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Occup Med (Lond) . An outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 in a public-facing office in England

tetano

Editor, Senior Moderator
Occup Med (Lond)


. 2023 Dec 11:kqad100.
doi: 10.1093/occmed/kqad100. Online ahead of print. An outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 in a public-facing office in England

G Nicholls[SUP] 1 [/SUP], B Atkinson[SUP] 2 [/SUP], K van Veldhoven[SUP] 3 [/SUP], I Nicholls[SUP] 2 [/SUP], M Coldwell[SUP] 1 [/SUP], A Clarke[SUP] 1 [/SUP], C J Atchison[SUP] 4 [/SUP], A I Raja[SUP] 5 [/SUP], A M Bennett[SUP] 2 [/SUP], D Morgan[SUP] 1 [/SUP], N Pearce[SUP] 6 [/SUP], T Fletcher[SUP] 7 [/SUP], E B Brickley[SUP] 5 [/SUP], Y Chen[SUP] 1 [/SUP]



Affiliations
Abstract

Background: An outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) with an attack rate of 55% (22/40 workers) occurred at a public-facing office in England from August to September 2021. Published evidence regarding outbreaks in office workplaces remains limited.
Aims: To describe an investigation of workplace- and worker-related risk factors following an outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 in a public-facing office.
Methods: The COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019) Outbreak Investigation to Understand Transmission (COVID-OUT) study undertook an investigation of the outbreak. This included surface sampling, occupational environmental assessment, molecular and serological testing of workers, and detailed questionnaires.
Results: Despite existing COVID-19 control measures, surface sampling conducted during a self-imposed 2-week temporary office closure identified viral contamination (10/60 samples, 17% positive), particularly in a small, shared security office (6/9, 67% positive) and on a window handle in one open-plan office. Targeted enhanced cleaning was, therefore, undertaken before the office reopened. Repeat surface sampling after this identified only one positive (2%) sample. Ventilation was deemed adequate using carbon dioxide monitoring (typically ≤1000 ppm). Twelve workers (30%) responded to the COVID-OUT questionnaire, and all had been vaccinated with two doses. One-third of respondents (4/12) reported direct physical or close contact with members of the public; of these, 75% (3/4) reported a divider/screen between themselves and members of the public.
Conclusions: The results highlight the potential utility of surface sampling to identify SARS-CoV-2 control deficiencies and the importance of evolving, site-specific risk assessments with layered COVID-19 mitigation strategies.


 
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