of influenza in Italian poultry [5].

Two additional epizootics caused by LPAI H7N1 viruses occurred in turkey flocks, between August 2000 and March 2001, in Veneto [9]. In October 2002, an LPAI H7N3 virus spread rapidly in farms rearing turkeys and chickens in the same regions that were devastated by the previous epizootics caused by H7N1 viruses, and it circulated until September 2003 [9, 10]. Previous studies showed that the H7N1 and H7N3 viruses were clearly distinguishable at the antigenic and molecular levels [11].

After these epizootics, a seroepidemiological investigation was conducted to determine the risk of transmission of AIVs to humans who had been in contact with the birds in the affected regions. Because of the insensitivity of the classic HI assay, we analyzed serum samples by use of a combination of serologic assays: the MN assay, which is recommended for the detection of specific antibodies against AIVs in human serum samples [6], and a modified HI assay performed with HRBCs, which has been shown to increase the sensitivity of the traditional HI assay using AIVs, because of sialic acid receptors present on the surface of the HRBCs [7].

A confirmatory H7- specific WB analysis was also performed.

Of 185 serum samples collected in 2003 during the epizootic caused by an LPAI H7N3 virus, 7 were found to be clearly and concordantly reactive, showing evidence of infection with or exposure to H7 viruses, because all serum samples reacted in MN assays to both H7N3 and H7N1 viruses, with higher titers to H7N3, which is consistent with exposure to H7N3 and crossreaction to the antigenically related H7N1. All of the seropositive
subjects had close direct physical contact with either turkeys or chickens in poultry housing, which was described as being a dusty environment. Of the seropositive subjects, only 1 had a clinical history of conjunctivitis at the time of the AI epizootics.

However, no seroreactivity was found in subjects exposed to the H7N1 viruses circulating in 1999?2001. It is possible that the risk of transmission to humans could be different between H7N1 and H7N3 virus subtypes and may be related, at least in part, to the neuraminidase (NA) of these viruses. As a consequence of H1N1 circulating during the last 30 years, most humans possess antibodies against N1 NA, and these antibodies
may have provided some protection during the outbreaks of AI caused by H7N1 viruses, although the human deaths caused by infection with H5N1 virus in Asia in 2004 do not fully support this hypothesis [12].

Because the genetic determinants responsible for bird-to-human transmission are still undetermined, the ability of different strains to infect humans is not understood, and genetic differences between the 2 virus groups may be important.

In this regard, the H7N1 viruses show several amino acid changes in the HA and the internal protein genes, compared with the sequences in both Italian H7N3 and Dutch H7N7viruses (L.C., unpublished data).

To our knowledge, this is the first serological evidence of transmission
of LPAI viruses to humans during an epizootic in domestic poultry. So far, reports of human infection with AIVs have been linked to outbreaks of AI caused by HPAI viruses in The Netherlands, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Hong Kong, and Canada.

The seropositivity rate in the 185 serum samples collected from workers exposed to AIVs during the outbreak of AI caused by H7N3 virus in Italy in 2003 was 3.8%. This result is consistent with that in a retrospective cohort study conducted in poultry workers during the AI outbreaks caused by H5N1 viruses in Hong Kong in 1997 [13].

A serosurvey conducted by Meijer et al. [14] using modified HI assays to detect anti-H7 antibody in poultry workers exposed to AIVs during the epizootic caused by H7N7 virus in The Netherlands in 2003 found that approximately half of the individuals exposed to poultry and the household contacts of infected persons had anti-H7 antibodies. It should be emphasized that the present study likely underestimates the real seroconversion rate in exposed individuals, because serum samples
were considered to be positive for antibodies to H7 viruses only if they repeatedly gave unequivocally positive results by use of at least 2 different serological techniques, including the MN assay.

Furthermore, the delay between the onset of some of the epizootics (e.g., epizootic 4) and the collection of the serum samples might have significantly reduced the chance of detecting antibodies to H7 viruses.
In conclusion, the serologic evidence for infections in poultry workers reported here further demonstrates the potential of AIVs to infect humans and suggests that permanent serosurveillance studies both in animals and in humans should be implemented to gain more knowledge about the crossing of the species barrier, which appears to be a means of generating
a virus with pandemic potential. Although all the individuals who were found to be seropositive in this study were exposed only to LPAI viruses, our findings highlight the risk of the emergence of a potentially pandemic strain, as a result of reassortment of avian and contemporaneously circulating human strains during outbreaks of AI caused by LPAI viruses, and emphasize the importance of strengthening specific surveillance
systems not only during outbreaks of AI caused by HPAI viruses
but also when LPAI viruses are circulating.
(...)
-
http://www.izsvenezie.it/dnn/Portals/0/AI/H7_serology_Italy.pdf
------
 

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Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

Source: http://www.newscientist.com/blog/sh...d-flu-maybe.html?DCMP=ILC-rhts&nsref=ts13_bar
Wednesday, June 04, 2008

UK gets the safe kind of bird flu - maybe

Bird flu has again broken out in England. In the last scare, wild swans on the south coast died of H5N1 , the virus that has swept across Eurasia and, to date, killed 241 people.

This time it's a chicken farm in bucolic Oxfordshire - but it's not that bird flu.

It's H7, a not-uncommon variety: it has been found three times before in Britain, and by sheer coincidence, an H7 outbreak in a giant henhouse in the US hit the global newswires at the same time. Today we learned that the British outbreak is of a "highly-pathogenic" H7 - but that just means it's undergone a common mutation that makes it extra-lethal to chickens. Virologists tell me they don't know that it makes any difference to its effect in people.

But Defra, the British ministry charged with handling these things, has been a little over-zealous in reassuring the public. There's nothing to fear from H7, it says:

Whilst it can pass very rarely and with difficulty to humans, this requires extremely close contact with infected birds, particularly faeces.



Not quite. A massive outbreak of highly-pathogenic H7 ripped through Dutch poultry in 2003. Dutch researchers later discovered that "of 419 people who worked with sick chickens, 212, more than half, had antibodies to the virus."

Not so hard to catch, then - but it still requires exposure to sick chickens, right? Nope. "Of 62 people who had contact with chicken workers, but not chickens, 33 had antibodies to H7N7."

Of course, antibodies just show you were infected. Does H7 make you sick? A dozen people at the centre of an H7 outbreak in poultry in Wales last year developed flu symptoms, and people near an outbreak in Canada in 2004 developed mild eye infections, as did many of the infected Dutch. Most seriously, one Dutch vet actually died of pneumonia caused by the virus.

Still, H7 is no H5N1, with its death rate of nearly two-thirds, even if it isn't as safe as Defra wants us to think. But what is creepy is that H7 is acquiring a liking for people.

Flu viruses bind to a sugar on respiratory tract cells called sialic acid, which comes in several shapes. Last week US scientists reported that H7 viruses from recent poultry outbreaks in North America are starting to bind the human form of sialic acid , and losing their ability to bind the bird form. Even worse, an H7 was even isolated from a man with the flu in New York in 2003 and it bound most effectively to the human form.

This is just what all the known human flu strains did when they crossed to us from birds, most notoriously the virus that caused the murderous 1918 pandemic . Worse, the researchers found that these H7 viruses spread readily among test animals.

Recent H7 viruses also seem to be moving from causing mild eye infections to the classic flu we know and loathe. It's a pity last week's study didn't include the flu-causing H7 from last year in Wales.

H5N1 has scientists scared because it can be lethal in humans - if it also learns to spread between us , it's bad news. Now it seems H7 is learning this trick. What if it also learns to be lethal?

It wouldn't be the first virus to discover an evolutionary advantage in harming human health. Some scientists I know are as worried about H7 as they are about H5.

Despite its apparently relaxed view of the risks, Defra should clamp down fast on this latest outbreak. If nothing else, the Dutch H7 outbreak in 2003 was ruinous for farmers, who had to destroy 31 million birds.

With newly importedbluetongue poised to explode among Britain's sheep, the nation's farmers don't need another plague, never mind one developing a taste for humans.

Debora MacKenzie, Brussels correspondent
 
Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

Wow.
Debora MacKenzie's article above is a refreshing change of pace. Congrats New Scientist it is just a shame it will not have the same readership as some of the less good MSM post earlier in this thread.
 
Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

[OIE] Highly pathogenic avian influenza, United Kingdom [http://www.oie.int/wahid-prod/public.php?page=single_report&pop=1&reportid=7095]

Information received on 05/06/2008 from Dr Nigel Gibbens, Chief Veterinary Officer, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, LONDON, United Kingdom

§ Summary
Report type Immediate notification
Start date 22/05/2008
Date of first confirmation of the event 04/06/2008
Report date 05/06/2008
Date submitted to OIE 05/06/2008
Reason for notification New strain of a listed disease
Causal agent Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus Serotype H7N7
Nature of diagnosis Laboratory (advanced)
This event pertains to the whole country

§ New outbreaks
Summary of outbreaks Total outbreaks: 1

Outbreak Location and Affected population: ENGLAND (Shenington, Oxfordshire) : Laying flock of Gallus Gallus.

Total animals affected: Species - Susceptible - Cases - Deaths - Destroyed - Slaughtered
* Birds - 25000 - 15000 - 10000 - 15000

§ Outbreak statistics
Species - Apparent morbidity rate - Apparent mortality rate - Apparent case fatality rate - Proportion susceptible animals lost*
* Birds - 60.00% - 40.00% - 66.67% - **
* Removed from the susceptible population through death, destruction and/or slaughter
** not_calc_miss_info

§ Epidemiology
Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection Unknown or inconclusive

§ Epidemiological comments
First noted two weeks ago with mild clinical disease.
Marked clinical disease in two sheds was then observed on 31 May 2008.
Epidemiological investigation is in progress.

§ Control measures
Measures applied Stamping out
Movement control inside the country
Screening
Zoning
Disinfection of infected premises/establishment(s)
Vaccination prohibited
No treatment of affected animals

Measures to be applied No other measures

§ Diagnostic test results
Laboratory name and type VLA Weybridge (OIE’s Reference Laboratory)
Tests and results: Species - Test - Test date - Result
* Birds - haemagglutination inhibition test (HIT) - 05/06/2008 - Positive
* Birds - neuraminidase inhibition assay - 05/06/2008 - Positive
* Birds - real-time PCR - 05/06/2008 - Positive
* Birds - virus isolation - 05/06/2008 - Positive
* Birds - virus sequencing - 05/06/2008 - Positive

§ Future Reporting
The event is continuing. Weekly follow-up reports will be submitted.

[SPANISH AND FRENCH PORTION]
Influenza aviar altamente patógena, Reino Unido
Información recibida el 05/06/2008 desde Dr Nigel Gibbens, Chief Veterinary Officer, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, LONDON, Reino Unido
Resumen
Tipo de informe Notificación inmediata
Fecha de inicio 22/05/2008
Fecha de la primera confirmación del evento 04/06/2008
Fecha del informe 05/06/2008
Fecha de envio del informe a la OIE 05/06/2008
Motivo de la notificación Nueva cepa de un agente patógeno de la Lista de la OIE
Agente causal Virus de la influenza aviar altamente patógena
Serotipo H7N7
Naturaleza del diagnóstico Pruebas de diagnóstico de laboratorio avanzadas (ej. virología, microscopía electrónica, biología molecular e inmunología)
Este evento concierne todo el país
Nuevos focosResumen de los focos Número total de focos: 1
Localización del foco and Población afectada ENGLAND (Shenington, Oxfordshire) : gallinas ponedoras (Gallus Gallus)

Número total de animales afectados Especies Susceptibles Casos Muertos Destruidos Sacrificados
Aves 25000 15000 10000 15000

Estadística del foco Especies Tasa de morbilidad aparente Tasa de mortalidad aparente Tasa de fatalidad aparente Proporción de animales susceptibles perdidos*
Aves 60.00% 40.00% 66.67% **
* Descontados de la población susceptible a raíz de su muerte, destrucción o sacrificio
** not_calc_miss_info

EpidemiologíaFuente del o de los focos u origen de la infección Desconocida o no concluyente

Otros detalles epidemiológicos / comentarios Hace dos semanas se observaron por primera vez signos clínicos leves. El 31 de mayo de 2008, se observaron signos clínicos marcados en dos gallineros. Se está llevando a cabo un estudio epidemiológico.

Medidas de ControlMedidas implementadas Sacrificio sanitario
Restricción de los movimientos en el interior del país
Tamizaje
Zonificación
Desinfección de áreas infectadas
Vacunación prohibida
Ningún tratamiento de los animales afectados

Medidas para implementar Ninguna otra medida


Resultados de las pruebas diagnósticasNombre y tipo de laboratorio VLA Weybridge (Laboratorio de referencia de la OIE)
Pruebas y resultados Especies Prueba Fecha de la prueba Resultados
Aves aislamiento viral 05/06/2008 Positivo
Aves PCR en tiempo real 05/06/2008 Positivo
Aves prueba de inhibición de la hemoaglutinación 05/06/2008 Positivo
Aves prueba de inhibición de la neuroaminidasa 05/06/2008 Positivo
Aves secuenciación viral 05/06/2008 Positivo


Informes futurosEl episodio continúa. Informes de seguimiento semanales serán enviados


Influenza aviaire hautement pathogène, Royaume-Uni
Information reçue le 05/06/2008 de Dr Nigel Gibbens, Chief Veterinary Officer, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, LONDON, Royaume-Uni
Résumé
Type de rapport Notification immédiate
Date de début 22/05/2008
Date de première confirmation de l´événement 04/06/2008
Date du rapport 05/06/2008
Date d'envoi à l'OIE 05/06/2008
Raison de notification Nouvelle souche d’une maladie appartenant à la liste de l'OIE
Agent causal Virus de l'influenza aviaire hautement pathogène
Sérotype H7N7
Nature du diagnostic Tests approfondis en laboratoire (i.e. virologie, microscopie électronique, biologie moléculaire, immunologie)
Cet événement se rapporte à tout le pays
Nouveaux foyersRécapitulatif des foyers Nombre total de foyers : 1
Localisation du foyer and Population atteinte ENGLAND (Shenington, Oxfordshire) : élevage de poules pondeuses (Gallus Gallus)

Nombre total d'animaux atteints Espèce(s) Sensibles Cas Morts Détruits Abattus
Oiseaux 25000 15000 10000 15000

Statistiques sur le foyer Espèce(s) Taux de morbidité apparent Taux de mortalité apparent Taux de fatalité apparent Proportion d'animaux sensibles perdus*
Oiseaux 60.00% 40.00% 66.67% **
* Soustraits de la population sensible suite à la mort, à l´abattage et/ou à la destruction
** not_calc_miss_info

EpidémiologieSource du/des foyer(s) ou origine de l´infection Inconnue ou incertaine

Autres renseignements épidémiologiques / Commentaires Des signes cliniques légers avaient été observés pour la première fois il y a deux semaines. Le 31 mai 2008, des signes cliniques marqués ont été observés dans deux poulaillers. Une enquête épidémiologique est en cours.

Mesures de lutteMesure de lutte appliquées Abattage sanitaire
Restriction des déplacements à l'intérieur du pays
Dépistage
Zonage
Désinfection des établissements infectés
Vaccination interdite
Aucun traitement des animaux atteints

Mesures à appliquer Aucune autre mesure


Résultats des tests de diagnosticsNom du laboratoire et type VLA Weybridge (Laboratoire de référence de l’OIE)
Tests et résultats Espèce(s) Test Date du test Résultat
Oiseaux épreuve d'inhibition de la neuraminidase 05/06/2008 Positif
Oiseaux épreuve d'inhibition de l'hémagglutination 05/06/2008 Positif
Oiseaux isolement viral 05/06/2008 Positif
Oiseaux PCR en temps réel 05/06/2008 Positif
Oiseaux séquençage viral 05/06/2008 Positif


Rapports futursCet événement se poursuit. Des rapports de suivi hebdomadaires devront être envoyés.


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Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

INFORMATION BULLETIN - Ref: 178/08
Date: 5 June 2008
Nobel House, 17 Smith Square, London SW1P 3JR
Out of hours telephone 020 7270 8960

AI outbreak in Oxfordshire: Update

Chief Veterinary Officer Nigel Gibbens has today confirmed that the strain of Avian Influenza found on the premises near Banbury in Oxfordshire is highly pathogenic H7N7.

Preliminary analysis also indicates that this H7N7 strain is likely to be related to viruses which have occasionally been detected in domestic poultry and wild birds elsewhere in Europe.

Further laboratory tests are in progress.

The full epidemiological investigation and tracings of any dangerous contacts are underway and all possible sources of the outbreak will be investigated.

The Health Protection Agency has confirmed that the risk to public health remains low.

Following confirmation of the virus subtype as H7N7, the Agency has reviewed current procedures based on the best evidence available.

They remain confident that all necessary steps are being taken to protect those people who may have been exposed to the virus on the premises or involved in disease control activities.

Protection and Surveillance Zones have replaced the Temporary Control Zone established on 3 June around the premises in Oxfordshire.

The restrictions that applied in the Temporary Control Zone remain in place.

Further information on the animal health aspects of avian influenza and current restrictions is available on the Defra website www.defra.gov.uk.

Farmers are urged to be vigilant and report signs of disease to a private vet or local Animal Health.

Information on public health aspects is available at www.hpa.org.uk

Notes to editors
All Avian Influenza viruses are categorised according to the ability to cause severe disease (pathogenicity) in avian species as either highly pathogenic viruses or low pathogenic.
Viruses consist of proteins. Avian Influenza viruses are classified using the H and N proteins. There are 16 different H proteins and 9 N proteins and any combination of these is possible. The H5 and H7s are considered to be the most important from the Animal Health perspective .
-
http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/2008/080605c.htm
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Re: New case of H7 bird flu in Oxfordshire

Oxfordshire avian flu strain related to European viruses

News | 5 June, 2008
By Alistair Driver
THE strain of avian flu found on an Oxfordshire farm this week is likely to be related to viruses that have been detected elsewhere in Europe, Defra said today (Thursday, June 5).

Chief veterinary officer Nigel Gibbens has confirmed that the strain of avian flu found on the 20,000-bird laying unit at Shenington, near Banbury, is highly pathogenic H7N7.
He said this strain had been found occasionally in domestic poultry and wild birds elsewhere in Europe. Further laboratory tests are in progress.
A full epidemiological investigation and tracings of any dangerous contacts are underway and all possible sources of the outbreak will be investigated, Defra said.
Protection and Surveillance Zones have now replaced the Temporary Control Zone established around the infected premises on June 3.
The restrictions that applied in the Temporary Control Zone remain in place. These include: ? The housing or otherwise isolation from contact with wild birds in the Protection Zone.


? All bird gatherings in the PZ and SZ are banned.
? Other movements of birds and some products are also banned in those Zones.
More detailed information on the restrictions that apply can be found on the Defra website (see the link below).
Farmers are urged to be vigilant and report signs of disease to a private vet or local Animal Health.
The Health Protection Agency has confirmed that the risk to public health remains low. Following confirmation of the virus subtype as H7N7, the agency has reviewed current procedures based on the best evidence available. It said it remained confident that all necessary steps were being taken to protect those people who may have been exposed to the virus on the premises or involved in disease control activities.

http://www.farmersguardian.com/story.asp?sectioncode=1&storycode=19117&c=1
 
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